THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. RICARDO PAÑGAN AND DIEGO TIGLAO, DEFENDANTS. RICARDO PANGAN, APPELLANT.

This is an appeal by Ricardo Pangan from the judgment of the Court of First
Instance of Pampanga convicting him of the murder of Pastor Cabral qualified by
treachery, with the generic aggravating circumstance of evident pre-meditation
offset by the mitigating circumstance of proximate vindication of a grave
offense, and sentencing him to life imprisonment, with the accessories of law,
to pay P1,000 indemnity to the heirs of the deceased, and the costs.

In support of his appeal the appellant assigns the following alleged errors
as committed by the trial court in its judgment to wit:

“1. The trial court erred in finding the accused guilty of the crime of
murder.

“2. The trial court erred in not holding that the accused acted in
self-defense.

“3. The trial court erred in sentencing the accused to life
imprisonment.”

The following facts were proved at the trial beyond a reasonable doubt:

Pastor Cabral, the deceased, was the superintendent of the hacienda
of Victoria Hizon Vda. de Rodriguez in the municipality of Arayat, Province of
Pampanga. The accused Ricardo Pañgan worked as a co-tenant on shares on the
estate, and as such was under the deceased. At various times before the incident
in question, the defendant’s carabaos had been caught browsing in several parts
of the plantation destroying tender sugar-cane shoots. At about 11 in the
morning of the day in question, that is, February 24,1931, the deceased, annoyed
at the report that two calves belonging to the accused had been caught again on
the sugar plantation, sent for the defendant. When he arrived, the deceased
angrily demanded why he let his carabaos run loose. The accused answered meekly,
“I do not let them run loose, uncle”, and excused himself saying that if his
carabaos have run loose that time, it was because he had gone to visit a cousin
who was ill in the hospital. The deceased then said: “You certainly are
bull-headed, appear to have no shame and pay no attention to what I tell you.”
And approaching him, he struck him twice with a whip he carried, similar to
Exhibit 1 of the government, hitting him in the left temporal region, and in the
occipital region, making his ear bleed. The accused offered no resistance, but
tried only to evade the blows. Upon seeing this, Cirilo Pafigan, who was passing
by at the moment and had stopped to listen, intervened and separated the two. He
then went up to the accused and told him to be patient with the deceased,
because the latter was the defendant’s best man at his wedding. Ricardo Pangan
told him he was not offering any resistance, and sat down upon the trunk of an
acacia tree. The deceased approached the defendant again, and insultingly asked
if he wanted to fight. The accused replied, “So long as I recognize you, I will
not fight.” Whereupon the deceased said: “Though all of you help one another,
I’ll shoot your heads off.” After that incident the accused retired to his home
to sleep. Between four and five in the afternoon of said day, the defendant went
to the deceased’s house, in order to ask him to return the two calves that had
been caught. As Pastor Cabral was not in, the defendant decided to wait and sat
down upon the stairs. Some moments later the deceased and his house companion,
Felix Rueda, arrived. The latter, who, went up first followed by Pastor Cabral,
told the accused to make way for them, which the accused did. Shortly after
Diego Tiglao also went up in order to liquidate his accounts with the
superintendent, Pastor- Cabral. The latter came downstairs and went to a place
some three meters from the staircase where the defendant was seated, answered a
call of nature with his back to the accused, and went upstairs again. After
taking his afternoon snack, Felix Rueda went to the fields, as instructed by the
deceased, to inspect the sugar-cane wagons, leaving the latter in the house with
Diego Tiglao. When he saw that the deceased was preparing to go down, the
accused descended the stairs and waited for him in the yard adjoining the house.
On coming down, Pastor Cabral saw the defendant and asked what he wanted. The
latter answered: “I have come, sir, to get my carabaos, and I beg you to give
them to me.” The deceased then said to him: “You bull-headed fellow without
shame, so you’ve come back, have you?” and going up to the accused kicked him
and struck him with a cane, which raised a welt on his left shoulder. As the
defendant stepped back to avoid the second blow aimed at him, the deceased
placed his right hand upon the handle of the revolver he carried at the waist.
When the accused saw the deceased take this attitude, he took out his knife
Exhibit D and opened it with his teeth. Pastor Cabral then drew his revolver but
before he could use it, the accused rushed at him and caught him by the hand
that held the weapon. During the ensuing struggle both fell to the ground, the
deceased upon his back and the accused upon, him, with one hand still gripping
his hand holding the revolver, and with the other stabbing him in the abdomen
and other parts of the body (Exhibit C), until at last he stabbed him in the
right arm, compelling him to drop the revolver. The accused took hold of it and
threw it to one side; then, going up to the house, he took the deceased’s whip
and ran towards the town of Santa Ana, on the way leaving it at his house. Upon
reaching at Santa Ana he went to the municipal building and gave himself up to
the authorities, delivering the knife Exhibit D to them. Pastor Cabral told
Feliciano Balboa, who had gone up to him attracted by the noise of the people,
that he felt he was dying from his wounds, and ordered him to tell his wife to
collect the insurance policy, and to tell his employer, Victoria Hizon Vda. de
Rodriguez not to abandon his family. Attracted by the same noise, Felix Rueda
went to the scene, and to him the wounded man said: “Call Aling Toring by
telephone, and tell her to take care of me and my children, because I am going
to die.” A few moments later Cirilo Pangan and the barrio lieutenant Macario
Gachalian arrived, and the deceased made the declaration which appears in
Exhibit B. The wounded man was then conveyed to the San Fernando Hospital where
he died that same night as a result of his wounds.

There is no question, then that the accused Ricardo Pañgan inflicted the
wounds that caused Pastor Cabral’s death. Nor is there any doubt that the latter
was a man of violent temper, who had the habit of beating the tenants on the
estate. And the accused-appellant, according to the evidence, having had the
deceased as sponsor at his marriage, respected him and regarded him so highly
that he suffered his ill treatment on the fatal morning with humility and
resignation, going quietly to his home. The record also shows that on the
afternoon of the same day, the accused-appellant did not go to the deceased’s
house for the purpose of revenge for such ill treatment, but in order to beg him
in all humility to return his two carabaos that had been caught; for if his
intention was to avenge himself, he had ample opportunity to do so while the
deceased stood three meters away answering to a call of nature with his back
towards him. Considering the deceased’s violent temper, and the defendant’s
immediate surrender to the authorities, there is more reason, for believing his
own testimony and that of his witnesses, than the evidence of the prosecution,
said testimony being corroborated by the wounds found upon the defendant’s body.
If when the accused asked for his carabaos, the deceased instead of granting the
request kicked him and hit him with a cane on the left shoulder, the deceased
was the aggressor. The defendant did not try to defend himself at once, but only
when he saw that the deceased was going to hit him again and had taken hold of
the revolver he carried. He then took his own knife out of his pocket and opened
it with his teeth, but did not use it until the deceased drew his revolver. In
view of the impending danger, the accused rushed at the deceased, caught hold of
the hand that held the revolver, and struggled with him so that both of them
fell to the ground with the deceased upon his back and the accused on top of
him. In this position, with the deceased still clutching his revolver, the
defendant, aware of his adversary’s violent temper, stabbed him several times
with the knife until he let go of the revolver. What the accused did in such a
critical moment is what any prudent man would have done under similar
circumstances.

In order to sustain its theory that the accused unexpectedly attacked the
deceased while the latter passed him on the way down from the house, the
prosecution mentions the blood stains found on the staircase and on the ground.
But it is an undisputed fact that immediately after stabbing the deceased, the
defendant went up the house to get the whip which the latter had left there, and
in doing so it is not unlikely that the blood that no doubt stained his hands
dripped on the stairs. This fact alone, then cannot serve to destroy the
defendant’s testimony with regard to the place of the struggle and the manner in
which it began.

We have, then, the following circumstances: an unlawful attack by the
deceased due solely to the. defendant’s insistence in begging that his carabaos
be returned to him; absence of sufficient provocation from the defendant; and
reasonable necessity of the means employed, namely, a penknife to repel an
attack with a cane and an impending attack with a revolver. All these
circumstances constitute complete self-defense which extinguishes criminal
liability as provided in article 8, No. 4, of the Penal Code.

Wherefore we are of opinion and hold that a person who, after being kicked,
and struck with a cane, without provocation on his part, takes out a penknife
from his pocket to defend himself from a second attack and with it stabs his
assailant several times after an unsuccessful struggle
to take away from him
a revolver he is holding in his hand, acts in complete defense of his person and
is exempt from criminal liability.

By virtue whereof, the accused-appellant having acted in self-defense, is
exempt from criminal liability for murder charged in the information, and is
hereby acquitted therefrom and said information dismissed, with costs de
oficio. So ordered.

Avanceña, C. J., Johnson, Street, Malcolm, Romualdez, and
Imperial, JJ., concur.