LA URBANA, MUTUAL BUILDING AND LOAN ASSOCIATION, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. CARMEN BELANDO, DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT.

The party plaintiff obtained judgment for the following amounts against the
defendant in the proper foreclosure proceedings:

“(a) Forty-one thousand seven hundred twenty-two pesos and seventy-nine
centavos (P41,722.79) with interest thereon at eight and a half per cent (8
1/2%) per annum from the first of August, 1927, until the date of payment, minus
the amount of premium, which, according to the law, is not to be paid in case of
a premature cancellation; (&) seven thousand four hundred forty pesos and
three centavos (P7,440.03) with interest thereon at one per centum (1%) a month
from the 1st of August, 1927, until the date of payment; and (c) six per centum
(6%) on the debt of P49,162,82, by way of attorney’s fees and costs.” (Page 8,
Bill of Exceptions.)

After this decree had become final and three months had elapsed, as provided
by law for payment thereof, the plaintiff asked the court to order the sale of
the .mortgaged property at public auction.

The court granted the petition and issued a writ of execution which was
returned by the sheriff, who attached the property, gave legal notice of the
sale, and finally sold it at auction, adjudicating the property described under
(a) in the copy of the notice of attachment, to Amparo Jaime, for P8,850, and
the lots described under (b), (c), (d), (e), (f), (g) and (h) in the copy of
the notice of attachment, to the plaintiff association for P6,850.

The sale was submitted for approval to the court, which approved it on
September 2, 1929.

On the 7th of September of the same year, the defendant moved the court to
vacate the order confirming said sale, on the ground that she had not been duly
notified of the plaintiff’s motion for the confirmation of the sale aforesaid;
that it had been improperly and irregularly conducted inasmuch as she had not
been informed of the time, place, and date of the auction by the sheriff or
anybody else; and that the selling price is inadequate and prejudicial to the
interests of the defendant.

Upon hearing the petition, the court denied it, and the defendant took the
present appeal.

There are two main points discussed in this instance: Notice of the
proceedings regarding the sale of the realty, and the selling price or the
amount for which it was sold.

With reference to the notice, it appears that Casal and Jose, the defendant’s
attorneys, were notified of the plaintiff’s motion playing that the mortgaged
property be ordered sold. It appears from the certificate issued by the sheriff
(pages 15-17, Bill of Exceptions), that the defendant was notified of the
attachment of said property prior to the public auction sale, and that the
announcement of said sale was published in three public places within the
municipality of Cavite, and in the newspaper El Debate. It also appears that
Luciano de la Rosa, as defendant’s attorney, was notified of the petition filed
by the plaintiff for the approval of the sale.

Under the circumstances, we believe the record does not justify an annulment
of said sale or a vacation of the decree confirming it, on the ground of lack of
notification to the interested parties.

The law does not require that such notification be given personally to the
party upon whose property execution is levied; and as for the attorneys, the
record does not show that they did not represent the defendant at the time of
receiving notification. With respect to the place, date, and time of the
auction, it is presumed—and this presumption has not been rebutted—that in
publishing the necessary notices, the sheriff fulfilled the requirements of the
law, giving the necessary details as set forth in section 454 of the Code of
Civil Procedure.

With regard to the matter of the selling price, it does not appear in the
premises that the realty would bring a higher price at a resale. This
circumstance is essential to rescind a sale regularly made and confirmed by a
competent court, on the ground of inadequacy of price. (National Bank vs.
Gonzalez, 45 Phil., 693.)

Furthermore, it appears that the plaintiff has not refused payment of its
judgment by the defendant, and is willing to accept the balance thereof and to
resell all the property adjudicated to it to the defendant, this offer having
been made while the instant cause was pending in the court below (page 32, Bill
of Exceptions), and reiterated in the appellee’s brief (page 15).

In view of the foregoing considerations, the confirmation of the sale in
question is hereby stayed for sixty days from the date the defendant receives
notice hereof, in order that she may, within that period, pay the plaintiff the
amount owed to it under the judgment referred to in the” beginning, deducting
therefrom the sum of P8,850 received by the plaintiff as proceeds of the sale of
the property made to Amparo Jaime. If within this period the defendant pays the
amount of said judgment, minus the sum of P8,850 aforementioned, the plaintiff
is ordered to resell to said defendant the property adjudicated to it at the
auction heretofore mentioned, for such sum as the defendant shall be bound to
pay by this decision. This ruling is in harmony with the doctrine laid down by
this court in Grimalt vs. Velazquez and Sy Quio (36 Phil, 936) to this
effect:

“In the present case, however, in view of the fact that the defendant had,
before the sale was finally confirmed, deposited with the sheriff the full
amount of the judgment, with interest and costs, there is no occasion for
ordering a resale of the premises.”

If said period elapses and the defendant fails to pay the sum mentioned, the
sale in question shall be deemed finally confirmed. So ordered, without
costs.

Avanceña, C. J., Street, Malcolm, Villamor, Ostrand, Johns and
Villa-Real, JJ., concur.