IN RE CANCELLATION OF THE CERTIFICATE OF NATURALIZATION OF PAUL A. BELL. PAUL A. BELL, PETITIONER AND APPELLANT, VS. THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL, OPPOSITOR AND APPELLEE.

These are proceedings initiated by the Attorney-General to secure the
cancellation of the certificate of Philippine citizenship of Paul A. Bell. Two
questions are submitted on appeal, the first preliminary in nature, and the
second going to the merits. The preliminary question arises out of a motion
filed by the Attorney-General in the lower court and renewed in this court,
which seeks a ruling to the effect that an appeal does not lie from an order
setting aside a previous order granting a certificate of naturalization. The
second question relates to the legal soundness of the decision appealed
from.

On August 16, 1928, one, Paul A, Bell, a citizen of Russia, registered with
the Court of First Instance of Manila his application for Philippine
citizenship. The application was verified and contained the necessary averments
as required by law. After due publication and hearing, Judge Del Rosario
rendered a decision admitting the petitioner to Philippine citizenship. In due
course, a naturalization certificate was issued to the petitioner. On February
7, 1931, the Attorney-General presented a motion in the Court of First Instance
of Manila to secure the cancellation of the naturalization certificate issued in
favor of Paul A. Bell. This motion was sworn to by the chief of the secret
service of the police department of the City of Manila, and had attached to it
two exhibits tending to show falsity in the application of the petitioner and
intimating that the petitioner was “a Red agent of Russia, and that he keeps the
Russian Government informed of all the Communistic movements in these Islands.”
Following a hearing, the same judge who had heard the original application
ordered the cancellation of the certificate of citizenship of Paul A. Bell
(alias) Paul A. Beliatzky. When the latter attempted to appeal from
this decision, he was met by a motion, as before intimated, interposed by the
Attorney-General challenging his right of appeal. But he judge then acting in
Manila overruled the objection and approved the record on appeal.

A resolution of the preliminary question offers no difficulties. The
Naturalization Law, Act No. 2927, gives to the Court of First Instance of the
province or district in which the petitioner resides exclusive original
jurisdiction, and to the Supreme Court “appellate jurisdiction, as to the
hearing of petitions for naturalization” (sec. 6). The law further provides that
“The final sentence may, at the request of either of the parties, be carried to
the Supreme Court for revision in the form provided in section one hundred and
forty-three and following sections of the Code of Civil Procedure” (sec. 9).
Aside from the general provisions to be found in section 18 of the Judiciary
Law, Act No. 136, which grant the Supreme Court “appellate jurisdiction of all
actions and special proceedings properly brought to it from the courts of first
instance,” the special provisions to be found in the Naturalization Law are
applicable. The phrase “petitions for naturalization” appearing in the statute
should be given a liberal construction and should be taken as including not only
the original petition for naturalization but also a motion to secure the
annulment of an order allowing a petition for naturalization. We fully agree
with Judge Goddard when, sitting in first instance, he observed: “To say that
the law provides an appeal where a petitioner is simply denied citizenship and
does not provide such an appeal to the highest court in the land when his prized
certificate of citizenship is taken away from him and cancelled, in the same
proceeding, seems absurd. This court does not believe that the Legislature meant
that sections 6 and 9 of Act No. 2927 should be so construed.” The motion of the
Attorney-General will be disallowed.

Coming now to the merits, it is to be observed that the original petition for
naturalization and the testimony of the petitioner at the hearing were under
oath. According to law the petition was required to set forth, and in fact did
set forth, the name and surname of the applicant, his present and former places
of residence, his occupation, the place and date of his birth, whether single or
married, the approximate date of his arrival in the Islands, the name of the
port of debarkation, the name of the ship on which he came, and the fact that he
is not disqualified (sec. 5). It is noted that in the petition and at the trial,
the applicant gave his name as Paul A. Bell, although it is admitted that his
true name was Paul A. Beliatzky. The trial judge accepted the explanation
offered that the petitioner was commonly known as Paul A. Bell, and we likewise
are inclined to think this is a reasonable view. Further, it should be stated,
in all fairness to the petitioner, that the intimation that he was a red agent
was not supported by any competent evidence, and that the statement to this
effect contained in the communication of the chief of the secret service of the
police department amounted to no more than inadmissible hearsay evidence. But
the application and the testimony alike contained explicit data regarding the
date of arrival in the Philippines, which was fixed at April, 1923, and which;
accordingly, on August 16, 1928, would have covered the necessary five years of
residence as specifically required by section 3 of the Naturalization Law,
whereas, as a matter of fact, it is now conceded that the applicant arrived in
Manila on July 26, 1924, so that on August 16, 1928, he had only resided in the
Philippines a little over four years. Petitioner explains that this was a
mistake made in good faith, that unintentionally he misled his lawyer, that he
suffers from a frail memory, and that he occupies a responsible position with
the Radio Corporation. But again it is necessary to emphasize that these
statements relative to residence in the Philippine Islands were twice made under
oath, and had the effect of inducing the court to grant a certificate of
naturalization when it should not have been granted.

The Naturalization Law of 1920 provides the disqualifications for Philippine
citizenship and the qualifications for Philippine citizenship. Among other
things, the law prescribes the possession of “all and each of the following
qualifications: First. Residence in the Philippine Islands for a continuous
period of not less than five years, * * *” (sec. 3). The law further provides
the following: “Upon motion made in the proper proceedings by the
Attorney-General or his representative, or by the proper provincial fiscal, the
competent judge may cancel the naturalization certificate issued: (a) if it is
shown that said naturalization certificate was obtained fraudulently; * * *”
(sec. 14).

The question in its simplest terms then is, if a foreigner who has given
wrong information in his application for Philippine citizenship as to the length
of his residence in the Philippines, and who has taken the oath of a witness and
given false testimony relative to the length of his residence in the
Philippines, has obtained his naturalization certificate fraudulently, within
the meaning of the law.

The United States naturalization law, as properly pointed out by counsel for
the appellant, is phrased somewhat differently from the Philippine
naturalization law. The American law empowers the proper court to cancel a
certificate of citizenship on the ground of fraud or on the ground that such
certificate of citizenship was illegally procured. But as will appear in a
moment, the difference between the American and the Philippine statutes is not
so mailed as to make inapplicable the pertinent American authorities.

One, K, deceived the court by false statements as to his age and length of
residence in the United States, with the result that the court held that “the
letters of naturalization were improvidently issued,” and must, therefore, be
ordered cancelled. (U, S. vs. Kornmehl [1898], 89 Fed., 10.) One, S,
obtained a certificate of naturalization; but it was later shown that he had not
resided continuously in the United States for a period of five years immediately
preceding the date of his petition for citizenship. The court said: “The
petition does not allege Simon’s fraud, but at the hearing it was assumed on
both sides that this ground of illegality was open to the United States. So far
as the United States relies upon fraud, it is bound to prove the fraud. * * * As
Simon’s naturalization in the state court was procured either fraudulently or
otherwise illegally, cancellation of the certificate is ordered.” (U. S.
vs. Simon [1909], 170 Fed., 680.) One, A, procured a certificate of
naturalization by reason of a petition in which it was stated that he was not a
married man, whereas he had a family in Austria which he had abandoned. The
court, in speaking of the phrase “illegally procured” said: “Neither the
complaint nor the proof makes out a case of a certificate ‘illegally procured,’
in that the term as used in Act June 29, 1906, c. 3592, sec. 15, 34 Stat., 599
(U. S. Comp. St. Supp. [1911], p. 537), imports a certificate issued by a court
without jurisdiction or in violation of the law’s procedure— without a petition
or witnesses, or notice, or hearing, for example.” The court further said:
“Aliens present themselves as friends, soliciting the boon of citizenship from
the United States. It is their duty to make true and full disclosure of their
qualifications, and honest answer to all questions prescribed. * * *. The fraud,
however, in pleading and proof, must rise to the bad eminence of than any
case—false representations or concealments of material facts, and without which
the judgment would not have been rendered and the certificate of citizenship
would not have been issued. * * *. Had the truth been disclosed at the hearing
upon his petition, as it is disclosed here, the result would not have been what
it was. * * *. It follows that the defendant’s certificate of citizenship
involved was procured by fraud and should be set aside and cancelled.” (U. S.
vs. Albertini [1913], 206 Fed., 133.) One, J, obtained a certificate of
naturalization based upon the perjured testimony of two witnesses, to the effect
that J had resided within the limits and under the jurisdiction of the United
States for five years at least, then last past. In the United States Supreme
Court, the decree cancelling1 the naturalization certificate was affirmed, Mr.
Justice Pitney stating: “An alien has no moral nor constitutional right to
retain the privileges of citizenship if, by false evidence or the like, an
imposition has been practised upon the court, without which the certificate of
citizenship could not and would not have been issued.” (Johannessen vs.
U. S. [1912], 225 U. S., 227.) We consider the foregoing authorities applicable
in principle.

For an alien to become a Philippine citizen is a privilege, not a right. The
conditions under which that privilege may be granted have clearly and
authoritatively been announced. To acquire Philippine citizenship, the alien
must possess all the qualifications prescribed by law. In presenting his
application to a court, it is presupposed that he is dealing fairly and honestly
with the court, for if he imposes on the court his application will be rejected
or cancelled. He is bound to see that the facts upon which the grant is
predicated actually exist, for otherwise he takes nothing by his paper grant.
Subsequently, when the error is discovered, it is too late for him to plead good
faith and a bad memory to exculpate himself from the charge of misrepresentation
of material facts. It must, therefore, be distinctly understood by aliens who
desire to become Philippine citizens that to do so they must possess all and
each of the qualifications named by law and none of the disqualifications, and
that if an alien is able to secure a certificate of naturalization by misleading
the court on any material fact, the courts possess jurisdiction to cancel the
certificate of naturalization improvidently issued. We are forced to rule that
the naturalization certificate of the appellant was obtained fraudulently.
(Johannessen vs. U. S., supra.)

Sustaining the appellant in some points raised in his assignments of error,
we yet reach the definite conclusion that the order approving the record on
appeal, and the decision cancelling the certificate of naturalization of Paul A.
Bell were basically correct, and so should be, as they are hereby, sustained and
affirmed, with the costs of this instance to be paid by the appellant.

Avanceña, C. J., Johnson, Street, Villamor, Ostrand, Romualdez,
Villa-Real, and Imperial, JJ., concur.