CLEMENTE LACESTE, PETITIONER, VS. PAULINO SANTOS, DIRECTOR OF PRISONS, RESPONDENT.

The petitioner, Clemente Laceste, prays the court to set him at liberty
through the writ of habeas corpus, pleading that there is no sufficient legal
ground for continuing his imprisonment any longer.

Together with Nicolas Lachica, he had been prosecuted, found guilty, and
sentenced to commitment for the crime of rape.

Subsequently Nicolas Lachica married the victim, Magdalena de Ocampo, and was
accordingly relieved from the criminal prosecution by virtue of section 2, Act
No. 1773, and article 448 of the Penal Code then in force, which provided that
such a marriage extinguished penal liability, and hence, the penalty. But the
petitioner herein continued serving his sentence, which was not affected by the
marriage of his coaccused and the offended party.

However, he is now entitled to the benefits accruing from such marriage in
accordance with the last paragraph of article 344 of the Revised Penal Code, in
force since the first of this year, providing as follows:

“In cases of seduction, abduction, acts of lasciviousness and rape, the
marriage of the offender with the offended party shall extinguish the criminal
action or remit the penalty already imposed upon him. The provisions of this
paragraph shall also be applicable to the coprincipals, accomplices and
accessories after the fact of the above-mentioned crimes.”

“En los casos de estupro, rapto, abusos deshonestos y violacion, el
matrimonio del ofensor con la ofendida extinguira la accion penal, a la
pena que ya se le hubiere impuesto. Lo dispuesto en este parrafo alcanza lo
mismo a los coautores que a los complices y encubridores de los delitos ya
mencionados.” (We have italicized the a).

We have quoted both the English and the Spanish text, in order to show the
real meaning of the provision; for the Spanish version contains a clerical
error: the preposition a is used instead of the disjunctive conjunction p in the
third line, so that it reads “a la pena que ya se le hubiere impuesto,”
instead of “o la pena que ya se le hubiere impuesto.”

The Attorney-General, answering the petition, is in favor of granting it,
because, under the aforementioned last paragraph of article 344 of the Revised
Penal Code now in force, which has retroactive effect, the petitioner is
entitled, to his liberty. We approve and adopt the following observations made
by the former:

“It is believed that the Revised Penal Code, Act No. 3815, article 344, last
paragraph, applies to the case of the herein petitioner, and that he should be
discharged from prison. All penal laws have been declared retroactive by the
Honorable Supreme Court in the cases of People vs. Moran (44 Phil.,
433); People vs. Parel (44 Phil., 437). And the Legislature, under
section 366 of the New Penal Code, has clearly intended to give retroactive
effect to article 22, because section 366 provides:

” ‘Without prejudice to the provisions contained in article 22 of this Code,
felonies and misdemeanors, committed prior to the date of effectiveness of this
Code, shall be punished in accordance with the Code or Acts in force at the time
of their commission.’

“If it was not the intention of the Legislature to make the new Code
retroactive, it would have used the words ‘notwithstanding’ or ‘in
spite of, instead of ‘without prejudice.’ “

Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code reads as follows:

“Art. 22. Retroactive effect of penal laws.—Penal laws shall have a
retroactive effect in so far as they favor the person guilty of a felony, who is
not a habitual criminal, as this term is defined in rule 5 of article 62 of this
Code, although at the time of the publication of such laws a final sentence has
been pronounced and the convict is serving the same.”

That this article applies to crimes committed before the new Code took
effect, cannot be doubted, for article 366 of said Code unmistakably provides
for such cases in the following words:

“Art. 366. Application of laws enacted prior to this Code.—Without
prejudice to the provisions contained in article 22 of this Code, felonies and
misdemeanors, committed prior to the date of effectiveness of this Code shall be
punished in accordance with the Code or Acts in force at the time of their
commission.”

It may be clearly seen that as far back as the year 1884, when the Penal Code
took effect in these Islands until the 81st of December, 1931, the principle
underlying our laws granting to the accused in certain cases an exception to the
general rule that laws shall not be retroactive when the law in question favors
the accused, has evidently been carried over into-the Revised Penal Code at
present in force in the Philippines through article 22, quoted above. This is an
exception to the general rule that all laws are prospective, not retrospective,
variously contained in the following maxims: Lex prospicit, non respicit (the
law looks forward, not backward); lex de futuro, judex de praeterito
(the law provides for the future, the judge for the past); and adopted in a
modified form with a prudent limitation in our Civil Code (article 3).
Conscience and good law justify this exception, which is contained in the
well-known aphorism:

Favorabilia sunt amplianda, odiosa restringenda. As one
distinguished author has put it, the exception was inspired by sentiments of
humanity, and accept by science.

Article 22 of the new Penal Code is applicable to the petitioner, who comes
within one of the cases especially provided for in article 344 of the Code: this
is a point upon which there neither is, nor can be, any discussion between the
parties to this case.

Wherefore, the petition is granted. Let the petitioner be immediately set at
liberty, with costs de oficio. So ordered.

Avanceña, C. J., Johnson, Street, Malcolm, Villamor, Ostrand,
Villa-Real, and Imperial, JJ., concur.