THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. LUIS J. PEGARUM, DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT.

On
February 6, 1932, a complaint was filed in the justice of the peace
court of Baguio, Mountain Province, wherein the appellant was charged
with having committed, on December 28, 1931, a crime of estafa.
After a preliminary investigation, the justice of the peace, on March
1, 1932, remanded the case to the Court of First Instance of the
Mountain Province. On March 21, 1932, the provincial fiscal of the
Mountain Province filed in the said court an information in the
following tenor:

“That on or about the 28th
day of December, 1931, in the City of Baguio, Philippine Islands, and
within the jurisdiction of this court, the above-named accused Luis J.
Pegarum, being then employed as stenographer and collector of the
Marsman & Company, and as such collected for the said Marsman &
Company from Wah Hing the amount of P94.35, did voluntarily,
maliciously and feloniously fail to turn or deliver said P94.35 to the
said Marsman & Company and appropriated and applied to his own
personal use and benefit said amount of P94.35, thereby damaging and
prejudicing the said Marsman & Company in the said sum of P94.35
equivalent to 471 15/20 pesetas.”

When the case was called for trial, the attorney for the defendant
raised the question of the jurisdiction of the court to try it,
contending that it was originally cognizable by the justice of the
peace of the City of Baguio. The court ruled that it had jurisdiction
to try the case in accordance with section 366 of the Revised Penal
Code, and proceeded with the trial. Thereafter, the defendant was found
guilty of the crime charged in the information, and sentenced to three
months and one day of arresto mayor, to pay Marsman & Co.
the sum of P94.35, or to suffer the corresponding subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency, and also to pay the costs.

On this appeal, the first question presented is one of law, and
involves the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance to try the
case. Under existing law justices of the peace, except in the City of
Manila, have original jurisdiction to try persons charged with offenses
for which the penalty provided by law “does not exceed six months’
imprisonment or a fine of two hundred pesos, or both such imprisonment
and fine.” (Section 4 of Act No. 1627, as amended by Act No. 2131.) The
jurisdiction of a justice of the peace in criminal actions is
determined by the penalty which may be imposed. (U. S. vs. Bernardo, 19 Phil., 265; U. S. vs.
Regala, 28 Phil., 57.) Before the Revised Penal Code took effect, the
penalty provided by law for the offense alleged to have been committed
by the appellant, was arresto mayor in its medium degree to presidio correccional in its minimum degree, or from two months and one day of arresto mayor to two years and four months of presidio correccional. The penalty prescribed in the Revised Penal Code for the same offense is arresto mayor in its medium and maximum periods, or from two months and one day to six months of arresto mayor. This is the penalty applicable in this case. (Revised Penal Code, article 22.)

It is, thus, clear that under the law in force at the time the crime
was committed, the Court of First Instance had jurisdiction to try the
case; while under the law in force at the time the complaint or
information was filed, the case was originally cognizable by the
justice of the peace. The specific question thus raised is whether the
jurisdiction of a court to try a criminal action is to be determined by
the law in force at the time of the commission of the crime, or by that
in force at the time of instituting the action. “As a general rule the
jurisdiction of a court depends upon the state of the facts existing at
the time it is invoked, and if the jurisdiction once attaches to the
person and subject matter of the litigation, the subsequent happening
of events, although they are of such a character as would have
prevented jurisdiction from attaching in the first instance, will not
operate to oust jurisdiction already attached.” (16 C. J., sec. 246, p.
181.) In the instant case, jurisdiction was invoked for the first time
when the complaint was filed in the justice of the peace court on
February 6, 1932. That was after the Revised Penal Code took effect. By
reason of the penalty which might be imposed, jurisdiction to try the
case was already vested in the justice of the peace. Hence, the Court
of First Instance acted beyond its jurisdiction in trying the case. As
the Supreme Court of the United States has declared, “where life or
liberty is affected by its proceedings, the court must keep strictly
within the limits of the law authorizing it to take jurisdiction and to
try the case and to render judgment. It cannot pass beyond those limits
in any essential requirement in either stage of these proceedings; and
its authority in those particulars is not to be enlarged by any mere
inferences from the law or doubtful construction of its terms. There
has been a great deal said and written, in many cases with embarrassing
looseness of expression, as to the jurisdiction of the courts in
criminal cases. From a somewhat extended examination of the authorities
we will venture to state some rule applicable to all of them, by which
the jurisdiction as to any particular judgment of the court in such
cases may be determined. It is plain that such court has jurisdiction
to render a particular judgment only when the offense charged is within
the class of offenses placed by the law under its jurisdiction; and
when, in taking custody of the accused, and in its modes of procedure
to the determination of the question of his guilt or innocence, and in
rendering judgment, the court keeps within the limitations prescribed
by the law, customary or statutory. When the court goes out of these
limitations its action, to the extent of such excess, is void.” (Re
Bonner, 151 U. S., 242, 256, 257; 38 Law. ed., 149, 151.)

The judgment appealed from is set aside and the case is remanded to the
court below for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
So ordered.

Avanceña, C. J., Street, Vickers, and Butte, JJ., concur.