VALENTINA CATALLA, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. THE TAYABAS LUMBER CO., ETC., DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT.

The
Tayabas Lumber Company appeals from the judgment rendered by the Court
of First Instance of Tayabas, the dispositive part of which reads as
follows:

“Wherefore, the defendant is
hereby sentenced to pay the plaintiff the sum of P3 a week from
September 12, 1930, and for the period of 208 weeks, with costs. The
defendant shall also pay the plaintiff the sum of P40 for the
deceased’s funeral expenses. The plaintiff is absolved from the
counterclaim.”

The action was filed by an
old woman, Valentina Catalla, in accordance with the provisions of the
Workmen’s Compensation Act, to obtain from the defendant an indemnity
for the accident which resulted in the sudden death of her son, Mariano
Oriel.

On September 7, 1930, Lu Kang in his capacity as the
defendant’s entity’s administrator, and Joaquin Martinez and Fabian
Mercurio, entered into an agreement in writing (Spanish translation
Exhibit 1-A) which, translated into English, reads as follows:

“Know all men by these presents:

“That
we, Joaquin Martinez and Fabian Mercurio, both of age, married and
residents of the barrio of Malicboy in the municipality of Pagbilao, as
parties of the first part, and Lu Kang, as administrator of the Tayabas
Lumber Company, as party of the second part, do hereby agree and
stipulate the following:

“We, Joaquin Martinez and Fabian
Mercurio, are actually in possession of two ‘kaingins’ situated in the
sitio called ‘Sapinit’ traversed by an old trail or path over which
timber from the mountains has been hauled, but said trail or path is
impassable due to the density of brush that has overgrown it; that, by
virtue of this contract, we have agreed with Mr. Lu Kang, manager of
the Tayabas Lumber Company, to have said trail or path cleared and
taken care of so as to facilitate the Tayabas Lumber Company in hauling
its timber over it, for the use of which trail or path, the latter
binds itself to pay us the sum of P50 per annum.

“We also
agree with the said Mr. Lu Kang that he will pay us in advance the sum
of P150 corresponding to the first three years’ use of the said trail
or path, and from this sum the expenses for the repair thereof shall be
taken.

“I, Lu Kang, administrator of the Tayabas Lumber Company, give my conformity to this agreement.

“In witness whereof, we hereunto sign this agreement this 7th day of September, 1930, here in Pagbilao, Tayabas.

	(Sgd.) “LU KANG
				(Sgd.)	“JOAQUIN MARTINEZ
					“FABIAN MERCURIO
	“Signed in the presence of:
	(Sgd.)		“J. MONDES
			“C. A. FELIPE”

In
accordance with this agreement, Martinez and Mercurio employed Mariano
Oriel, who had been working on the aforementioned trail, cutting trees
and brush and clearing the undergrowth. Five days after the
ratification of the contract Exhibit 1, that is, on September 12, 1930,
while Oriel was working thereon, a big tree fell upon him and he died a
few hours later as a result of the injuries he had received. The
deceased was earning from P1 to P2 daily which was paid him directly by
his employers, Martinez and Mercurio, without the intervention of the
appellant corporation.

The appellant assigns the following errors in his brief:

“I.
The lower court erred in holding that Mariano Oriel worked for the
defendant one year before the accident took place, which resulted in
his death.

“II. The lower court erred in holding that,
even granting that Mariano Oriel was employed by contractors Joaquin
Martinez and Fabian Mercurio, the defendant is still liable to pay
compensation under the Workmen’s Compensation Act. (Act No. 3428, as
amended.)

“III. The lower court erred in holding that
Mariano Oriel was working for the account and benefit of the defendant
at the time of the accident and not for the account and benefit of
Joaquin Martinez and Fabian Mercurio.

“IV. The lower
court erred in ordering the defendant to pay the plaintiff the sum of
P3 per week during the period of 208 weeks beginning September 12,
1930, and the sum of P40 as funeral expenses, instead of dismissing the
complaint, with costs against the plaintiff.”

Leaving aside the other questions raised in the appeal as unnecessary
for the purposes of this decision, the only important point on which
the case hinges is whether the deceased Oriel, at the time of the
accident, was an employee of the appellant in the legal sense.

We regret to be compelled to decide the question against the appellee’s
claim. This case should be decided not from a sympathetic point of view
which the working class well deserves, but in accordance with the
proven facts and the law applicable thereto. In accordance with Exhibit
1 and its translation Exhibit 1-A, there is no doubt but that the
deceased was not an employee or laborer of the appellant and that
between them there was not even a contractual or juridical relation.

The trail belonged to Martinez and Mercurio because it was within the
lands of which they were in possession. The contract executed between
them and the appellant was entirely independent of the latter’s
business of cutting timber, and the wages earned by the deceased came
directly from the owners of the lands. It is true that the appellant’s
timber had to pass over the trail which Martinez and Mercurio were to
open, but the appellant had not the least intervention in the task of
clearing it which the former undertook to do, except that of paying the
annual rent of P50 which was stipulated as payment for the use of said
trail. Employers should deserve before the law the same consideration
as workmen and they should not be held liable for accidents suffered by
those who are hot their laborers or employees. According to the
evidence, the relation created was between the deceased, on the one
hand, and Joaquin Martinez and Fabian Mercurio, on the other.

Having reached this conclusion, it is unnecessary to pass upon the other questions raised.

The counterclaim interposed by the appellant deserves no consideration
due to the fact that no assignment of error was made in connection
therewith and there is no sufficient evidence in support thereof.

The judgment appealed from is hereby reversed and the Tayabas Lumber
Company absolved from the complaint, without special pronouncement as
to costs for the reason that the plaintiff-appellee is poor. So ordered.

Villamor, Villa-Real, Hull, and Vickers, JJ., concur.