ESTATE OF THE DECEASED ALFREDO PARDO DE TAVERA. CARMEN PARDO DE TAVERA Y CEMBRANO, PETITIONER AND APPELLANT, VS. PAZ LOPEZ MANZANO VIUDA DE PARDO DE TAVERA, OPPOSITOR AND APPELLEE.

From the findings made by the trial judge in the order entered by him
in this case, which must be here accepted as conclusive since no motion
for a new trial based on the insufficiency of the evidence was
presented, there are taken the following facts:

Alfredo
Pardo de Tavera died in the City of Manila on August 21, 1928. In due
course the widow of the deceased was named administratrix of the
estate, the estate was divided between her and the minor child of the
deceased and the administratrix, and on July 31, 1930, the case was
definitely archived. Carmen Pardo de Tavera y Cembrano, the sister of
the deceased, had personal knowledge of the pendency of the proceedings
above-mentioned, but saw fit not to present the will of the deceased
for probate. It was only on September 10, 1931, that the sister offered
the will for legalization, and asked that all previous action taken in
the administration be declared null and void. It is our understanding
that by the terms of the will, the sister was named the executrix, but
was not made a legatee, the entire estate of the deceased, with the
exception of a gold watch, being left to the minor child.

When the petition of the sister was filed, it met with the opposition
of the widow. After hearing, Judge Albert sustained the views of the
latter and accordingly dismissed the petition. The legal question
raised by the sole assignment of error of the losing party is addressed
to the action of the trial court in denying the probate of the will
left by the deceased Alfredo Pardo de Tavera.

Sections 657,
658, and 659 of the Code of Civil Procedure were manifestly designed to
fit the case of the discovery of a will during the pendency of
intestate proceedings. The jurisprudence of Vermont from which the
above cited sections were copied is silent on the question at issue.
However, the Code of Civil Procedure, in section 306, further provides
that the effect of a judgment or final order in an action or special
proceeding before a court having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment
or order, may be, in respect to the administration of the estate of a
deceased person, conclusive upon the administration. This provision is
derived from California, and there a decree of distribution is
considered essentially a proceeding in the nature of one in rem.
There is no law in this jurisdiction indicating what should be done on
the presentation of a will after the intestate proceedings have been
closed, or fixing the time within which a will may be probated. The
principles of the common law which permit the probate of a valid will
produced even following the distribution of the estate as intestate
property at any time no matter how great after the death of the
testator, are not perforce controlling. There are present sound
practical considerations which will serve to guide us to a right
conclusion. The sister has no material interest in the estate of her
deceased brother. Aside from the fact that she failed to act as
executrix, probably through her own negligence, she has no claim
against the estate. She, therefore, lacks standing to offer the will
for probate at this late date. Further, it is self-evident that should
the will be probated, the estate would be distributed between the
surviving widow and the only child exactly as it has been distributed
in the regular administration proceedings. Why then permit the doing of
a totally inconsequential act at the behest of one not primarily
interested? We think the trial judge was right in denying the probate
of the will.

To repeat, the case before us is one where the
statute is silent as to what action should be taken when a will is
presented for probate after the distribution of the estate of a
deceased person, but where the statute generally makes the judgment or
order in respect to the administration of the estate of a deceased
person conclusive, and where the petitioner has no claim against the
estate of the deceased, but on the contrary with knowledge of the
pendency of intestate proceedings, has preferred to remain silent—in
such case we hold that the petitioner is without legal right to insist
on the probate of the will. Out of excessive caution, let it be
understood that this ruling does not have to do with a case where a
will is proved during the pendency of intestate proceedings, and does
not relate to the case of one with an interest in an estate who offers
a will for probate even after the administration has been closed and of
whom an unconscionable advantage may have been taken through fraud,
accident, or mistake. These possible cases will be left for decision as
they arise. (Re Estate of William Walker [1911], 36 L. R. A. [N. S.], 89.)

Fully convinced of the untenability of appellant’s position, the result
will be to affirm the order from which the appeal has been taken, with
the costs of this instance against the appellant.

Avanceña, C. J., Hull, Vickers, and Imperial, JJ., concur.