ALBINO SARMIENTO, PETITIONER, VS. IGNACIO VILLAMOR, JUDGE OF FIRST INSTANCE, ET AL., RESPONDENTS.

Sarmiento versus Villamor

The Case

This is an original action for a writ of certiorari brought by Albino Sarmiento against Judge Ignacio Villamor of the Court of First Instance of the Province of La Laguna. Sarmiento had bought personal property at a public execution sale, and the judge later set aside that sale and ordered the property returned to the judgment debtor, without giving Sarmiento any hearing. The case matters because it fixes a rule every reviewee must carry: a purchaser at an execution sale acquires the debtor's rights in the property, and the court cannot strip him of those rights without due process of law.

Procedural History

Cornelia Ponteris sued Agaton Argente and Leon Argente for a sum of money in the Court of First Instance of the Province of La Laguna. The defendants demurred, the demurrer was overruled, and they answered. When the case was called for trial and the plaintiff failed to appear, the trial judge dismissed the action and rendered judgment for the defendants for the costs. The costs were assessed, execution issued against the plaintiff, and certain personal property of hers was attached and sold to Albino Sarmiento. Ponteris then moved in the same trial court to set aside the judgment by default and for a new trial. Judge Villamor granted the motion, set aside the writ of execution and the sale, and ordered the sheriff to return the property to Ponteris. When Sarmiento refused to surrender it until paid for repairs he had made, the judge issued a further order directing the return of the property, reserving to Sarmiento only the right to recover the amount he had paid. Sarmiento went directly to the Supreme Court by petition for certiorari, asking that the record be sent up to determine whether the lower court had exceeded its jurisdiction.

Facts

Ponteris commenced her action against the Argente defendants in December 1905. The defendants appeared, demurred, were ordered to answer, and did so. The cause was set for hearing, and later, with the consent of all the parties, reset for trial on the sixteenth of October 1906. On that day the plaintiff did not appear, and the judge dismissed the cause and rendered judgment for the defendants for the costs.

The costs were assessed at twenty eight pesos and seventy centavos. Execution issued against the plaintiff, and under the writ the sheriff attached personal property belonging to her and sold it to Albino Sarmiento on the tenth of December 1906.

In January 1907 Ponteris moved to set aside the judgment by default and for a new trial. The judge granted the motion, set aside the execution and the sale, and ordered the property returned to her. Sarmiento refused to comply until he was paid for expenses he had incurred in repairing the property he had bought. The judge then issued a further order that Sarmiento return the property, reserving to him the right to recover the amount he had paid for it. Sarmiento brought this petition for certiorari.

Issues

• Whether or not the judge had authority under the law to set aside the sale of the personal property made under the execution and order its return, without giving the purchaser a hearing and the right to defend the property rights he had acquired by virtue of the execution.

Applicable Provisions

Section 461 of the Code of Procedure in Civil Actions provides:

When the purchaser of any personal property, capable of manual delivery, pays the purchase money, the officer making the sale must deliver to the purchaser the property and, if desired, execute and deliver to him a certificate of sale. Such sale conveys to the purchaser all the right which the debtor had in such property on the day the execution or attachment was levied.

This provision is the source of the purchaser's title, and it measures exactly what he takes: all the right the debtor had on the day of the levy.

Ruling

The Court resolved the sole issue against the judge. It noted that under execution sales the purchaser of personal property acquires all of the rights which the execution debtor had in the property on the day the execution or attachment was levied. No claim was made that the property sold was not the property of Cornelia Ponteris. The Court held that the title to the property passed to Albino Sarmiento absolutely on the tenth of December 1906, and that he could not be deprived of it except by due process of law. The judge had no authority, after the sale of the property under the execution, granting that the same was made in accordance with law, to set aside the sale and order a return of the property. The order of the twenty second of January 1907 was therefore declared null and void.

Doctrine

A purchaser at an execution sale of personal property acquires all the right which the debtor had in the property on the day the execution or attachment was levied, as Section 461 of the Code of Procedure in Civil Actions declares. Once the purchase money is paid and the property delivered, title vests in the purchaser, and he cannot be deprived of it except by due process of law. The trial court has no authority, after the sale, to set the sale aside and order the return of the property without giving the purchaser a hearing and the right to defend the rights he acquired. The remedy of a party who believes the sale was wrongful is not a summary order of return, but a proceeding that respects the purchaser's day in court.

Disposition

Sarmiento prevailed: the Supreme Court declared the judge's order of the twenty second of January 1907 null and void, with costs against the respondents.

Remember This

Memorize the line that the execution purchaser takes all the right the debtor had on the day of the levy, and that he cannot be deprived of it except by due process of law. Examiners use this case to test execution sales and the limits of a judge's authority to undo a completed sale without hearing the purchaser.