MANUEL RODRIGUEZ, PETITIONER, VS. THE DIRECTOR OF PRISONS, RESPONDENT.

This is an original petition for habeas corpus filed by prisoner Manuel
Rodriguez, praying that after proper proceedings an order be issued requiring
the respondent Director of Prisons to immediately set him at liberty, on the
ground that he is illegally detained, inasmuch as he has already served the
penalty corresponding to his offence under the provisions of the Revised Penal
Code.

The pertinent facts necessary for a solution of the question raised in the
present petition are as follows:

Upon arraignment for the crime of estafa in the Court of First
Instance of Manila, the petitioner spontaneously pleaded guilty, whereupon the
trial court rendered a judgment of conviction, and there being no circumstance
to modify his criminal liability, imposed upon him the minimum of the medium
degree of the penalty of presidio correccional in its minimum and
medium degrees, in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 3, article 534 of
the old Penal Code, that its, one year, eight months, and twenty-one days of
presidio correctional, to pay an indemnity of P647.70, and to suffer subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency.

The first question to decide here is
whether or not the provisions of the Revised Penal Code with reference to the
crime of estafa, of which the petitioner was convicted, are more favorable to
him than those of the old Penal Code.

The penalty of one year, eight months, and twenty-one days imposed upon said
petitioner by the trial court is the minimum of the medium degree of the penalty
of presidio correccional in its minimum and medium degrees, ranging
from six months and one day to four years and two months, as provided in article
534, paragraph 3, of the old Penal Code, as amended by Act No. 3244. The penalty
provided in the Revised Penal Code, article 315, paragraph 3, for the same
offence is arresto mayor in the maximum degree to prision
correccional in the minimum degree, that is, from four months and one day
to two years and four months, of which the medium degree is from one year and
one day to one year and eight months, which is more lenient and hence more
favorable to the petitioner than the same degree of the penalty imposed by
article 534, paragraph 3, of the former Penal Code cited above.

Article
22 of the Revised Penal Code provides:

“Art. 22. Retroactive effect of penal laws.—Penal laws shall have a
retroactive effect in so far as they favor the person guilty of a felony, who is
not a habitual criminal, as this term is defined in rule 5 of article ,62 of
this Code, although at the time of the publication of such laws a final sentence
has been pronounced and the convict is serving the same.”

As the provisions of the aforementioned Revised Penal Code with reference to
the crime of estafa here in question are more favorable to the said
petitioner, and as the latter is not an habitual criminal, the more lenient
penalty provided in the Revised Penal Code must be imposed upon him.

The second question to decide is whether or not in habeas corpus proceedings
the mitigating circumstance of voluntary confession of guilt established for the
first time in article 13, paragraph 7, of the Revised Penal Code, can be taken
into consideration.

The mitigating circumstances, as their name indicates, serve to lessen the
penalty fixed by law, and whenever they are present courts are bound to take
them into consideration, according to article 77, in connection with article 80,
paragraph 3, of the old Penal Code, and article 62, in connection with article
64, paragraph 2, of the Revised Penal Code.

In the present case, the trial court could not legally take into account the
mitigating circumstance of voluntary confession of guilt, established in article
13, paragraph 7, of the new Penal Code, because it did not exist in the old
Penal Code under which the petitioner herein was prosecuted and sentenced.

Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code, above quoted, extends its benefits even
to convicts serving sentence, and the only legal remedy open to them to make use
of such benefits is the writ of habeas corpus, inasmuch as, if the penalty
imposed upon them under the former penal law was decreased by the revised code,
and the latter has retroactive effect, the excess has become illegal. Now then,
it appearing from the sentence that there was a voluntary confession of guilt,
and that it has served as the basis of conviction, and taking into consideration
that had such circumstance been classified by the old Penal Code as a mitigating
circumstance, the trial court would have been bound to give it effect, could we
now disregard it without failing in our duty in order to give effect to the
positive provisions of the law which make all penal laws retroactive in so far
as they favor the accused, who is not an habitual criminal, there being no
necessity to review the proceeding? In the case before us, the voluntary
confession of guilt appears in the sentence and has served as the basis of the
defendant’s conviction by the trial court; for which reason we must take it into
account, in order to give retroactive effect to article 22, cited above, of the
Revised Penal Code for the benefit of the petitioner herein.

As we have seen, the aforesaid petitioner was sentenced to one year, eight
months, and twenty-one days of presidio correccional, to pay an indemnity of
P647.70, and to suffer subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, which is
the minimum of the medium degree (from one year, eight months, and twenty-one
days to two years, eleven months, and ten days) of the penalty of presidio
correccional in the minimum and medium degrees (from six months and one day
to four years and two months), prescribed by article 534, paragraph 3, of the
old Penal Code, as amended by Act No. 3244. The penalty provided in article 315,
paragraph 3, of the Revised Penal Code for the same crime is arresto mayor in
the maximum degree to prision correccional in the minimum degree, that
is, four months and one day to two years and four months, which is more lenient
than that provided in the old Penal Code. Taking into account the mitigating
circumstance of voluntary confession of guilt, without any aggravating
circumstance to offset it, the penalty provided in the Revised Penal Code must
be imposed in the minimum degree, that is, four months and one day to one year
(article 80, paragraph 2, of the old Penal Code, and article 64 of the Revised
Penal Code), and inasmuch as it is the practice of Courts of First Instance in
the exercise of their discretion (article 81, paragraph 7, as amended by section
1 of Act No. 2298) to fix the penalty in the minimum period, and the trial court
having fixed the penalty imposed upon the petitioner in the minimum period of
the medium degree, we must also fix it accordingly, that is, four months and one
day of arresto mayor, which is the minimum period of the minimum degree
of the penalty provided by the Revised Penal Code.

The herein petitioner having already served seven months and twenty-nine days
of imprisonment, as against the penalty of four months and twenty-one days, with
all possible allowances, in accordance with the Revised Penal Code, he has
already more than served his sentence and is entitled to be released
immediately.

For the foregoing considerations, we are of opinion and hold that when in a
sentence of conviction it appears that the defendant voluntarily confessed his
guilt in court before the prosecution has presented its evidence, such voluntary
confession shall be taken into account in a petition for habeas corpus to give
effect to article 22 of the Revised Penal Code.

Wherefore, the herein petitioner being illegally detained, the petition is
granted and the respondent Director of Prisons is hereby ordered to set him at
liberty immediately, without special pronouncement of costs. So ordered.

Avanceña, C. J., Villamor, Abad Santos, Imperial, and Butte,
JJ., concur.

MALCOLM, J., with whom concur STREET, OSTRAND, HULL, and VICKERS, JJ.,
dissenting:

We stand squarely on the proposition that, after
a court having jurisdiction of a criminal case has rendered a final judgment in
that case and the convict has begun to serve his sentence in conformity with
that judgment, the courts can not, in habeas corpus proceedings, enter upon a
review of the decision or record to determine if a mitigating circumstance
should be taken into account in order to obtain a reduction of the penalty and
the liberation of the convict. Habeas corpus lies only to determine the question
of the jurisdiction and lawful power of the custodian to hold the petitioner in
custody, and is not available as a revisory remedy for the correction of errors
either of law or fact. (29 C. J., 25; Trono Felipe vs. Director of
Prisons [1913], 24 Phil., 121.) The Revised Penal Code provides that felonies
and misdemeanors committed prior to the date of effectiveness of this Code shall
be punished in accordance with the code or acts in force at the time of their
commission, while retroactive effect may only be given to the Revised Penal Code
for the benefit of the person guilty of a felony who is not a habitual criminal
to determine the proper penalty as found under the old Penal Code and to
contrast with it the penalty corresponding to the crime under the Revised Penal
Code. But if the courts are to scrutinize the decision and the record to
ascertain if mitigating circumstances now found for the first time in the
Revised Penal Code are to be given effect, the courts will embark upon
unchartered seas and unutterable confusion will result. We believe that the
court should not now revise a final judgment by inserting in that judgment a
finding relating to a mitigating circumstance, thus permitting the liberation of
the accused. As a consequence, our vote is for the denial of the writ.