THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. PELAGIO TRAZO AND FELIX ESCARTIN, DEFENDANTS. FELIX ESCARTIN, APPELLANT.

This appeal has been brought to reverse a judgment of the Court of
First Instance of Bohol, finding the appellant, Felix Escartin, guilty
of the offense of murder and sentencing him to undergo imprisonment for
twenty years, with the accessory penalties prescribed by law, and
requiring him to pay one-half the costs of prosecution. The appellant
was also sentenced to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the amount
of P1,000.

The appellant, Felix Escartin, appears to have
entertained a rancor against his neighbor, Sergio Doroy, resident of
the municipality of Talibon, Bohol, resulting from conflicting
interests in a woman; while his coaccused, Pelagio Trazo, had his own
reasons for dislike to the deceased. On Thursday, January 7, 1932, the
witness Eracleo Pulgo, who was fishing in the Hangtud brook, in the
sitio of Licoan, heard the discharge of a gun. He supposed momentarily
that some hunter had killed a wild pig, and he moved in the direction
of the noise. Imagine his surprise to see the appellant, Felix
Escartin, and Pelagio Trazo dragging the body of a dead person over the
ground. The witness was frightened and fled. Arriving at home, he did
not leave the house until the forenoon of January 11, 1932. On that day
he learned that Eduardo Doroy was looking for a brother, Sergio Doroy,
who had disappeared. Pulgo thereupon told Eduardo what he had seen on
the preceding Thursday; and the two presently succeeded in locating the
place of burial of Sergio Doroy near the spot where the witness had
seen the two accused persons pulling the corpse over the ground. Upon
examination of the body it was found to be that of Sergio and it was
discovered that it contained two bullet wounds, one on the upper
external side of the left eye and the other below the left nipple.

Pelagio Trazo, coaccused of the appellant, was introduced as a witness
for the prosecution and testified that he had accompanied Felix
Escartin upon the occasion when Sergio Doroy was slain, but he imputed
to Escartin the chief role in the killing. It is evident from this
witness that the two waited upon the scene of the killing until the
deceased appeared, and Felix hid himself behind certain branches to
prevent the deceased from seeing him upon approach.

The
proof is convincing as to the guilt of the appellant. We credit, as did
the trial court, the testimony of Eracleo Pulgo, and the circumstances
surrounding the killing corroborate the statement of Pelagio Trazo to
the effect that the killing was effected by lying in wait.

More than one witness testified to the fact that the appellant
entertained ill will against the deceased, and more than once had
threatened harm to the deceased. It was further shown that the
appellant possessed the gun which was used in taking Sergio’s life.

Pelagio Trazo was a competent voluntary witness against the appellant,
and although the court found that said witness was an accomplice and
participant in the crime, his testimony is corroborated by other
evidence, and, being so corroborated, is sufficient to sustain the
conviction. When two or more persons are jointly prosecuted for the
same crime, but separately tried, either of such persons is competent
as a witness against the other, although the case against the witness
himself is still pending. (Benson vs. United States, 146 U. S.,
325, 333-334.) The suggestion that Trazo was incompetent because he had
not been discharged in accordance with the provisions of section 2 of
Act No. 2709 is also not well founded. The purpose of the last
mentioned Act was to enable the prosecution to induce one of several
codefendants to testify as a witness against his coaccused, without
being in a danger of incriminating himself. It does not preclude a
witness from testifying against his coaccused when willing so to do
without discharge.

The crime committed was that of murder in which the qualifying circumstance was alevosia
in that the appellant shot the deceased from ambush, when unarmed and
unsuspecting, thereby insuring the execution of the crime without risk
to the appellant. There was present neither aggravating nor mitigating
circumstance and the penalty imposed upon the appellant should be in
its medium degree.

It being understood, therefore, that the penalty imposed upon the appellant is reclusion perpetua, the sentence, as thus modified, is affirmed, with costs against the appellant. So ordered.

Malcolm, Abad Santos, Vickers, and Imperial, JJ., concur.