G.R. No. 35867. March 31, 1932

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. ALFREDO ROSIL (ALIAS LIBAT), DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT.

Decisions / Signed Resolutions March 31, 1932 VILLA-REAL, J.:
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VILLA-REAL, J.:


Alfredo Rosil (alias Libat) appeals to this court from the sentence,
of the Court of First Instance of Palawan convicting him of the crime of
parricide without any modifying circumstance, and sentencing him to life
imprisonment, the accessaries of law, an indemnity of P500 to the heirs of the
deceased, and to pay the costs.

In support of his appeal, the appellant assigns the following alleged errors
as committed by the trial court in its judgment, to wit:

“1 The lower court erred in holding the accused and appellant guilty of the
crime of parricide.

“2. The trial court erred in sentencing the herein appellant to cadena
perpetua.

“3. The court of origin erred in not estimating the following attenuating
circumstances: (1) vindicacion proxima, de una ofensa grave al acusado;
(2) arrebato y obcecacion; and (3) lack of instruction on the part of
the accused herein appellant.

“4. The court below erred in not acquitting the accused from the crime
charged in the information.

“5. The court below erred in denying the petition for continuance of the
hearing of this case by the defense.”

The following facts were proved at the trial beyond a reasonable doubt:

The accused Alfredo Rosil (alias Libat) married the deceased Tomasa
Magalito according to the rites of the Tagbanua tribe to which both of them
belonged. Prior to October 13, 1930 the accused became suspicious that his wife
was unfaithful to him, because she would leave their home alone and go with a
man named Urbano. Later she deserted the conjugal home for another house,
refusing to return when her husband begged her to do so. On the afternoon of the
day of record, October 13, 1930, the accused spoke to his wife about her
conduct, and she answered that she had a right to act as she did. At this the
defendant slapped her and beat her with a strip of rattan. As she resisted, he
stabbed her in the left side of the breast with the knife Exhibit B, and then
gave himself up at once to the barrio lieutenant, Santiago Garcia, his
half-brother, to whom he said he had killed his wife, and delivered up the
knife, Exhibit B. An hour later his victim died. The following morning Santiago
Garcia went to the defendant’s home, where the crime had been committed, in the
sitio of Cumapcap, barrio of Bucungan, municipality of Puerto Princesa, Province
of Palawan, and there he found the body of the deceased Tomasa Magalito on a
bed, with a wound in the right side of her breast. On October 20, 1930 while the
defendant was under arrest, he was investigated by the provincial fiscal,
Antonio Lacson, who questioned him in English, the clerk of court Pedro Valdes
interpreting into the Cuyuno dialect which is the defendant’s native dialect.
The statement he made at that investigation appears in Exhibit D, which he
signed after its contents had been interpreted for him into Cuyuno, and wherein
he relates the same facts he had recounted to his half-brother.

At the preliminary investigation held on October 22, 1930 before Gaudencio
Abordo, the justice of the peace of Puerto Princesa, the accused, with counsel
de ofieio, upon arraignment pleaded guilty, ratifying what he had stated before
the provincial fiscal (Exhibit D) and signing Exhibit C of his own free will,
after its contents had been interpreted into the Tagbanua dialect, which he
understands.

The above statement of facts, proven beyond a reasonable doubt at the trial,
leaves no room for doubt that the accused was the one who caused the death of
the deceased Tomasa Magalito, to whom he was married according to the rites of
the tribe of Tagbanuas to which both of them belonged, which rites sanctioned
said marriage according to the admission of the accused, and constitutes the
crime of parricide, denned and penalized in, article 402 of the Penal Code, the
penalty fixed by law being life imprisonment to death. To graduate said penalty
the mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation must be considered,
without any aggravating circumstance to offset it, for which reason the penalty
must be imposed in the minimum degree, that is, life imprisonment.

Wherefore, finding the judgment appealed from to be in conformity with the
law and the evidence, it is hereby affirmed in its entirety with costs against
the appellant, it being understood that in accordance with the Revised Penal
Code the penalty is reclusion perpetua and not cadena perpetua. So ordered.

Avanceña, C. J., Johnson, Street, Romualdez, and Imperial,
JJ.,
concur.


CONCURRING

MALCOLM, J.

The decision prepared by Justice Villa-Real contains the following very
significant language: “The above statement of facts, proven beyond reasonable
doubt at the trial, leaves no room for doubt that the accused was the one who
caused the death of the deceased Tomasa Magalito, to whom he was married
according to the rites of the tribe of Tagbanuas to which both of them belonged,
which rites sanctioned said marriage according to the admission of the accused,
and constitutes the crime of parricide.” This means, I take it, the definite
abandonment of the doctrine announced in the cases of United States vs.
Tubban ([1915], 29 Phil, 434), and United States vs. Verzola ([1916],
3.3 Phil., 285), refusing to recognize a tribal marriage ceremony—a doctrine
which this court has heretofore declined to follow in the civil case of Adong
vs. Cheong Seng Gee ([1922], 43 Phil., 43). Such action also conforms
to the portion of section 25 of the existing Marriage Law providing: “Marriages
between persons who do not profess the Mohammedan or Christian religions nor any
particular religion and who inhabit any of the regions of the Philippine Islands
which are under the jurisdiction of the Bureau of non-Christian Tribes may also
be performed in accordance with the rites and practices of their religion, if
they have any, or with tribal customs if not.” Marriage relations among
individuals living in regions ordinarily referred to as non-Christian are just
as sacred and should be just as much respected as are the marriage relations of
individuals settled in more advanced communities and adhering to recognized
religions. With the understanding, therefore, that the decision means a complete
reversal of the attitude adopted in the two cases previously referred to, I
concur in the result.