IN RE ESTATE OF THE LATE MRS. R. H. FRANKEL. PHILIPPINE TRUST COMPANY, ADMINISTRATOR AND APPELLEE, VS. CLARA WEBBER ET AL., APPELLANTS. FREMA FISCHLER, APPELLEE.

This appeal has been taken from an order of the Court of First Instance of
Manila entered in the course of the present proceedings, and providing as
follows:

“In view of the foregoing (1) the item of two thousand pesos (P2,000) for
attorney’s fees in the final account submitted by the administrator is hereby
approved; but the scheme of partition must be amended so as to charge this sum
proportionally to the estate of each of the spouses, Herman Frankel and Mrs.
Frankel. In other words, this sum must be taken from the value of the estate of
the husband and of the wife pro rata.

“(2) The opposition of Anna Hartske, her son Charles Robinson, Clara Webber
and her daughter, Gertrude Webber, to the scheme of partition is disallowed,
together with every other opposition to the final account based upon the amount
of the interest due on the sum of forty thousand eight hundred three pesos and
seventy-three centavos (P40,803.73). To this sum, however, must be added the
interest for the month of May, 1930, which, according to the report, amounts to
eighty-three pesos and twenty-three centavos (P83.23), and the interest thereon
at the same rate from the date last mentioned until these funds are finally
delivered.

“(3) Clara Webber’s opposition in the matter of the jewels is also
overruled.

“(4) Lastly, Frema Fischler’s opposition with reference to the payment of
interest upon the principal of her legacy is also overruled.

“The judicial administrator shall file a scheme of partition, amended in
accordance with this order, within five (5) days after it becomes final under
the law.” (Pp. 54 and 55, Bill of Exceptions.)

The appellants, through counsel, assign the following alleged errors as
committed by the trial court:

“1. In overruling the oppositions of the appellants to the final account and
project of partition filed on May 19, 1930, and to the report filed on June 26,
1930.

“2. In overruling Mrs. Clara Webber’s adidtional objection to the project of
partition with reference to the jewelry.”

These proceedings deal with a final account, a report, and a scheme of
partition filed by the administrator of the estate of the late R. H.
Frankel.

The appellants objected to said final account, scheme of partition, and
report, upon the following grounds:

(1) That the value of the estate belonging to the conjugal partnership of
Herman Frankel and his wife, at the time of the latter’s death, is not shown;
(2) that the additional item of P2,000 for the administrator’s services is
improper, unlawful, and exorbitant; (3) that the administrator did not invest
the funds belonging to the estate adequately and advantageously; and (4) that
the interest earned, according to the report filed by the administrator on June
26, 1930, is not accurate, and the statement of the income and the expenses
cannot be understood by the parties.

The value of the conjugal estate has been finally decided by a competent
court, and is now res judicata.

To grant an additional allowance for the services rendered by the judicial
administrator was discretionary with the trial court, and we find no reason for
holding that said court abused that discretion or made improper use of it, in
view of the importance and duration of the work in question.

With reference to the investment of the inheritance funds, we find that the
trial court rightly held such investment to be in no way exceptionable or
contrary to any law.

The conduct of the administrator of an inheritance who deposits the funds
entrusted, to his care in a current account with a solid and responsible bank,
instead of depositing them in a fixed account at a higher rate of interest, with
a view to having them subject to withdrawal at a moment’s notice, is not
unlawful or even improper, but rather worthy of approval; and he is not
answerable for the low rate of interest thus obtained, because, generally
speaking—and there is no reason for applying any special rule—in default of
instructions to the contrary, a judicial administrator of an inheritance is not
called upon to speculate with funds in his custody or to place them where they
may not be withdrawn at once at the order of a competent court, but rather to
manage them in accordance with the law, keeping them subject to the orders of
the proper court. (Sec. 643, Code of Civil Procedure.) To this end when the
administrator happens to be a trust company engaged in banking, as in this case,
there is nothing wrong in its depositing the inheritance funds in its own
banking department rather than in another bank, if there is no evidence that its
own bank is lacking in security.

No question is raised regarding the rate of interest earned by such funds,
but the computation of interest is said to be inaccurate. There is no merit in
this contention, considering the administrator’s report covering the period from
August, 1926, to April 25, 1930. Furthermore, with reference to the deposit and
the rate of interest obtained, we consider the following remarks of the
administrator appellee just and sound:

“The Philippine Trust Company has had at all times and still now has
sufficient lawful money of the Philippine Islands to pay all the cash of said
estate on deposit with it. It has not invested the funds of the estate because
it considers that in view of the will, the action of the residuary legatees, and
the nature of its duties, any such investment would make the funds unliquid, and
would violate the duties of its trust, which were to assemble the assets, in
order to distribute as this Honorable Court may decree.” (Pp. 9 and 10, Brief of
the administrator-appellee.)

As to the second assignment of error with reference to Mrs. Clara Webber’s
objection, we find no merit in it, considering the proposed adjudication of the
jewelry according to the scheme of partition, and the grounds upon which the
trial court overruled this additional objection, to wit:

“Mrs. Clara Webber filed an additional opposition to the scheme of partition
in so far as it gives her one-half of the jewelry. She contends that inasmuch as
the will gives her one-half of said jewelry, and as its value has depreciated
considerably, being hardly worth P500 at present, it is a serious error and a
manifest lack of equity to appraise its value at P2,995.50, adjudicating to her
one-half thereof. She proposes that the jewelry be sold and the proceeds divided
equally between her and the other legatee. This contention is not well taken;
first, because the will of the testatrix must be carried out where it provides
that one-half of the jewelry itself is to be given to this opponent; and
secondly, because there is no need of selling the jewelry; as for the value,
that is reasonable because it was fixed by the committee of appraisal, and no
proper objection was entered in due time. This additional opposition must be
rejected.

“The last opposition is that filed by Frema Fischler, who claims the legal
interest upon her legacy of P10,000. It is argued that since this sum of money
has been in the administrator’s hands for many years, this legatee is entitled
to the legal interest upon it from the time of the testatrix’s death. There is
no merit in this opposition. While it is true that under article 882 of the
Civil Code the legacy of a specific determinate thing vests in the legatee upon
the testator’s death, as well as any pending fruits or income, inasmuch as we
are here concerned with a generic or a so-called legacy of quantity, article 884
of the Code must be applied, which provides that interest from the time of the
testator’s death shall be given the legatee if the testator has expressly so
provided. With reference to the present opponent, it appears that the testatrix
has not clearly and expressly provided for the payment of the interest upon the
P10,000 legacy; according to the last-named article it is clear that the
opponent is not entitled to the interest claimed. InFuentes vs. Canon (6 Phil.,
117), and Chiong Joe-Soy vs. Vafio (8 Phil., 119), the Supreme Court ruled that
generic legacies or legacies of quantity, like the one adjudicated to the
opponent, do not draw legal interest until a demand is made for them; and a
legacy cannot be legally demanded before the scheme of partition is duly
approved by the probate court. And in the case cited by counsel for Fred Frankel
(Ongpin vs. Rivera, 44 Phil, 808), the Supreme Court held that a cash legacy
does not earn interest until the person bound to deliver it—in this case the
judicial administrator—is in default. The administrator in the present case is
not in default, for the scheme of partition not only has not yet been approved,
but is actually the subject matter of many oppositions filed by the legatees and
the heir.” (Pp. 52, 53, and 54, Bill of Exceptions.)

Finding the order appealed from to be justified by the merits of the case, we
hereby affirmed it, with costs against the appellants. So ordered.

Avanceña, C. J., Street, Malcolm, Villamor, Ostrand, and
Villa-Real, JJ., concur.