G.R. No. 35524. March 18, 1932
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. JULIAN SUMICAD, DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT.
STREET, J.:
Instance of the Province of Occidental Misamis, finding the appellant, Julian
Sumicad, guilty of the offense of homicide and sentencing him to undergo
imprisonment for twelve years and one day, reclusion temporal, and requiring him
to indemnify the family of the deceased in the amount of P1,000, as well as to
pay the costs of prosecution.
On February 23, 1931, the accused, a resident of Buena voluntad, in the
municipality of Plaridel, Occidental Misamis, was engaged with others in the
gratuitous labor of hauling logs for the construction of a chapel in the barrio
above-mentioned. At about 5.30 o’clock in the afternoon on the day mentioned,
when the laborers were resting from the work of the day, one Segundo Cubol
happened to pass the place where the accused was sitting. Prior to this date the
accused had rendered five and one-half days service to Cubol, and as the latter
passed, the accused said to him, “Segundo, pay me for the five and one-half days
work for which you owe me.” , Cubol replied, “What debt,” an exclamation which
was followed by an insulting expression. At the same time he struck the accused
with his fist. The accused arose from the log upon which he was sitting and
moved backward, trying to escape, but Cubol pursued him and continued striking
him with his fists. As the accused receded he found himself cornered by a pile
of logs, the wings of which extended out on either side, effectually preventing
any further retreat. As Cubol pressed upon him, the accused drew his bolo and
delivered a blow on Cubol’s right shoulder. Upon this Cubol lunged at the
accused with the evident intention of wresting the bolo from the accused. To
prevent this the accused struck two other blows with the bolo, inflicting two
deep cuts on Cubol’s forehead above the left eye, One of these blows broke
through the cranium. The other made a cut extending” from the left eyebrow to
the nose arid upper lip. Upon receiving these wounds, Cubol gave down and
crawled away, finding a seat on a log nearby. A witness, named Francisco
Villegas, who came up in a moment, after learning something about the matter,
asked Cubol whether he had struck the accused blows with his fist. Cubol replied
that he had. The witness Villegas then turned to the accused, who was standing a
short distance away, and told him to put up his bolo and go to the
poblacion. Acting upon this suggestion the accused immediately repaired
to the office of the justice of the peace and surrendered himself to the
authorities. Cubol lived only an hour or so, and died from the effect of the
wounds received. In one of the pockets of the deceased a knife was found, and
the accused testified that, when he struck the deceased with his bolo, the
latter was attempting to draw a knife from his pocket.
The accused was 25 years of age when this case was tried, has a height of 5
feet and 1 1/2 inches, and a weight of 105 pounds. The deceased appears to have
been a taller, larger and stronger man. The evidence shows that the deceased was
quarrelsome and in the habit of making frequent trouble by fighting in the
places where he happened to be present with others. In the local courts he had
been convicted and sentenced to jail for assault and battery in two different
cases. In another case he was convicted of the offense of inflicting minor
physical injuries, being sentenced to imprisonment for one month and one day. In
still another case he had been convicted of theft and sentenced to imprisonment
for the same period of one month and one day. The proof leaves no reason to
doubt that the deceased was hot-tempered and that he had the reputation of being
a trouble maker. It is a safe inference from this proof— and there is nothing to
the contrary,—that the deceased was with good reason considered by his neighbors
to be a dangerous man.
From the facts above stated it is evident that the quarrel which resulted in
the death of Segundo Cubol was of his own making, and that the accused was not
materially to blame in bringing about the trouble. Two of the elements of
self-defense were therefore clearly present, namely, that the deceased was the
aggressor and that there was lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the
accused. The only further question that can therefore arise in discussing the
criminal liability of the accused is whether there was reasonable necessity for
the means employed by him to prevent or repel the aggression to which he was
subjected. Upon this point it will be noted that, when the aggression was begun
by the deceased, the accused retreated until he was cornered in the angle of a
pile of logs. His further retreat was thus effectually cut off both in the rear
and at the sides. In response to the blows which the deceased delivered with his
fists, the accused first delivered a cut on the left shoulder of the deceased;
but, if we rightly interpret the transcript of the record on this point, the
sanitary officer who examined the body of the deceased meant to say that this
wound alone could not have resulted in death. This we consider to be the
decisive turning point in the case. Upon receiving that cut the deceased should
have been admonished that further aggression on his part would be met by
determined resistance and that any further advance would be at grave peril to
himself. Instead of acting upon this warning, the deceased pressed forward in
the attempt to possess himself of the bolo, the only means of defense then at
the command of the accused.
Under these circumstances what might the accused have been reasonably
expected to do. Was he to surrender the weapon to his assailant, a larger and
stronger man than himself, who was now infuriated by the blood that had been
drawn from his shoulder? Or was he justified in keeping the weapon in his hands
and, as an ultimate resort, in using it as a means for his own defense? Our
reply is that he was justified in pursuing the latter alternative; for it would
probably have been an act of suicide to permit that weapon to pass into the
hands of his assailant. In judging a question of this kind the reputation of the
deceased for violence is pertinent, for it tends to show that when the fatal
blows were struck the accused had reasonable grounds for believing that he was
in grave peril to life or limb.
It is undoubtedly well established in jurisprudence that a man is not, as a
rule, justified in taking the life of one who assaults him with his fist only,
without the use of a dangerous weapon. The person assaulted must, in such case,
either resist with the arms that nature gave him or with other means of defense
at his disposal, short of taking life. But that rule contemplates the situation
where the contestants are in the open and the person assaulted can exercise the
option of running away. It can have no binding force in the case where the
person assaulted has retreated to the wall, as the saying is, and uses in a
defensive way the only weapon at his disposal. One is not required, when hard
pressed, to draw fine distinctions as to the extent of the injury which a
reckless and infuriated assailant might probably inflict upon him (Brownell vs.
People, 38 Mich., 732). And it was not incumbent on the accused in this case,
when assailed by a bully of known violent disposition, who was larger and
stronger than himself, to take the risk of losing possession of his bolo and of
having it turned upon him with probable fatal results to himself. On the
contrary, under the circumstances stated, he had the right to resist the
aggression with the bolo, and if he unfortunately inflicted a fatal blow, it
must be considered to have been given in justifiable self-defense. Upon this
point it may be recalled that the deceased, when asked about the circumstances
of the homicide, admitted that he himself was the aggressor; and it is
noteworthy that he used no word placing blame upon the accused.
We are of the opinion that all the elements necessary to constitute
justifiable self-defense were present in this case and the accused should have
been acquitted.
The judgment appealed from will therefore be reversed and the appellant
absolved from the information, with costs of both instances de oficio. So
ordered.
Malcolm, Romualdez, Villa-Real, and Imperial, JJ.,
concur.
Johnson, J., reserves his vote.
Avanceña, C. J., with whom concurs Villamor, J., dissenting
:
I dissent. In my opinion, there is but an incomplete self-defense here. The
defendant’s act in wounding the deceased with a bolo so as to bring about the
latter’s death, was not a reasonably necessary means of defending himself
against the other’s attack, which was but a matter of fisticuffs. The Supreme
Court of Spain has held this doctrine in many cases; e. g., where the deceased
attacked the defendant with his fists (November 29, 1883; May 3, 1888; and May
9, 1911) ; where the deceased, for no particular reason, threw himself upon the
defendant, caught him by the throat, and tried to choke him (November 4, 1910);
where the deceased boxed the accused, knocking him down, and keeping him
underneath (November 28, 1910) ; and where the deceased attacked the accused
with an umbrella (April 22,1896). In all these cases it was not held that the,
defendant acted with full justification in self-defense. Our own reports contain
rulings of the like tenor; in the earliest case, the deceased attacked the
accused with a piece of bamboo (IT. S. vs. De Castro, 2 Phil, 67), and
in the latest, he attacked the defendant with his fists (G. R. No. 34750).[1] In neither was it held that a complete case
of self-defense had been made out. Nor is the defendant’s case improved by the
consideration that he aimed the first blow at the deceased’s arm, and delivered
the last two blows, which caused death, after the other had attempted to wrench
away the bolo; for, having received the first blow on the arm, the deceased was
justified in acting as he did, in the reasonable belief that the defendant would
continue the attack with that weapon.
DISSENTING
OSTRAND, J.
I cannot fully agree with the majority in this case and therefore
dissent.
[1]
People vs. Montalbo, page 443, ante