MAMERTO PORTILLO, PROTESTANT AND APPELLEE, VS. ENRIQUE SALVANI, PROTESTEE AND APPELLANT.

The question of first impression in this jurisdiction here to be
decided is whether the provision of the amended Election Law that “All
proceeding’s in an electoral contest shall be terminated within one
year” is merely directory and so is attended with no consequences, or
is mandatory and so is productive of serious results.

Following the general elections in 1928 in the Province of Antique,
the provincial board of canvassers of that province proclaimed Enrique
Salvani elected to the office of provincial governor with 2,934 votes
as against 2,925 votes for Mamerto Portillo, his nearest competitor. On
July 9, 1928, Portillo filed his protest. The case was submitted for
the decision of the trial judge on March 23,1929. On July 26, 1929,
Salvani having received no notice of the decision and more than the one
year fixed by statute having elapsed, impugned the jurisdiction of the
trial court. On August 15th of the same year, there was received in the
office of the clerk of court of Antique the decision of the trial
judge, which was forwarded from Capiz on the 12th of the same month.
This decision of fifty-four pages bore the date of July 3, 1929. In it
Portillo was declared elected Governor of the Province of Antique with
2,952 votes and with 2,818 votes for Salvani. On being informed of the
decision in the electoral contest, Salvani renewed his motion and again
alleged that the judgment rendered was a nullity on the ground that the
trial court had lost its jurisdiction over the case. These motions were
denied by the Auxiliary Judge of First Instance then presiding over the
court of Antique.

The parties have endeavored to enlighten us on the issue by the
citation of foreign authorities. On examination, these precedents are,
however, found of little help. Salvani, for example, relies on a series
of cases relating to justice of the peace courts in the United States,
which hold that statutes fixing the time for the rendering of judgments
are mandatory, since the powers of the inferior courts are dependent
upon and limited by the statute. (Note State vs. Houston [1907], 36
Mont, 178.) Portillo on the other hand contends that a fairly
exhaustive search for authorities has revealed but one ease in point,
Bernardo vs. Rue ([1914], 26 Cal. A., 108; 146 Pac., 79). But while
this decision does hold that the California statute requiring the court
to enter its judgment within ten days after submission of the case is
directory as to an election contest, it must not be forgotten that the
California courts likewise adhere to the minority doctrine pertaining
to the jurisdiction of justice of the peace courts. The various texts,
cyclopedias of law, and decisions could be searched out and inserted to
encumber this decision, without proving of any particular benefit in
the ultimate resolution of the question.

Like in all cases depending for their correct disposition on
statutory construction, the primary question is, What was the
legislative intent? The real purpose of the Legislature, we believe,
can be ascertained by various courses of reasoning. And first let us
investigate the legislative history of the existing amendment to the
Election Law.

The original Election Law in the Philippines was Act No. 1582.
Section 27 thereof, relating to election contests, was silent as to the
time within which the contests must be concluded. In 1912, the
Legislature amended the law when it enacted Act No. 2170 by including
the mild provision that “The contests shall be filed with the court
within two weeks after the election and shall be decided by the same as
soon as possible after the hearing of the contest.” The Election Law
was further strengthened in this respect in 1922 when this law, now
incorporated in the Administrative Code, was amended by Act No. 3030 by
the inclusion of the provision that “The court shall hear election
contests in preference to all other cases and shall try and decide them
as soon as possible,” It was two or three years ago when the
Legislature revised and compiled the Election Law that it continued the
above quoted sentence but made the law apply as well to the Supreme
Court and inserted the new provision we are scrutinizing to the effect
that “All proceedings in an electoral contest shall be terminated
within one year.”

It will be noted that by progressive steps the Philippine
Legislature has proceeded from silence to mild admonition, to stronger
suggestion, to inserting finally an explicit and emphatic provision.
What the Legislature now desires is that it shall be obligatory upon
Courts of First Instance to decide pending election cases within one
year from the time of registration. Had the Legislature simply amended
the law once without making use of negative words, undoubtedly the
courts would be constrained to hold the amendment not a limitation of
authority. When, however, the legislative body has felt itself
compelled repeatedly to amend the law, an entirely different situation
is presented. As the United States Supreme Court in the last number of
its Advance Opinions, which has been received, said, “The deliberate
selection in a statute of language differing from that of earlier acts
on the subject indicates that a change of law was intended.” (Brewster
vs. Gage [1930], U. S. Sup. Ct. Advance Opinions, p. 183.) To hold the
law directory would amount to a ruling that the latest amendment of the
Election Law had no more weight, than the law had before the amendment.
Surely such was not the legislative purpose.

From another angle, we find the uniform holding to be that Courts
of First Instance, while acting in election contest cases, are courts
of special and limited jurisdiction (Topacio vs. Paredes [1912], 23
Phil., 238; Tengco vs. Jocson [1922], 43 ,Phil., 715; Palisoc vs.
Tamondong and Medina Cue [1922], 43 Phil, 789; Viola vs. Court of First
Instance of Camarines Sur and Adolfo [1925], 47 Phil., 849). The
jurisdiction of Courts of First Instance to try contested election
cases being special, is confined within the provisions of the statute.
The Election Law must be strictly construed and must be exactly
followed by those who act under and in pursuance of the powers therein
conferred (Topacio vs. Paredes, supra; Tengco vs. Jocson, supra).
Certain parts of the Election Law this court has held are mandatory
(Ocampo vs. Mina and Arejola [1920], 41 Phil., 880 and Yumul vs. Palma
[1928], 52 Phil., 412, with which compare Lino Luna vs. Rodriguez
[1918], 39 Phil., 208).

Two of the best known authorities on the Election Law of the
Philippines, Justice Ignacio Villamor and Senator Jose P. Laurel,
although they have not commented directly on the point here under
consideration, .yet have used language indicative of their respective
points of view. Thus in the case of San Juan vs. Abordo ([1927], 50
Phil, 703), Justice Villamor said:

“The controversy should cease when one of the litigants has been
declared hors de combat by the authority of the law. And there is no
need to insist that it is to the public interest that election contests
should be rapidly and economically decided, avoiding unnecessary
delays. In this way the uncertainty as to the result of the election is
done away with, the ardor of party contests is quenched, and political
repose, which is so necessary to the progress of the country, is
restored in the community. It is for this reason that the Legislature
has provided that the courts should hear and decide election contests
as promptly as possible, in preference to all other kinds of cases, and
whether or not they are in regular session.”

Senator Laurel, .one of the authors of the codified Election Law,
in his work on the Law of Elections of the Philippine Islands, pages
196-198, states the following:

“The Court of First Instance and the Supreme Court shall hear
election contests in preference to all other cases and shall try and
decide them as soon as possible, whether it be a regular term of court
or not; and in no case must the proceedings therein last for more than
one year. The law contemplates that election contests should be
concluded as speedily as possible to the end that the real will of the
voters may be given effect. Unnecessary delay and multiplicity of
action should not therefore be imposed .upon the people of the
municipality without the very best and sufficient reasons. * * * There
is the strongest reason for enforcing this rule most rigidly in cases
of contested election because promptness in commencing and prosecuting
the proceeding is of the utmost importance, to the end that a, decision
may be reached before the term has wholly or in part expired. The
courts should require the parties to speed the cause, so that the
official term which is in the dispute may not expire, either in whole
or in part, before the final decision is reached.”

With the foregoing discussion of the legal question to the
forefront, it would now be proper to turn again to the facts. It will
be recalled that the protest was filed on July 9, 1928, and that the
decision on the protest was received in the office of the clerk of
court on August 15, 1929, although purporting to have been signed on
July 3, 1929. The court can take judicial notice of the fact that it
would not take from July 3d to August 15th for a decision to proceed
from Capiz, Capiz, to San Jose, Antique. Although in certain cases it
might be wise to distinguish between the rendering of the judgment and
its entry in the records of the court, that point need not complicate
matters here, for the law contains provisions governing judgments
signed by the judge after he has left the province where the case was
heard. The law provides that the judgment shall be entered in the court
as of the day when the same was received by the clerk in the same
manner as if the judge had been present in court to direct the entry of
the judgment. In this connection, there may be cited the decision of
Justice Johnson in the case of Lino Luna vs. Rodriguez and De los
Angeles ([1917], 37 Phil, 186). On this basis, the decision in the
election case was thirty- seven days late, which means that the
proceedings were not terminated within one year.

To avoid all misunderstanding, it should be said that we have not
neglected to take under observation the undeniable fact that the law
imposes the duty of prompt action primarily upon the court and
secondarily upon the protestant and that the parties, particularly the
protestee, have no control over the action of the court. To punish the
litigants for the wrongs of the court which the litigants have no power
to prevent is not subversive of justice. All this must be conceded. At
the same time, not to put strength into the law would completely
nullify its force. Confronted with this dilemma, we turn again to rest
our judgment on what we conceive to be the legislative purpose in
changing the law for courts of special jurisdiction. Should a judge be
inclined to move tardily, we entertain little doubt that ,.; on the
initiative of the protestant either the Department of Justice would
take action or the appellate court would coerce the judge to activity.
The burden in election contests is continually placed on the
protestant, and the law is peculiarly obligatory upon him—much more so
than upon the protestee who occupies a purely defensive position.

What has been here said is confined to a discussion of the first
assignment of error and the arguments of the parties thereon, and does
not purport to decide the legal , effect of extraordinary remedies
instituted in this court 4 against Courts of First Instance as tolling
the time and so extending the year within which the proceedings must be
concluded, a point not discussed on this appeal.

It is accordingly our view that the Philippine Legislature intended
the amendment to the Election Law that “All proceedings in an electoral
contest shall be terminated within one year” to be mandatory, and that
inasmuch as the proceedings in the electoral contest at bar were not
terminated within one year, the trial court lost authority over the
case at the expiration of the year, with the result that the judgment
thereafter attempted to be rendered was void for want of jurisdiction.
The remainder of the assignment of errors need not be discussed.

Accordingly, the order of the court below overruling the motions of
July 26th and August 19,1929, shall be reversed, and all proceedings in
the election contest dismissed, without special pronouncement as to the
costs in either instance. On the return of the record to the court of
origin, a copy of this decision shall be furnished the provincial board
of canvassers for its guidance. So ordered.

Johnson, Villamor Ostrand and Villa-Real, JJ., concur.

Johns, J., concurs in the result.