FRANCISCO MAGNO, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANT, VS. MONICA VIOLA AND VICENTE SOTTO, DEFENDANTS AND APPELLANTS.

This action was brought in the Court of
First Instance of Nueva Ecija by the plaintiff and appellant against
the defendants and appellants to try the titles to two parcels of land
referred to in the record as lots Nos. 2 and 3. The case was tried upon
on agreed statement of facts and upon the documentary evidence
submitted by the parties. After trial, the court below rendered
judgment the dispositive part of which reads as follows:

“En su virtud, el Juzgado es de opinion que
debe fallar y falla esta causa en cuanto a la demanda, declarando que
el demandante Francisco Magno es dueno de las 3/6 partes del lote No. 2
descrito en el parrafo 2.° de la demanda, y en 2/3 partes del lote No.
3 descrit6 en el parrafo 3.° de la misma. Y se ordena a la demandada
Monica Viola que restituya inmediatamente a la posesion de dicho
demandante dichas porciones de terreno mediante y previa la
correspondiente delimitacidn de las mismas. Y por la ocupacion por la
demandada Monica Viola de dichas participaciones del demandante
equivalentes a 4/6 partes de la totalidad de ambos lotes, dicha
demandada debe indemnizarle a dicho demandante en la cantidad de P660
igual a 4/6 partes de la cantidad de P990 importe de los 600 cavanes al
precio de P1.65 cavan estipulado por ambas partes como frutos de dichos
dos terrenos.

“En cuanto a la reconvencion de los demandados, por falta de meritos y pruebas, se absuelve de ella al demandante.

“Y siendo hechos declarados probados en esta decision aunque no pedidos
expresamente por una y otra parte en sus respectivos escritos, el
Juzgado declara al demandante obligado a restituir la suma de P665.68,
la cual debera depositar o consignar en la Escribania del Juzgado a
disposicion de los apellidados Salvanera, demandantes que fueron en la
causa civil No. 4089 de este Juzgado, en cuyos autos en su caso y en su
dia se hara tambien constar dicha restitucion. Se declara a la
demandante Mdnica Viola con derecho a rescatar del demandante 2/6
partes del lote No. 2 y y3 parte del lote No. 3 mediante reembolso o
devoIucion a dicho demandante de la suma de P666.67 en el lote No. 2 y
P330.78 en el lote No. 3, previa tambteh la correspondiente
delimitation. Con las costas a los demandados.”

From this judgment, both parties appealed.

The pertinent facts in this case may be briefly stated as follows:
In a partition case in the court of origin between the predecessors in
interest of the parties herein and others, the two parcels of land here
in question were adjudicated as follows: Lot No. 2, 4/6 to Vidal and
Cecilia Salvanera, 1/6 to Santiago and Dorotea Padua, and 1/6 to
Francisco Magnoj plaintiff herein. Lot No. 3, 2/3 to Vidal and Cecilia
Salvanera, and £ to Tomas Joson. In the same case, Vidal arid Cecilia
Salvanera were ordered to pay Francisco Msigno 4/6 of the sum of
P3,490, or P2,326.66. Upon failure to pay this amount, the ‘shares of
Vidal and Cecilia Salvanera in the two lots were levied on execution
and sold at public auction to Francisco Magno, the 4/6 share in lot No.
2 for P2,000, and the 2/3 share in lot No. 3 for P992.34. Within the
period of redemption prescribed by law, Monica Viola, defendant and
appellant herein, believing that the two lots were sold at public
auction in their entirety, offered to redeem them on the strength of a
deed of sale executed in her favor by her codefendant and coappellant
Vicente Sotto, who conveyed to her y2 of lot No. 2 and 1/2 of lot 3, of
which portions the latter claimed to be the owner by virtue of a
contract of retainer he had with Vidal and Cecilia Salvanera. Sotto
claimed that he was entitled to redeem as a coowner, not only his own
shares just mentioned, but also the other halves of said two lots. On
the strength of the offer to redeem, Monica Viola in October 1930 took
possession of the two lots. Claiming that he was the exclusive owner of
the two lots mentioned, Francisco Magno instituted the present action.

Upon the facts stated, the resolution of the various errors
assigned by both parties in their briefs depends upon the following mam
points: (1) The share or shares acquired by the plaintiff in the
property in question; (2) the right of the defendants to redeem; and
(3) granting that such right exists, the extent thereof.

1. We agree with the plaintiff that he is entitled to be
   declared the owner of 5/6 of lot No. 2 and of the entire lot No. 3, for
   the reason that (1) by virtue of the decision on the partition case, he
   was adjudged the owner of 1/6 of lot No. 2; (2) by virtue of the
   sheriff’s sale he acquired 4/6 of lot No. 2 and 2/3 of lot No. 3; and
   (3) by virtue of a private sale made in his favor by Tomas Joson, he
   also acquired the latter’s share of 1/3 of lot No. 3. This is
   practically the same conclusion reached by the court below. The
   apparent difference arises from the fact that from the portions to
   which the plaintiff was entitled, were taken the portions which
   defendants had right to redeem.

2. Plaintiff contends that Vicente Sotto had never acquired any
   proprietary right over the land in question by reason of the contract
   of retainer with his former clients. On this point, it should be stated
   that the right of redemption is not predicated on proprietary right,
   which, after the sale-of property on execution, leaves the judgment
   debtor and vests in the purchaser, but on a bare statutory privilege to
   be exercised only by the persons expressly named in the statute.
   (McQueeney vs. Toomey, 36 Mont., 282; 122 Am.. St. Rep., 358; 92 Pac., 561; 12 Ann. Cas., 316; Banking Corp. of Montana vs.
   Hein, 52 Mont, 238; 156 Pac, 1085.) In other words, the statute does
   not make actual ownership at the time of sale or redemption a condition
   precedent, the right following the person and not the land. (Henderson vs. Prestwood, 115 Ala., 464; 22 S., 15; Yoakum vs. Bower, 51 Cal., 539; Floyd vs. Sellers, 7 Colo. A., 491; 44 Pac., 371; Livingston vs. Arnoux, 56 N. Y., 507.)

Section 464 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that property
sold subject to redemption may be redeemed by the judgment debtor, or
his successor in interest in the whole or any part of the property.
Does Vicente Sotto or his assignee fall within the term “successor in
interest”? The rule is that the term “successor in interest” includes
one to whom the debtor has transferred his statutory right of
redemption (Big Sespe Oil Co. vs. Cochran, 276 Fed., 216,
223); one to whom the debtor has conveyed his interest in the property
for the purpose of redemption (Southern California Lumber Co. vs. McDowell, 105 Cal., 99; 38 Pac., 627; Simpson vs. Castle, 52 Cal., 644; Schumacher vs.
Langford, 20 Cal. App., 61; 127 Pac., 1057); one who succeeds to the
interest of the debtor by operation of law (XI McKinney’s California
Jurisprudence, 99); one or more joint debtors who were joint owners of
the property sold (Emerson vs. Yosemite Gold Min. etc. Co.,
149 Cal., 50; 85 Pac, 122); the wife as regards her husband’s homestead
by reason of the fact that some portion of her husband’s title passes
to her (Hefner vs. Urton, 71 Cal., 479; 12 Pac., 486). This
court has held that a surety can not redeem the property of the
principal sold on execution because the surety, by paying the debt of
the principal, stands in the place of the creditor, not of the debtor,
and consequently is not a successor in interest in the property. (G.
Urrutia & Co. vs. Moreno and Heyes, 28 Phil., 260, 268.)

In the present case, Vicente Sotto had a contract with his former
clients in the partition case, whereby the latter agreed to give to him
one-half of what they would obtain in said case. His former clients
having obtained 4/6 of lot No. 2 and 2/3 of lot No. 3, it is clear that
Sotto was entitled to 1/3 of each of said lots. Construing liberally
the provisions of section 464 of the Code of Civil Procedure, we are of
the opinion that Vicente Sotto or his assignee is a successor in
interest in the part of’the property above indicated. (Javellana vs. Mirasol and Nunez, 40 Phil., 761.)

It remains to consider whether or not defendants had the right to reedem the entire lots. In Powers vs.
Sherry (115 Minn., 290; 132 N. W., 210), the court held that one who
owns a separate part of the land sold or has some interest therein may
redeem the whole tract. In Eldridge vs. Wright (55 Cal., 531,
534), the court also held that successors in part could not redeem at
all, except by redeeming the whole. The rule may vary however where the
purchaser is himself a part owner. So in Horton vs. Maffitt
(14 Minn., 216), the court held that a cotenant may redeem the entire
joint estate, though in so doing he will be deemed to have acted for
the benefit of all the cotenants. The civil law rule goes even further.
It completely ‘denies the right of redemption to a coowner when the
purchaser is a part owner. The rule proceeds on the theory that the
privilege conferred by statute upon the coowner to redeem is to
facilitate a method for terminating ownership in common and to
consolidate the dominion in one sole owner. (Estrada vs. Reyes, 33 Phil., 31.)

In the instant case, the purchaser, Francisco Magno, was a part
owner. Hence, Sotto or his assignee had no right to redeem the shares
of his former clients Vidal and Cecilia Salvanera. Sotto’s right of
redemption must be limited to thatjgart of the property to which he was
estiiled under the contract with the Salvaneras. The conclusion of the
lower court is in accordance with this view of the law.

Plaintiff claims that the lower court erred in requiring him to
deposit with the clerk of the court, for the use and benefit of Vidal
and Cecilia Salvanera, the sum of P665.68. We are unable to accept this
view. The sum required to be deposited was a part of the amount of
plaintiff’s bid which, according to the decision of the court below in
civil case No. 4089, should belong to the Salvaneras. While it is true
that the Salvaneras are not parties in the present suit, they were
parties in said civil case No. 4089 of which this suit is but a
corollary. Plaintiff’s contention that he made a mistake in fixing the
amount of his bid can not be properly raised in this action.

In the view we have taken of the case, we consider the other points
raised by counsel in their briefs not sufficiently substantial to
require serious consideration.

The judgment appealed from is affirmed, without special pronouncement as to costs in this instance. So ordered.

Malcolm, Villa-Real, Butte, and Diaz, JJ., concur.