G.R. No. 37320. August 15, 1932
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, AND ISIDORO ARAGON AND TEODORICA RUIZ, OFFENDED PARTIES AND APPELLANTS, VS. VICENTA GUIDO AND HONORATA AGUIRRE, DEF…
VILLAMOR, J.:
Instance of Manila in which Vicenta Guido y Crisologo and Honorata Aguirre were
prosecuted for the crime of qualified theft of certain jewelry. The accused were
found guilty and sentenced, the former to ten years and one day of presidio
mayor with the accessaries of article 57 of the Penal Code, to indemnify
the offended party, Levy Hermanos, Inc., in the amount of P7.405.45, without
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and.to pay one-half of the costs;
and the latter to one year and eight months of presidio correctional, with the
accessaries of article 58 of the Penal Code, to indemnify the offended party,
Levy Hermanos, Inc., in the amount of P7,405.45, with subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency not to exceed one-third the duration of the principal
penalty, and to pay one-half of the costs.
The court further ordered that the stolen jewels that were recovered be
restored to the owner, Levy Hermanos, Inc.
The appellants appealed from that part of the sentence ordering the return of
the jewels to the owner, without making provision for the indemnification of the
owners of the pawnshops where they were pawned.
Leaving aside the merits of the present appeal, and confining ourselves to
deciding the motion to dismiss said appeal, we believe the appellants, alleging
as they do that they have been prejudiced by the judgment of the court ordering
the return of the jewels to the owner without making provision for the
reimbursement of the value of the pledges, may validly appeal from said judgment
in accordance with section 44 of General Orders, No. 58, providing:
“Either party may appeal from a final judgment or from an order made after
judgment affecting the substantial rights of the appellant. The people of the
Philippine Islands may also appeal from a judgment for the defendant rendered on
a demurrer to an information or complaint, and from an order dismissing a
complaint or information.” (As amended by section 4, Act No.
2886.)
The word “party” used in the law must be understood to mean not only the
government and the accused, but also other persons who may be affected by the
judgment rendered in the criminal proceedings. In accordance with this
interpretation it has always been recognized in this jurisdiction that the
sureties of the defendant are interested parties in the civil question of the
forfeiture of the bond, and may take an appeal from any order entered against
them in the criminal action. No one has disputed their right to appeal in such
cases and the files of this court abound with proceedings of this nature.
In the present case no attempt is made to decide whether there is any merit
in the appeal; it is not incumbent upon us to decide now whether the grounds
alleged by the appellants are in conformity with the law or not. The only
question raised by the motion for dismissal is whether the appellants are
entitled to appeal from the aforementioned order.
In order to decide said question one need but ask whether the appellants were
prejudiced in any substantial right of theirs with relation to the jewels. That
they were prejudiced, there can be no doubt, because, if the order appealed from
were carried out, they would be deprived of the possession of said jewels
without the corresponding compensation, equivalent to the amount for which they
were pledged. Inasmuch as they are thus prejudiced, it is evident that they are
interested and necessary parties to the incident and are therefore entitled to
intervene directly therein.
It is immaterial that the appellants may bring a civil suit against La
Estrella del Norte, Inc., to recover the amount for which the jewels were
pledged, in case such an independent action could be maintained. If the
appellants have two remedies within the law, they should not be compelled to
resort to the very one th§y have not chosen, there being no legal provision
prohibiting their choice.
The question raised is not entirely new in this jurisdiction. In the case of
United States vs. Bruhez (28 Phil., 305), Joaquin Lorenzo Uy had been convicted
of the illegal importation of opium and the sum of P3,500 in the form of seven
P500 bills was confiscated by the customs authorities and presented to the court
during the trial. This amount, according to the evidence, had been delivered to
Bruhez, at that time a customs inspector, as a bribe, so that he would allow the
entry of smuggled opium. Subsequently, Ignacio Velasco, a third party to the
criminal action, entered an appearance praying that the sum of money be returned
to him, alleging that it belonged to him, and had been wrongfully obtained by
Lorenzo by means of a forged cheque. The court denied the petition on the ground
that it had no jurisdiction ove the money which had been already confiscated by
the customs officials. This court, speaking through Justice Moreland in its
decision, said:
“It is our opinion that the court below should have resolved all of the
questions presented by the issues, among them being the ownership of the P3,500.
If that money was owned by Joaquin Lorenzo Uy Yjo and was by him used to bribe a
customs official to permit the illegal importation of opium, it became an
instrument used in the commission of that’crime and would be susceptible to the
dispositions provided for in articles 25 and 62 of the Penal Code. Article 25
provides, among other things, that, as an accessory penalty, there shall be a
forfeiture of the instruments and proceeds of the offense’ and article 62
provides that ‘every penalty imposed for the commission of a felony shall carry
with it the forfeiture of the proceeds of the crime and the instrument with
which it was committed. Such proceeds and instruments shall be forfeited unless
they be the property of a third person not liable for the offense.’“These articles constitute the law which governs the disposition of the money
in question. If Joaquin Lorenzo Uy Yjo had been convicted of the crime of
bribery, then. the money paid as a bribe would have been forfeited by virtue of
article 389. The crime charged and prosecuted, however, being that of illegal
importation of opium, the money became an instrument used in the commission of
the crime and, therefore, became subject to the articles of the Penal Code
already referred to.“Under these articles of the Penal Code the court trying the cause has
jurisdiction to determine the ownership and disposition of the instrument used
in the commission of the crime, and any person claiming this instrument has a
right to take his proceeding in that court for the purpose of determining his
rights in the premises.” (Pages 309 and 310.)
A careful reading of the decision in the case above cited will show not only
that the right to intervene and to appeal of the person claiming to be the owner
of the confiscated money in connection with the crimes of illegal importation
and bribery, was recognized, but that it clearly and expressly decided that the
ownership of said money and other similar incidents should all be determined in
the criminal action in pursuance of the provisions of articles 25 and62 of the
old Penal Code, or articles 25 and 45 respectively, of the Revised Penal
Code.
Thus, the offended party, be he the owner of the property stolen or
misappropriated, or the owner of the pawnshop, may appeal from the judgment of
the trial court with reference to the indemnity to be paid resulting from the
commission of the offense. The pawnbrokers, herein appellants, are deemed to
have been prejudiced by the commission of the crime, because by reason of the
fact that the jewels pledged to them had been stolen they will now be deprived
of their possession without first having a declaration of indemnity for the
amount of the pledges.
By virtue of the foregoing, without passing upon the merits of the appeal, in
order that the appellants may file their briefs, the motion for dismissal is
hereby denied, without special pronouncement as to costs. So ordered.
Street, Malcolm, Ostrand, Abad Santos, Imperial, and Butte,
JJ., concur.
VILLA-REAL, J.:
I concur in the result.
HULL, J.:
I concur in the result.
DISSENTING
AVANCEÑA, C. J.
I dissent, and vote for the dismissal of the appeal. The appellants seek to
intervene in this proceeding by virtue of the following facts:
“The pawnshops of Isidoro Aragon at 1460 Herran, Manila, of T. A. Ruiz at
1510 Herran, Manila, and of T. R. de Jose (who is none other than T. A. Ruiz) at
1414 Herran, Manila, are establishments conducted under government authority,
engaged in making loans upon jewels at rates of interest fixed by Act No. 2615
of the Philippine Legislature; and the jewels exhibited in this cause, taken
from these establishments by the police, had been pawned there in the ordinary
course of business, a renewal of the pledge of jewels Exhibits Z60B, Z62B, and
Z85B, having been made.”
In my opinion the appellants have no right to appeal from the judgment
rendered in this case in so far as it orders that the jewels recovered be
returned to the owner, without making provision for the indemnity to be paid to
them, as owners of the establishments where they had been pawned.
According to section 44 of General Orders, No. 58, either party may appeal
from a final judgment or from an order issued after judgment, affecting the
substantial rights of the appellant. I concur with the majority in holding that
the word “party” here used does not mean only the government and the accused.
But I believe that those who have no right to intervene in the proceedings
cannot appeal therefrom, not being parties thereto. The only persons who may
intervene in a criminal case besides the government and the accused, according
to section 107 of General Orders, No. 58, are those claiming to have been
injured by the commission of the offense. It is evident that this provision
refers to those injured by the commission of the offense in question, and not
any other offense. This is a necessary consequence of the protection which the
law affords the accused in providing in section 11 of General Orders, No. 58
that he can be charged with but one offense in an information, in order that he
may the better prepare himself for his defense, which he would be unable to do
if he were charged with a number of different offenses. If this be so with
reference to the offenses themselves, a fortiori it should be so with reference
to their mere consequences. If, in a criminal proceeding, no man can be tried
for more than one offense, much less can facts be considered therein which are
not a consequence of the crime prosecuted, but of a different crime subsequently
committed.
In the case before us the crime in question is the theft of the jewels
belonging to the Estrella del Norte. The only offended party in this -theft is
the Estrella del Norte. If the accused, after having committed this crime,
pretending to be the owners of the jewels, pledged them in certajn pawnshops,
they committed another crime, namely, estafa, in which the pawnbrokers, as
owners of such shops, were the offended parties. It cannot be said, however,
that these pawnbrokers were injured by the commission of the crime of theft. If
they were injured it was because the jewels were pawned with them.
This is the rule clearly laid down by this court in the case of United States
vs. Barambangan (34 Phil., 645). In that case certain individuals were
accused of the theft of a carabao belonging to a Moro. Later, the accused sold
the animal to a third person. In said case the carabao was returned to the
owner. The lower court sentenced the accused to return to the purchaser the
amount he had paid for the carabao. This court reversed the judgment, ruling
that the theft of an animal and the sale, thereof to a third party constitute
two separate and distinct crimes, larceny and estafa, and that in the cause for
larceny against the accused, he cannot be condemned to indemnify the purchaser
of the carabao, who was injured by the commission of the crime of estafa, a
separate and distinct offense.
It will be noted that the appellants’ contention, if sustained, would tend to
aggravate the penalty imposed upon the accused. The restitution of the jewels to
the owner relieves the accused of their civil liability. If the jewels are not
restored, or if the owner has to pay the appellants the money advanced for the
pledges, the accused, in turn, would have to indemnify the owner for the value
of the jewels, or suffer the proper subsidiary imprisonment.
The cases of bonds given in criminal causes for the provisional liberty of
the accused bear no analogy to this. It is true that the sureties may appeal
within the criminal proceedings, whenever the bond they have given is affected
by any order of the court, but this is because the bond given for the
provisional liberty of a defendant in a criminal proceeding takes the place of
the accused with respect to his appearance and makes the sureties parties to the
case; for which reason General Orders, No. 58 establishes the procedure to be
followed in the forfeiture of those bonds.
Neither is there any analogy between the present case and that of United
States vs. Bruhez (28 Phil., 305) cited by the majority. In that case
an intervention was filed in the proceeding by the owner of an object used by
the accused as an instrument of the crime, and as such, under the law, it must
be confiscated unless it belonged to a third person not liable for the crime. It
is clear that in that case the injury to the third person was a direct
consequence of the commission of the crime being prosecuted.
Another line of reasoning leads to the same conclusion.
Article 120 of the old Penal Code, copied verbatim in article 105 of the
Revised Penal Code, provides that the thing which is the object of the crime
shall be restored even though it be found in the possession of a third person
who has acquired it by lawful means, saving to the latter his action against the
proper person who may be liable to him unless the third person has acquired it
in the manner and under the circumstances which, by law, bar an action for its
recovery. In the present case there is no allegation that the appellants
acquired the jewels under the circumstances which by law bar an action for their
recovery. It has not been alleged that the appellants acquired ownership by
prescription, which is the main thing meant by this provision of the Penal Code,
nor that their pawnshops are Monies de Piedad established by authority of the
government for the benevolent or charitable purpose of helping the poor, nor
that they acquired these jewels in good faith at a public auction, which are
other exceptions established by the Civil Code. (Article 464.) From the nature
of their claims in this case, the appellants have no right to object to the
restitution. They can, however, institute an action against the proper party for
the amount involved, through, a proceeding other than the present. The
importance of this question lies in that it may throw open the doors of a
criminal case to extraneous facts which may constitute other crimes, but which
have no relation to the offense charged, thereby confusing the mind of the
accused and rendering his position more difficult to defend.