THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. DEMETRIO FRANCISCO Y GAAC, DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT.

There is no question of fact involved in the present case, for the defense
counsel admits that all the allegations of the information have been
established, and that the sentence imposed upon the defendant is justified.

Counsel insinuates, however, though without insistence, that the case should
be remanded to the trial court, because the judgment contains no finding of
facts, citing United States vs. Avillar (28 Phil., 131). That ruling is
not applicable to the present case where the penalty imposed by the trial court
is clear and definite. While the judgment is brief, it contains the finding that
the accused is guilty of the offense charged. Moreover, failure to make findings
upon the facts does not necessarily require a reversal, if the facts found are
sufficient to support the judgment. (Pastor vs. Gaspar, 2 Phil.,
592.)

Although both the principal and the additional penalty for habitual
delinquency are less severe under the Revised Penal Code than under the laws in
force when the crime was committed (vide art. 309, No. 4, Revised Penal
Code as against art. 518, No. 4, Penal Code; and art. 62, rule 5, subdivision
(a), Revised Penal, Code as against Act No. 3586), still, inasmuch as
the defendant is an habitual criminal and therefore does not come under the
favorable provisions of article 22 of the new Penal Code, there must be applied
to the defendant the penal laws in force when he committed the crime.

We agree with the Attorney-General’s recommendation as to the proper penalty
to be imposed upon the appellant.

For the crime here prosecuted, which is defined and penalized in article 518,
No. 4 of the Penal Code in force at the time it was committed, as it was amended
by Act No. 3244, in connection with article 520 of said Code, the appellant
deserves the medium degree of the corresponding penalty, in view of the absence
of any modifying circumstance.

And for the habitual criminality, consisting in two rather than three prior
convictions, considering two of them as one in the light of the ruling set forth
in People vs. De la Cruz (G. R. No. 33786), there must be imposed upon
the appellant the additional penalty of three to nine years’ imprisonment.

Wherefore, the judgment appealed from is modified, the appellant being
sentenced to four years, two months, and one day of prision
correccional, and three years’ additional imprisonment for his habitual
delinquency, together with the costs of both instances. So ordered.

Avanceña, C. J., Johnson, Street, Malcolm, Villamor, Ostrand,
Villa-Real, and Imperial, JJ., concur.