MODESTO MONTEDERAMOS, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. CATALINA YNONOY ET AL., DEFENDANTS AND APPELLANTS.

This is an appeal taken by the defendants, Catalina Ynonoy et al., from the
judgment of the Court of First Instance of Oriental Negros, the dispositive part
of which reads as follows:

“Wherefore, the court finds that the preponderance of the evidence is in
favor of the plaintiff, Modesto Montederamos, and therefore declares the deed of
sale executed by Timotea Vendiola to Anastacio Amil on October 10, 1925, and
ratified before the notary public, Mr. Dorado on the same day, to be null and
void. Let the defendants restore the land conveyed through said deed, to the
plaintiff, and pay the costs. So ordered.”

In support of their appeal, the appellants assign the following alleged
errors as committed by the trial court in its judgment:

“1. The lower court erred in holding that the husband’s consent to the sale
by the wife of her paraphernal property must be in writing and in a public
instrument.

“2. The lower court erred in not holding that the plaintiff-appellee gave his
express consent to the sale by his wife of the land in question, belonging to
her, to Anastacio Amil, defendant’s predecessor in interest.

“3. The lower court erred in declaring the sale, Exhibit C,
avoided.”

The plaintiff-appellee, Modesto Montederamos commenced this action to annul
the deed of sale whereby his wife, Timotea Vendiola, sold a parcel of land, her
paraphernal property, to Anastacio Amil, the defendants’
predecessor-in-interest, alleging that she did so without his consent.

The defendants answer alleging that the sale was made with the knowledge and
consent of the vendor’s husband.

The preponderance of the evidence shows that on October 10, 1925, Modesto
Montederamos and his wife Timotea Vendiola went to Anastacio Amil’s house,
offering to sell him a part of Timotea Vendiola’s paraphernal property
containing in all seventy-eight coconut trees, which part contained eighteen
coconut trees of two years’ growth, for P400; that Anastacio Amil accepted the
offer and told one of his sons to get the money and count it in the presence of
Modesto Montederamos, who counted it also and then wrapped it up in a
handkerchief; that Timotea Vendiola then suggested their going to the
municipality of Dumaguete to have the deed of sale drawn up, and they did so,
but the plaintiff, Modesto Montederamos, remained at home to take care of the
children; that upon arriving at the municipality, Timotea Vendiola had one
Geronimo Marino prepare the proper deed of sale, and then they went to the house
of the notary, Aniceto B. Dorado, to have it executed and ratified; that before
ratifying the deed, the notary demanded that Modesto Montederamos be present in
order to sign it, but Timotea Vendiola told him that her husband has remained at
home to take care of the children, and would sign the deed later; that since she
insisted upon it, the notary ratified the deed in the absence of Modesto
Montederamos.

The plaintiff attempted to show that in the year 1924, he mortgaged all his
wife’s paraphernal property to one Bruno Alabastro for the sum of P918, although
the mortgage deed was not formally executed until December, 1925; that on
October 10,1925, Timotea Vendiola went to the municipality of Dumaguete to
purchase some rice, and upon her return told him that she had sold the parcel of
land here in question to one Anastacio Amil for the sum of P400; that when
Modesto Montederamos learned of the transaction, he disapproved it and
reprimanded his wife for having made the sale knowing that the property was
mortgaged for P918; that on the following day, the plaintiff went to Anastacio
Amil’s house to return the sum of P400, but the latter refused to receive the
money; that in April, 1926, Bruno Alabastro filed a complaint for forcible entry
and detainer against Anastacio Amil in the justice of the peace court for the
municipality of Bacong, Oriental Negros, alleging that he had a preferential
right to the possession of the land in question, by virtue of a mortgage he held
upon executed by Modesto Montederamos and his wife, Timotea Vendiola.

In the course of her testimony in this case, Timotea Vendiola stated in her
husband’s presence that the sale had been made to Anastacio Amil with his
knowledge and consent, and that both of them had invested the P400 in some
business (Exhibit 1).

Since it has been proved by a preponderance of the evidence that the
plaintiff-appellee Modesto Montederamos was cognizant of the sale made by his
wife, that he gave his consent to it and used the proceeds of it, the question
arises: Is such consent valid, in view of article 1387 of the Civil Code, which
reads as follows:

“ART. 1387. The wife cannot alienate, encumber or mortgage the paraphernal
property without the permission of the husband, or appear in court to litigate
with regard to the same, unless she has been judicially authorized to do so.”
Manresa, commenting upon article 61 of the Civil Code, prohibiting the wife from
alienating her property without authority or consent of her husband, says in
Vol. I, page 324, 3d Edition, of his Commentaries upon the Spanish Civil Code,
the following:

“The cases decided by the Supreme Court- prior to the Civil Code, which must
be deemed applicable even after the latter went into effect, inasmuch as the law
has not been modified in this respect, held that the husband’s permission
enabling his wife to enter into a contract, might be given in any manner,
provided it was shown that he had consented and approved of the obligations
which his wife contracted, and that only the husband could ask for the annulment
of such acts and contracts as his wife may have undertaken without his
intervention or permission; wherefore, such acts cannot be deemed null and void,
but merely voidable as may be seen by looking up the decisions of October
10,1861, November 14, 1862, June 20, 1863, June 27, 1866, October 9, 1868,
January 30, 1872, June 22, 1880, and a number of others.”

According to the legal provision quoted above, and the ruling of the Spanish
Supreme Court, the husband’s permission or consent to his wife’s valid
alienation of her paraphernal property need not be explicit or set forth in a
document of any kind, so long as it may be inferred beyond all doubt from some
acts of his, that he consented and approved of the obligations contracted by his
wife.

In the case before us, nothing else is to be inferred from Modesto
Montederamos’ accompanying his wife to Amil’s house for the purpose of offering
to sell him the land in litigation; his receipt and investment of the price in a
business of his own; and his making no objection to his wife’s testifying before
him in another case involving the same sale, that he had given his consent to
it, than that he had in fact done so. After having made the vendee Anastacio
Amil understand by his presence and act that he consented, at least tacitly, to
the sale qf the land in litigation that his wife was about to realize, which was
indeed realized, after having himself used the money so obtained, he cannot now
seek the annulment of the contract thereunto executed, on the ground that he did
not sign it, and did not expressly give his consent either orally or in any
document.

Wherefore, we are of opinion and so hold that article 1387 of the Civil Code
does not require the husband’s consent, which is indispensable to the validity
of contracts entered into by his wife, to be expressly given, or that it be set
down in any document; but such consent may be manifested by means of acts giving
rise to the conclusion that the husband consented to and approved of the
obligations contracted by his wife.

By virtue whereof, the judgment appealed from is reversed and the defendants
are absolved from the complaint, which is hereby dismissed, with costs against
the appellee.

So ordered.

Avanceña, C. J., Johnson, Street, Malcolm, Villamor, Ostrand,
Romualdez, and Imperial, JJ., concur.