CHANG KA HEE, IN BEHALF OF HIS SON DIONG SONG KENG, PETITIONER AND APPELLEE, VS. THE INSULAR COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS, RESPONDENT AND APPELLANT.

The Collector of Customs appealed from the decision of the Court of First
Instance of Manila, declaring that petitioner Diong Song Keng is entitled to
enter and remain in this country.

On December 5, 1930, Diong Song Keng arrived at the Port of Manila on board
steamship Susmia from China, and applied for permission to enter and reside in
this country, claiming he is entitled thereto by reason of the fact that he is a
minor son of Chang Ka Hee, a citizen of the Republic of China, with a
non-resident’s certificate issued under section 6, and at present a teacher at
the Chinese Y. M. C. A., Manila.

He was investigated by a special board appointed by the appellant, and in
view of all the evidence presented, this board of special enquiry decided that
the appellee was not entitled to reside in this country, and accordingly denied
his petition. An appeal was taken to the Insular Collector of Customs, who
affirmed the decision in its entirety. The appellee then applied to the Court of
First Instance of Manila for a writ of habeas corpus, and in view of the
evidence adduced, the appellant’s decision was reversed and the appellee
declared to be entitled to remain in the country as a minor son of his aforesaid
father. From this judgment the Attorney-General appealed.

The appellant assigns two errors in his brief, to wit:

“1. In holding that the customs authorities abused their discretion and
authority in refusing the applicant Diong Song Keng admission to this country as
the minor son of the petitioner Chang Ka Hee.

“2. In issuing the writ of habeas corpus prayed for.” This appeal raises a
question of fact, and another of law. The former relates to the evidence adduced
at the administrative investigation, and the latter to the appellee’s right
arising from such evidence.

The decision of the board of special enquiry, affirmed by the Insular
Collector of Customs, contains the following findings:

“The applicant Diong Song Keng, male, 14 years is seeking admission into this
country as a minor son of Chang Ka Hee, a Section Six traveller. His name
appeared on the precis and notary affidavit of his alleged father. He is,
however, refused landing by the board on account of contradiction and
discrepancy in his statement.

“Diong Song Keng testified that his alleged father, Chang Ka Hee, was a
teacher before coming to this country, but when he was asked to name the school
in which his father was teaching, he was unable to do so. He further stated that
his alleged father was teaching in Amoy. The alleged father, however, declared
that he was teaching in Fuklin before coming here, a place entirely different
from the one mentioned by the applicant. Upon further examination of the
proceeding in this case, it was found that Fuklin Is the birth place of the
applicant and also the place where his alleged father pursued his profession as
a teacher. If the applicant is really the son of Chang Ka Hee, he should have
known where his alleged father was then a teacher. No reason is seen why he
should know his father’s calling without knowing where did his father practice
that calling, more so when his father practiced said profession in the town
where the present applicant was born. Such a common knowledge supposed to be
known to all members of Chang Ka Hee’s family ought to have been known to the
applicant if he is the true son of the former. It may be argued that the
applicant was then only a boy of tender age when the alleged father left China
for this country and that he is not expected to know such small detail. The
board could not concede to this argument. It maintained, on the contrary, that
the applicant by this time ought to have known where his alleged father worked
as a teacher before coming to this country, for undoubtedly the older members of
the applicant’s family (mother and grandparents) with whom he was left in China,
ought to have told him something about his father particularly where and what
his father used to be. If the applicant was able to know his father’s
profession, his birth place and other data in connection with his family, it
also follows that by now he ought to have known where his alleged father
practice his profession. Children as a rule are inquisitive and if the applicant
is really the son of Chang Ka Hee as he claims to be, he should have at least
known the place where his father used to be a teacher.

“It may be mentioned in this connection that the applicant is completely
ignorant of his surrounding in China.

He does not know his immediate neighbor living in a house just fifty steps
from his own. When the alleged father was asked the same question he was able to
give the name of that immediate neighbor in spite of the fact that he left China
for the first time almost seven years ago. The applicant in this case looks to
be an intelligent boy or at least above the average for a boy of his age and the
board could not believe his testimony to the effect that he does not know his
nearest neighbor. He has been living as a neighbor of the person named by his
alleged father for almost one-half of his lifetime and the board believes that
he should at least know even the name only of that particular neighbor.”

It will be noted that in affirming the decision of the board of special
enquiry and denying the appellee’s right to enter, the appellant relied, in the
main, upon contradictions in the statements of the petitioner-appellee’ and his
alleged father, Chang Ka Hee. From these contradictions, both the board of
special enquiry and the Insular Collector of Customs inferred that the appellee
was not a son of the alleged father. We have examined the evidence presented
during the investigation and find that it sufficiently sustains the conclusions
of the customs officials. The petitioner-appellee stated, for example, that his
alleged father was a teacher before coming to Manila, but upon being asked the
name of the school or college where his alleged father taught, he was unable to
do so. He further stated that his so-called father taught at Amoy. The latter,
however, testifying in favor of the petitioner, declared under oath that he
taught in Fuklin before coming here, which place is entirely different from that
named by the appellee.

It has been repeatedly held that decisions rendered by customs officials in
matters of immigration may be reversed only when they involve an abuse of
discretion or authority, and that there is no such violation of the law when any
principle of evidence justifies the findings of the aforesaid officials. (Tan
Beko vs. Collector of Customs, 26 Phil., 254; Que Quay vs.
Collector of Customs, 33 Phil. 128; Guevara vs. Collector of Customs,
34 Phil., 394; Molden vs. Collector of Customs, 34 Phil., 493; and
Chattamat vs. Collector of Customs, 42 Phil., 916.)

It appearing that the Insular Collector of Customs has not exceeded his
powers or abused his discretion or authority, the judgment appealed from is
reversed and it is held that the petitioner-appellee is not entitled to enter
and remain in this country; without special award of costs. So ordered.

Avanceña, C. J., Johnson, Street, Malcolm, Villamor, Ostrand,
Romualdez, and Villa-Real, JJ., concur.