DY SY, PETITIONER AND APPELLANT, VS. THE COLLECTOR OP CUSTOMS OF DAVAO, RESPONDENT AND APPELLEE.

Dy Sy versus the Collector of Customs of Davao

The Case

This is the case of Dy Sy versus the Collector of Customs of Davao, decided in July 1931. Dy Sy, a Chinese resident, sought a writ of habeas corpus to keep himself in the Philippines, and the Collector of Customs of Davao stood against him as the official charged with enforcing the immigration laws. The action is therefore a test of personal liberty against the immigration power of the State. The case matters for the bar candidate because it fixes two enduring rules: first, that a mere registry certificate issued to residents generally is not the special certificate that proves a Chinese person's right to remain; and second, that a final judgment denying that right bars a later petition under the principle of res judicata, meaning a matter already finally decided cannot be litigated again.

Procedural History

Dy Sy first petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus, and a competent court denied the petition on the sixth of October 1928. He appealed that denial, but the appeal was dismissed, and the decision became final. He then filed a second petition for a writ of habeas corpus, this time before the Court of First Instance of Davao, which likewise denied it. From that denial he brought the present appeal to the Supreme Court, assigning as error that the denial was contrary to law and to the evidence.

Facts

Dy Sy claimed a right to remain in the Philippines and relied on a registry certificate, marked as Exhibit D, which he had presented as proof of that right. The certificate, however, was not issued by the Collector of Customs. It was issued by the Collector of Internal Revenue of Manila, and at the time it was issued a Collector of Customs had already been appointed by the Military Government for the city.

The record also showed that the very question of his right to remain had already been litigated. Before filing this action, Dy Sy had petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus, and that petition was denied by a competent court on the sixth of October 1928. He appealed the denial, the appeal was dismissed, and the decision became final.

Undeterred, he filed the present petition before the Court of First Instance of Davao, again resting on the same registry certificate. The trial court denied him, and he appealed to the Supreme Court.

Issues

• Whether or not the registry certificate, Exhibit D, is sufficient to entitle Dy Sy to remain in the Philippines.
• Whether or not the prior final judgment denying him that right bars the present petition under the principle of res judicata.

Applicable Provisions

Circular Number 6 of the Military Governor, dated the thirtieth of May 1899, published Circular Number 13 of the Bureau of Customs and Insular Affairs, which provides:

The laws and regulations governing immigration to the United States are hereby declared to be in effect in the territory under government by the military force of the United States, and collector of customs are directed to enforce said laws and regulations until the establishment of immigration stations in said territory. All money collected under this order must be deposited and accounted for as prescribed for customs collections.

This circular bears on the case because it places enforcement of the immigration laws in the hands of the collector of customs, which explains why a certificate from the Collector of Internal Revenue cannot serve as the proof of the right to remain.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the registry certificate is not sufficient. It is equivalent only to the present cedula certificate, and it was issued to every resident in the country, not to Chinese alone, under Circular Number 12 issued on the twelfth of December 1899 by the Office of the Military Governor. It was also issued not by the Collector of Customs but by the Collector of Internal Revenue of Manila, at a time when a Collector of Customs had already been appointed for the city. The certificate therefore proves residence in a general sense, not the special right to remain that the immigration laws require.

On the second issue, the Court held that the matter had already been finally decided by a tribunal and was therefore res judicata. Dy Sy had already been denied the right to remain on the ground that Exhibit D was insufficient, in a habeas corpus proceeding denied by a competent court on the sixth of October 1928, and that decision became final upon the dismissal of his appeal. A final judgment on the same right, between the same parties, could not be reopened by filing a fresh petition.

Doctrine

Two rules must be retained. First, a registry certificate issued to residents generally, equivalent to a cedula certificate, does not establish a Chinese person's right to remain in the Philippines; that right must be shown by the certificate issued through the proper immigration authority, the collector of customs. Second, a final judgment denying a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, once it has become final upon dismissal of the appeal, operates as res judicata against a subsequent petition raising the same right. The immigration power, as declared in the circular, is enforced by the collector of customs, and the courts will not allow a litigant to relitigate a right already finally adjudged.

Disposition

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment appealed from, with costs against the appellant, Dy Sy.

Remember This

The one line to memorize: a general registry certificate is no proof of the right to remain, and a final denial of habeas corpus bars its repetition under res judicata. Examiners use this case to test the sufficiency of registry certificates in immigration cases and the application of res judicata to successive petitions for a writ of habeas corpus.