THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, APPLICANT AND APPELLEE, VS. JUAN FRANCO ET AL., CLAIMANTS. VICTOR RIVERA AND COHEIRS, APPELLANTS.

On
June 10, 1929, the Director of Lands, on behalf of the Government of
the Philippine Islands, filed a petition in the Court of First Instance
of Pampanga, in cadastral case No. 22, G. L. R. O. Record No. 1000, to
settle and adjudicate the title to two parcels of land located in the
municipality of Ploridablanca, Pampanga, in accordance with the
provisions of section 50 of Act No. 2874. Of these two parcels the lot
No. 1 contains an area of 3.4648 hectares and the lot No. 2 an area of
20.5352 hectares. In this proceeding there appeared as claimants Victor
Rivera and his coheirs, Romualdo, Antonia, Pelagia, and Geronima, of
the same surname, it being alleged that said claimants had acquired
possession of said lots by inheritance and that they, and their
predecessors in interest, had been in possession of the same for a
period of sixty years. At the hearing of the cause the Director of
Lands asserted the right of the Government in behalf of Juan Franco,
who has submitted his final proof for the purpose of securing a
homestead patent thereto; and Juan Franco himself appeared for the
purpose of proving his claim as a homesteader. After proof had been
submitted the trial court overruled the claim of the Riveras and
declared the land which is the subject of controversy to be public
land, subject to the rights of Juan Franco. From this judgment the
Rivera claimants appealed.

It appears that on June 14, 1894,
Vicente Manacmul obtained a possessory information showing him to be
the occupant of something near seventy-five hectares of land located in
the sitio of Tibag, in the barrio of San Isidro,
municipality of Floridablanca, in the Province of Pampanga, said land
being bounded on the north by Estero Cabalasan, on the east by land of
Nicolas Bravo, on the south by land of Timoteo Alberto, and on the west
by the Esteros Tibag and Cabalasan. This possessory information was
taken by Manacmul to the register’s office of the Province of Pampanga
in August, 1894, and on August 17 of the same year it was recorded by
the register of deeds. In connection with the recording of this
instrument, however, the register made it appear that, inasmuch as he
was not at that time able to search the old register to ascertain
whether there might be some older existing annotation to the contrary,
he suspended the inscription, reserving to his future convenience the
conversion of the provisional annotation into a definitive record. No
further entry appears to have been made, but it is evident that no
obstacle really existed which would have made definitive inscription
improper, or at least no adverse interest has shown itself in the
subsequent history of the property, other than that of Juan Franco,
which will presently be mentioned.

Vicente Manacmul appears
to have conveyed the property described in the possessory information
to Julian Vitug, the predecessor of the Rivera claimants, and the same
property is shown, under the same description, in the inventory of the
property of Julian Vitug, deceased, filed in the Court of First
Instance of Pampanga, on April 26, 1906, by the commissioners appointed
in the administration of said decedent. In the year 1902 a part of the
property covered by the possessory information was declared for the
purpose of taxation in the municipality of Floridablanca by Julian
Vitug, at a valuation of P1,015. But this assessment covered some 26
hectares only, or only about one-third of the area supposedly contained
in the possessory information.

But notwithstanding the
qualification made of the inscription of the possessory information by
the register of deeds, and notwithstanding a doubt suggested concerning
whether Julian Vitug and his successors actually exercised possession
over all the land supposed to be covered by the possessory information,
we will assume, for the purpose of the solution of this case, that the
record made of the possessory information was sufficient to accredit
the fact of possession at that time by Vicente Manacmul, that the
possessory information might, under the Spanish law, have ripened in
the course of twenty years into a dominical title, and that the
claimants of the surname of Rivera, as successors in interest of Julian
Vitug might, if not now barred by the statute of limitations, have
maintained their title to full ownership.

The proof
submitted in behalf of the Government and its protege, Juan Franco,
tends to show that prior to the year 1917, the lots in question did not
pertain to any individual but belonged to the Government; and it is
shown that said lots in the years extending from 1904 to 1922 were
within the forest concession of one Petronilo Songco, of Betis,
Pampanga, whose cutters were accustomed to take timber from the
property. Moreover, in the year 1917, Juan Franco entered upon the
property and, at the suggestion of Alejandro de Mesa, began to clear
and cultivate the lots. In connection with his occupation of the
property Franco built a house upon it, which he has been using as a
habitation for himself and family. After he had thus established
himself upon the land, Franco made application in the Bureau of Lands
for a homestead located thereon, believing in good faith that the land
belonged to the Government of the Philippine Islands. His application
was accepted and registered in the Bureau of Lands and upon his
compliance with all legal formalities, the Director of Lands later
ordered the measurement of the land and the taking of final proof.
Franco’s possession was exclusive and uninterrupted until the latter
part of the year 1929 when Victor Rivera, upon behalf of himself and
his brothers and sisters, entered upon the property and attempted to
plant a portion of ground which had already been prepared by Franco for
sugar cane. Furthermore, Franco’s possession was adverse as against all
the world except the Government of the Philippine Islands.

The facts above stated raise, to our mind, a simple and well defined
question of law, which is, whether Juan Franco, claiming in
subservience to the Government, is entitled to the benefit of
prescription under section 41 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Under
this provision, in order to vest title by prescription or adverse
possession, “the possession by the claimant or by the person under or
through whom he claims must have been actual, open, public, continuous,
under a claim of title exclusive of any other right and adverse to all
other claimants”. This language is very explicit, and if attention be
fixed precisely upon the letter of the law, it might seem that the
right of the homesteader could not be sustained, since he admittedly
did not claim adversely to the Government, and, therefore, it might
seem that his possession was not, to use the customary formula, adverse
to the whole world. There is indeed some authority for this point of
view, but the better doctrine, revealing the drift of the later cases,
is to the contrary; and it is now held, by the better considered
decisions, that a person who takes possession of land in the erroneous
belief that it is public land, with the intention of holding and
claiming it under the homestead law, may acquire title thereto by
adverse possession as against the true owner. (Schneider vs. Hutchinson, 76 Am. St. Rep., 481; Mass vs. Burdetzke, 93 Minn., 295; 106 Am. St. Rep., 436; Iowa Railroad Land Co. vs. Blumer, 206 U. S., 482, 495.) In Boe vs.
Arnold (54 Ore., 52; 20 Am. & Eng. Ann. Cases, 533), the Supreme
Court of Oregon had occasion to examine this question, and the older
cases in that jurisdiction, holding that possession held in
subservience to the Government was not adverse possession as against
the true owner, were overruled and the doctrine established in
conformity with the view above stated. This conclusion commends itself
to us as correct. It is axiomatic that prescription cannot be asserted
against the sovereign, and it is therefore futile for any claimant of
real property to claim adverse possession against the Government. It
results that it is never necessary, in order to acquire title by
adverse possession against an individual owner, that the person
asserting adverse possession should have held adversely to the
Government. The decisions bearing upon this point will be found
collated in the note to Boe vs. Arnold (20 Am. & Eng. Ann.
Cases, 533), as well as in 2 C. J., pp. 130, 131, and it is unnecessary
to extend the discussion.

From what has been said it follows
that the title of Juan Franco to the land claimed by him as homesteader
is good and no error was committed by the trial court in declaring said
parcels to be public land, subject to the rights acquired by the
homesteader.

The judgment appealed from is therefore correct and the same is affirmed, with costs against the appellants. So ordered.

Avanceña, C. J., Ostrand, Abad Santos, and Butte, JJ., concur.