DOMINGA CONCEPCION, PETITIONER, VS. GREGOBIO GARCIA, AS SPECIAL DEPUTY SHERIFF, RESPONDENT.

This is an original petition presented in this court by Dominga
Concepcion wherein she seeks to obtain a peremptory order of mandamus
directed to the respondent, Gregorio Garcia, as special deputy sheriff
in civil case No. 35867, in the Court of First Instance of the City of
Manila, requiring him to surrender the possession of certain personal
property claimed by the petitioner, as third-party claimant in an
attachment issued in the civil case mentioned, with general relief and
with costs. The case has now been submitted upon answer of the
respondent.

It appears that on August 9, 1929, the Government of the Philippine
Islands instituted a civil action (No. 35867) in the Court of First
Instance of the City of Manila, against Florencio Reyes, former chief
of the stamp division in the Bureau of Posts, for the purpose of
recovering the sum of P212,349.42, the value of stamps alleged to have
been misappropriated by him. In connection with the complaint in said
case the Government obtained an attachment against the defendant, by
virtue whereof the respondent, in the capacity of deputy sheriff,
levied upon certain household effects as the property of the defendant.
On September 20, 1929, the present petitioner, Dominga Concepcion, the
wife of Reyes, presented in writing to the sheriff a third-party claim
asserting ownership in the household effects which had been taken upon
attachment, all pursuant to section 442 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
Upon receiving this claim the respondent Garcia demanded that the
Government should give bond to secure him against liability from said
claim; and inasmuch as the estimated value of the property was in the
amount of P5,500, the respondent demanded an indemnity bond in the
amount of P11,000. At the request of the Attorney-General the period
for the giving of this bond was extended until October 10, 1929, and
before this date arrived the Legislature enacted a statute (Act No.
3531) adding an amendment, in the form of a proviso, to both sections
442 and 451 of the Code of Civil Procedure. This proviso has the same
wording in the additions to each of the provisions mentioned, to the
following effect:

“Provided, however, That when the
plaintiff, or the person in whose favor the writ of attachment runs, is
the Insular Government, or any officer duly representing it, the filing
of such bond shall not be required, and in case the sheriff or
attaching officer is sued for damages as a result of the attachment, he
shall be represented by1 the Attorney-General and if held liable
therefor, the actual damages adjudged by the court shall be paid by the
Insular Treasurer out of such funds as may be appropriated for the
purpose.”

This Act was approved on September 28, 1929, and it was therefore in
full effect upon October 10,1929, when the period expired within which
the bond demanded by the sheriff should have been given. However,
under the authority of the amendment above mentioned, the respondent
deputy sheriff maintained the attachment, and he now admittedly has the
attached property in his possession.

The present petition seeks to compel the respondent, by mandamus, to
surrender the property, consisting of the household effects described
in the petitioner’s third-party claim; and the theory underlying the
petition is that Act No. 3531 is not applicable to the situation
described, and that, if the Act should be interpreted as applicable
thereto, it should be held unconstitutional. In this connection it is
claimed that, if the Act be interpreted as applicable to the subject
matter of the aforesaid attachment, it would thereby be given an ex post facto effect inconsistently with that portion of section 3 of our organic law which prohibits the enactment of ex post facto laws.

The criticism directed to the statute is not well founded. Act No.
3581 is an Act dealing exclusively with remedies and modes of
procedure. Such an Act is repugnant to no constitutional provision, and
its legality is beyond question. A person has no vested right in any
particular remedy, and a litigant cannot insist on the application to
the trial of his case, whether civil or criminal, of any other than the
existing rules of procedure. Statutes making changes in the remedy or
procedure are laws within the discretion of the lawmaking power, and
are valid so long as they do not deprive the accused of any substantial
right, or conflict with specific and applicable provisions of the
Federal Constitution (6 R. C. L., p. 294). Moreover, the term “ex post facto”
as applied to statutes, in section 3 of our organic law, is a technical
term, used only in connection with crimes and penalties. The term is
never used to indicate the obnoxious character of statutes dealing
retroactively with civil rights. Of course retroactive statutes dealing
with civil rights may also be unconstitutional if they impair the
obligations of contracts or deprive a person of a vested right, but
this remedial Act is not subject to criticism on this ground. As was
said in Roman Catholic Bishop of Lipa vs. Municipality of Taal (38 Phil., 367, 377), “The Act in question is not an ex post facto law, as it is not penal in its nature. It has long been settled that the phrase ‘ex post facto laws’,
Is not applicable to civil laws, but to penal and criminal laws which
punish a party for acts antecedently done which were not punishable at
all, or not punishable to the extent or in the manner prescribed. In
short ex post facto laws relate to penal and
criminal proceedings, which impose punishment or forfeitures, and not
to civil proceedings, which affect private rights retrospectively.”

What has been said is sufficient to dispose of the petition, but, as
pointed out in the memorandum of the Attorney-General, there is an
additional obstacle to the granting of the writ of mandamus in this
case. This is found in the circumstance that, under section 442 of the
Code of Civil Procedure, the sheriff is not under legal duty to
surrender attached property when no bond is given. On the contrary, said
section leaves the officer entirely free to hold the property or not,
and merely leaves him at liberty, iii the ordinary case where the
Government is not a party, to surrender the property if the bond
indicated in that section be not given. It results that the sheriff is
under no legal duty to surrender the property, and the enactment with
respect to the giving of bond was made exclusively for his protection.
In the case before us the sheriff is content to hold the property in
reliance upon the-protection given by the amendment.

The petition, in our opinion, is without legal merit, and the same
is hereby dismissed, with costs against the petitioner. So ordered.

Avanceña, C. J., Johnson, Malcolm, Ostrand, Johns, and Romualdez, JJ., concur.