IÑIGO S. DAZA, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. FELISA TOMACRUZ AND PABLO TANJUTCO, DEFENDANTS AND APPELLANTS.

The
plaintiff herein brought this action in the Court of First Instance of
Bulacan for the partition of a parcel of land and the improvements
thereon described in certificate of title No. 3411, to obtain damages
from the defendants herein, and to compel them to render an accounting
of their administration of the property in question, consisting in a
fishery.

The defendants appealed from the judgment ordering
the partition of the property in question; from the order appointing
partition commissioners; and from the order approving the report
submitted by the majority of said commissioners and adjudicating to
each party in his corresponding share thereof. They likewise appealed
from the order prohibiting them from taking and selling fish from the
fishery in question without first obtaining permission of the court.

The facts established by the evidence are stated in the opinion of the trial court as follows:

“It
is an established fact that the property described in the complaint is
the same designated as No. 3 in certificate of title No. 3411 (Exhibit
C) issued in the name of Felisa Tomacruz on October 1, 1927, in spite
of the fact that this same property belongs not only to her but also to
her brother, the Rev. Father Tirso Tomacruz. Felisa mortgaged the
property for the first time on October 24, 1927, to the Philippine
National Bank to secure the payment of a loan of P7,000 with interest
thereon at the rate of 9 per cent per annum. In none of the
above-mentioned transactions, that is, the registration and the
mortgage of the land in question, did her brother and coowner, Father
Tirso Tomacruz, intervene or was he mentioned.

“The reason
for this omission cannot be categorically ascertained from the records
of the case, but the truth is that one month after the first mortgage
was constituted, Felisa, as a mere formality, conveyed one-half of the
property in question through an absolute sale to Father Tirso without
receiving any amount therefor, inasmuch as the act was nothing more
than a recognition of the latter’s participation therein. The sale,
however, was not noted immediately on the corresponding certificate of
title and the omission of such notation thereon afforded Felisa the
opportunity to constitute, as she did in fact constitute, a second
mortgage on the property on March 8, 1929, although two additional
parcels of land were included, for the sum of two thousand pesos
(P2,000) with interest thereon at the rate of 10 per cent per annum,
and to give force and effect to such mortgage by having it noted on the
corresponding certificate of title on the following day, March 9, 1929.

“Notwithstanding
these anomalies, nothing would have happened, had it not occurred to
Father Tirso to sell, as he did in fact sell, his share in the property
to the plaintiff herein, Iñigo S. Daza, on November 29, 1929. Daza
presented the deed of sale for registration on December 4, 1929, but
inasmuch as the registration of Father Tirso’s document of acquisition
was a necessary requisite thereto, he also presented for registration
the deed of sale executed by Felisa Tomacruz in favor of Father Tirso.
Both documents were finally recorded on the aforementioned date but
inasmuch as during the proceedings Daza learned of the existence of the
lien on the property purchased by him, he demanded of Father Tirso the
redemption of the mortgage in question. Father Tirso, who, according to
the deed of sale had already received the sum of eighteen thousand
pesos (P18,000) in consideration thereof, refunded to Daza the sum of
P3,225.84. Instead of redeeming the mortgage, Daza bought the
Philippine National Bank’s rights and anomalously became a mortgage
creditor with the right to foreclose the mortgage on all of the
property acquired by him. This purchase was recorded on January 7,
1931. Daza demanded of the defendants herein the partition of the
property in question and inasmuch as they refused to comply therewith,
he instituted this action now under consideration.”

In their brief, the appellants assign twenty-one (21) alleged errors as
committed by the trial court in its decision. This extensive assignment
of errors is rather due to the method of unnecessarily subdividing
questions of fact and of law which are kindred in nature. In its
decision, the court reduced all the questions raised in the pleadings
to four, to wit: (1) Whether the sale executed in favor of the appellee
was fictitious as claimed by the appellants; (2) whether the latter are
entitled to a reimbursement of the alleged expenses for improvements;
(3) whether they are still entitled to exercise the right of legal
redemption; and (4) whether the appellee is entitled to the partition
sought by him. Aside from the other questions arising from the
subsequent orders excepted to by the appellants, we are of the opinion
that among the questions raised, those formulated by the court are the
only ones that really deserve serious consideration.

In this
instance, the appellants have abandoned their claim that the purchase
by the appellee of one-half of the property was fictitious and
fraudulent. They have undoubtedly been convinced by the overwhelming
evidence presented by the appellee, which established the sale of the
litigated half of the property beyond question. The appellants could
not seriously question the aforesaid transfer thereof on the ground
that they admitted from the beginning that Father Tirso Tomacruz was a
coowner in the same proportion of the fishery in question.

The court held that the appellants were not entitled to a reimbursement
of the alleged expenses for improvements on the ground that the records
show that they did not in good faith spend for such improvements the
money they obtained from mortgages on all of the property, which
mortgages were constituted behind Father Tomacruz’s back, without his
knowledge or consent, notwithstanding the fact that he was a coowner
thereof. The court, likewise, declared that even granting that the
appellants were entitled to such reimbursement, Father Tomacruz had
already contributed his proportionate share thereof by returning to the
appellee the sum of P3,225.84 deducted from the P18,000 representing
the price of his share of one-half of the property in question. These
conclusions are supported by the weight of the evidence and are in
accordance with the findings of the court.

The appellants
were denied the exercise of the right of legal redemption invoked by
them in their cross-complaint on the ground that they made use of said
right too late, that is, only on February 22, 1931, whereas, on the
other hand, the records show that the sale executed by Father Tomacruz
in favor of the appellee was recorded in the registry of deeds on
December 4, 1929. In accordance with article 1524 of the Civil Code
which fixes a period of nine (9) days within which the right of legal
redemption may be exercised, it is evident that the appellants lost
such right due to the lapse of the aforesaid period. (Sempio vs. Del Rosario, 44 Phil., 1.)

The appellants contend that the exact price paid for the property was
P14,774.16 inasmuch as the sum of P3,225.84 was returned to the
appellee by Father Tomacruz, and they likewise argue that, in view of
this circumstance, the period for the exercise of the right of legal
redemption should commence from the date they were informed of the
exact price thereof and not from the date the transfer was recorded.
The fallacy of such reasoning, which is evidently based on false
premises, is at once apparent. It is not true that the price was not
P18,000. If the vendor was obliged to return the sum of P3,225.84, it
was due to the appellants’ having mortgaged all of the property twice
without his knowledge or consent, thus placing their coowner in an
embarrassing situation with respect to the purchaser, the herein
appellee, and he had to reimburse the latter by returning to him
one-half of the amount of the liens already existing on the share sold.
Hence, in the last analysis, the appellants herein were responsible for
the reduction suffered by Father Tomacruz in the price of his one-half
participation in the property in question.

The appellants’
last contentions which deserve consideration are those arising from the
subsequent orders relative to the appointment of partition
commissioners, the approval of the report submitted by the majority
thereof, and the prohibition to sell fish without first obtaining
permission of the court. Inasmuch as the partition applied for was in
order, it was the duty of the court to appoint capable commissioners
for that purpose and this is exactly what it did. The majority of the
said commissioners found a just and equitable way of dividing the
property into two parts, one of which they allotted to each litigant.
This disproves the appellants’ contention that the fish-pond was not
susceptible of division and it is clear that the court did not commit
an error in approving the report in question. But the appellants
contend that another division should have been made of the fishery in
the manner proposed by them. The fact that the court rejected their
proposition does not necessarily mean that it committed an error
inasmuch as we are convinced that the partition recommended by the
majority of the commissioners and approved by the court was the most
convenient, just and equitable. With regard to the prohibition, the
court undoubtedly adopted such measure in order to equally safeguard
the rights of both parties with the view of determining the products of
the fish-pond so that, at the proper time, it could adjudicate to each
coowner his corresponding share thereof. We see nothing objectionable
in this precaution. With the adoption of such a measure, further
unnecessary litigation will doubtless be avoided.

The
judgment appealed from being in accordance with the law, it is hereby
affirmed, with costs against the appellants. So ordered.

Malcolm, Villa-Real, Abad Santos, and Hull, JJ., concur.