IGNACIO P. PAGUNTALAN, PETITIONER, VS. THE DIRECTOR OF PRISONS, RESPONDENT.

This petition for the writ of habeas corpus was filed by prisoner Ignacio P.
Paguntalan praying that after proper proceedings the Director of Prisons be
ordered to set him at liberty immediately, on the ground that he is being
illegally detained.

The illegality of his detention consists, according to the petitioner, in
that he is not an habitual criminal, according to the definition given in
article 62, paragraph 5, of the Revised Penal Code and to the doctrine laid down
by this court in People vs. Santiago (55 Phil., 266); and, having already served
four years, nine months, and sixteen days of imprisonment, the remainder of the
penalty imposed upon him is not authorized by law.

Article 62, paragraph 5, of the Revised Penal Code reads as follows:

“Art. 62. Effect of the attendance of mitigating or aggravating circumstances
and of habitual delinquency.— Mitigating or aggravating circumstances and
habitual delinquency shall be taken into account for the purpose of diminishing
or increasing the penalty in conformity with the following
rules:

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“5. Habitual delinquency shall have the following effects:

“(a) Upon a third conviction the culprit shall be sentenced to the penalty
provided by law for the last crime of which he be found guilty and to the
additional penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum
periods;

“(b) Upon a fourth conviction the culprit shall be sentenced to the penalty
provided for the last crime of which he be found guilty and to the additional
penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods; and

“(c) Upon a fifth or additional conviction, the culprit shall be sentenced to
the penalty provided for the last crime of which he be found guilty and to the
additional penalty of prisidn mayor in its maximum period to reclusion temporal
in its minimum period.

“Notwithstanding the provisions of this article, the total of the two
penalties to be imposed upon the offender, in conformity herewith, shall in no
case exceed 30 years.

“For the purposes of this article, a person shall be deemed to be habitual
delinquent, if within a period of ten years from the date of his release or last
conviction of the crimes of robo, kurto, estafa, or falsification, he is found
guilty of any of said crimes a third time or oftener.”

In People vs. Santiago, supra, this court enunciated the
following doctrine:

“Criminal Law; Habitual Delinquency.—When an habitual criminal has committed
several crimes, without being first convicted of any of them before committing
the others, he cannot be sentenced for each of said crimes to the gradually
increasing additional penalty, and for the purposes of the law, said crimes must
be considered as one, applying the additional penalty to one of them, and
ignoring the rest.”

The facts in the present proceedings, upon which the petitioner bases his
action, are as follows:

On January 7, 1915, the petitioner was sentenced by the Court of First
Instance of Occidental Negros to two years, four months, and one day of
prision correccional for the crime of abduction, and set at liberty on
March 4, 1917.

On December 8, 1921, the same petitioner was sentenced by the Court of First
Instance of Manila to two months and one day of arresto mayor for the
crime of estafa.

On December 9, 1921, he was again sentenced by the Court of First Instance
,of Manila to three years, six months, and twenty-one days of prision
correccional for the crime of robbery.

On the same day, December 9, 1921, the petitioner was sentenced by the
municipal court of Manila to two months and one day of arresto mayor,
and an indemnity of P145 for the crime of estafa.

On January 31, 1922, the same petitioner was sentenced by the Court of First
Instance of Manila to one year, eight months, and twenty-one days of prision
correccional for the crime of robbery.

Having served the last three sentences, the petitioner was released on
September 14, 1926.

On October 24, 1927, he was sentenced by the Court of First Instance of
Batangas to 10 years imprisonment for the crime of robbery, besides an
additional penalty of five years for habitual delinquency.

In the present case the petitioner does not invoke the benefit of article 22
of the Revised Penal Code, giving retroactive effect to penal provisions so far
as they are favorable to the accused, provided he is not an habitual criminal,
but seeks the review of a sentence which has proved erroneous in view of a
subsequent doctrine laid down by this court the error consisting in that,
instead of counting the various convictions as one only, due to the proximity
and almost simultaneity of the commission of the several crimes of which the
petitioner was convicted, the same were considered as separate convictions for
the purposes of the law establishing habitual delinquency. This error could have
been corrected by appeal, for it was rather an error of judgment and not an
undue exercise of judicial powers which vitiates and nullifies the proceeding.
This court has repeatedly held that mere errors of fact or law which do not
nullify the proceedings taken by a court in the exercise of its functions,
having ‘jurisdiction over the crime and over the defendant, cannot be corrected
through the special remedy of habeas corpus. (Trono Felipe vs.
Director of Prisons, 24 Phil., 121; U. S. vs. Jayme, 24 Phil., 90;
McMicking vs. Schields, 238 U. S., 99; 41 Phil., 97.1.)

In view of the foregoing considerations and the doctrines laid down by this
court, the herein petitioner being committed in Bilibid Prison by virtue of a
legal and valid judgment without having served his full sentence, the petition
for habeas corpus is hereby denied, without special pronouncement of costs. So
ordered.

Avanceña, C. J., Street, Malcolm, Villamor, Ostrand, Abad Santos, Hull,
Vickers, Imperial, and Butte, JJ., concur.