CRISANTA SUAREZ ET AL., PLAINTIFFS AND APPELLANTS, VS. PRUDENCIO TIRAMBULO ET AL., DEFENDANTS AND APPELLEES.

This
action was instituted in the Court of First Instance of the Province of
Oriental Negros by Crisanta, Raymunda, and Guillerma, of the surname
Suarez, the first two being assisted by their husbands. The defendants
are Prudencio Tirambulo and his wife, Elisea Buntigao, with whom are
joined Policarpia Mogillo and the Philippine National Bank. The purpose
of the complaint is, in effect, to obtain a judicial decree declaring
the plaintiffs of the surname Suarez entitled to certain portions of
two pieces of property located in the municipality of Guihulngan,
Oriental Negros, and to compel Tirambulo to transfer to them the
undivided portions of which they claim to be owners, with other relief.
Upon hearing the cause the trial court dismissed the complaint, without
express pronouncement as to costs, and the plaintiffs appealed.

On September 16, 1914, Prudencio Tirambulo filed an application in the
Court of Land Registration of the Province of Oriental Negros for the
registration of two parcels of land. In this proceeding default was
taken and no one appeared to contest the proceedings. Accordingly, when
the cause was heard, on January 18, 1915, the property was adjudicated
to him and his wife; and on April 19, 1915, the original certificate of
title No. 62 was issued to the applicant. That decree has never been
questioned in any proceeding for review, and no contention even now is
made to the effect that there was anything wrong with the title other
than hereinafter explained. The certificate referred to includes over
one hundred hectares, and the plaintiffs, as well as the defendant
Tirambulo and wife, have all lived thereon for a long period of time.

Since Tirambulo acquired the Torrens certificate to this property,
he—and he alone—has exercised the power of ownership in various ways.
Thus,, on March 30, 1917, he mortgaged the property to the Philippine
National Bank for P2,500. On August 8, 1923, he again mortgaged it to
the Philippine National Bank; and after the mortgage was paid off, he
sold it under pacto de retro to Jose Garcia for P2,952. On January 11, 1926, he again sold the property to the same Garcia, with pacto de retro,
for P5,800. In March, 1927, he mortgaged the property a second time to
the Philippine National Bank, and on December 12, 1928, through his
attorney in fact, E. Villanueva, he again mortgaged it to the same
bank. During these years his right as absolute owner of the property
has not been questioned by any one, although, when the property was
first mortgaged to the bank, an inspector for the bank visited the
property and investigated it to discover any adverse claim. The last
mortgage to the bank was made to secure a debt for P35,000, and there
was included in this mortgage property belonging to others, but nothing
appears as to the relative value of properties so mortgaged. In the end
the mortgage debt has not been paid, and we take judicial knowledge of
the fact that judgment has been rendered in favor of the bank in an
action for foreclosure brought against the defendant Tirambulo. The
decision of the Court of First Instance in that case was brought to
this court by appeal, but that appeal has been dismissed and the cause
remanded for execution. It is obvious that the mortgage made by
Tirambulo was valid, and it is undeniable that the bank was an innocent
purchaser for value. The result will therefore undoubtedly be, unless
the property has been or will be redeemed from the bank’s mortgage,
that a sale will be made which will vest a valid title in the purchaser.

This action was begun on February 16, 1931, and an amended complaint
was filed on May 26 of the same year. The principal basis of the action
consists in the allegation that the female plaintiffs of the name
Suarez are coheirs of Elisea Buntigao, who is their half sister, and
that they all are owners in common of the property covered by the
Torrens title. In this connection it is claimed that, before Prudencio
Tirambulo procured the Torrens title above-mentioned, he had agreed
with the plaintiffs to represent them and to act for them as well as
for himself and wife in the procurance of the Torrens title, and that,
in violation of this promise, he took the title exclusively in his own
name. It is further asserted that until the year 1930 the plaintiffs
did not know that the Torrens title had been thus taken exclusively in
the name of Tirambulo.

As a legal proposition a contention
of this kind is tenable, for, if a person acts for another in procuring
a Torrens title, he will not be permitted, in breach of faith, to
deprive his principals of their interest and to claim the whole for
himself. But the point where this case fails is in the proof. It is a
well settled rule of law that, where a trust is to be established by
oral proof, the testimony supporting it must be sufficiently strong to
prove the right of the alleged beneficiary with as much certainty as if
a document were shown. To understand this feature of the case, it is
necessary to take account of the relations of the parties and of the
history of the title.

Back in Spanish times, a generation
before the advent of the Americans, there lived in Guihulngan one
Casimiro Suarez. His wife was Policarpia Mogillo, and they had three
children who have survived, namely, the plaintiffs Crisanta, Raymunda,
and Guillerma. Casimiro died long ago and Policarpia Mogillo married,
as her second husband, one Mateo Buntigao. It is the contention of the
plaintiffs that the land now sued for was acquired during the first
marriage, with the result that the plaintiffs inherited from their
deceased father his half in the conjugal property.

Elisea
Buntigao, wife of Prudencio Tirambulo, is a daughter of Policarpia
Mogillo by her second marriage, and it is the theory of the defense
that the property which is the subject of this contention was acquired
by Policarpia Mogillo during her second marriage. This accords with the
finding of the court from the proof submitted in the land registration
case, and the truth of this finding is indicated by the proof in this
case. One of the things that has given trouble is that, on November 9,
1911, Policarpia Mogillo, by document acknowledged before a notary
public, assigned in partition to her four children of first and second
marriages certain specific portions of her property, and the plaintiffs
have, since that date, been actually occupying the portions so assigned
to them, and this document is relied upon as proof of their ownership
of such parcels. But this document, the execution of which is
unquestioned, contains in its last paragraph a statement that this
division was intended to be definitive so long as the grantor should
not otherwise dispose (va en caracter de definitivo interin no disponga otra cosa). This clearly indicates that the grantor intended to reserve a power of absolute disposition.

Finally, on May 13, 1914, or shortly before the registration proceeding
was begun by Prudencio Tirambulo, Policarpia Mogillo sold and conveyed
to him the two parcels of land which were presently the subject of
registration proceedings, and that transfer supplied the basis upon
which registration was effected. At that time Policarpia Mogillo was
living with one of the plaintiffs, though later she has been living
with the Tirambulos.

As to how and when Policarpia Mogillo
acquired the property which she thus conveyed to Tirambulo, the court
of registration found that she acquired it during her second marriage
by purchase from one Nicolas Planas, and the proof showing such
acquisition is at least more convincing than the proof that she
acquired it during the first marriage. It is evident that the long
occupation of portions of the property by the plaintiffs has tended to
engender in their mind in late days the belief that they ought, any
way, to be owners of the parcels so held by them. But the decree of the
Court of Land Registration refutes this, and there is no proof before
us which would justify any court in annulling the title, or holding
Tirambulo to the obligations of a trustee with respect to the property.
We note that the only witness whose testimony tends to show an
agreement on the part of Tirambulo to procure the Torrens title in
behalf of the three plaintiffs, as well as in behalf of his own wife,
is Marcelino Buntigao. But he is a highly interested party, being the
husband of Crisanta Suarez. His testimony is denied by the defendant
Tirambulo and wife, and we are of the opinion that the trial judge was
correct in finding the issue of fact in favor of the defendants.

The long lapse of time during which the plaintiffs have made no move
looking towards the assertion of their claim, when it is absolutely
certain that they knew the state of the title, and acquiesced in the
claim of the defendants, is convincing that the agreement was not made.
Upon this point it is proved that, after the property was registered in
the name of Tirambulo, the tax assessor appeared among these plaintiffs
and they voluntarily signed the transfers authorizing the assessment of
the property thereafter in the name of Tirambulo. Since that time he
has uniformly paid the taxes; and although the plaintiffs claim that
they have accounted to him for their share of the taxes, the trial
judge found that this pretense was not supported by the evidence, and
we think that he committed no error in so holding.

The judgment appealed from will be affirmed, and it is so ordered, without pronouncement as to costs.

Abad Santos, Vickers, Butte, and Diaz, JJ., concur.