THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. RAFAEL SALINAS Y AGAS, DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT.

The additional penalty of twenty-one years imposed upon the accused,
as well as the constitutionality of Act No. 3397, is questioned in this
instance.

It is contended that the five thefts by the accused before the one
at bar were perpetrated when Act No. 3397 was not yet in force, hence,
they cannot be affected by this Act. There is no attempt, however, to
again penalize the former crimes which had already been prosecuted, but
the habitual delinquency shown by the accused in committing the crime
at bar after the enforcement of said Act. In similar terms, the special
division of this court held, in deciding the case of People vs. Sierra (G. R. No. 28516),^[1] referring to the former act regarding habitual delinquency, Act No. 3062, that:

“* * * the crime prosecuted in the complaint was
committed when said Act was already in force. In fact, this Act does
not punish the crimes previously committed by the appellant, but the
habituality involved in that committed after its enforcement, because
habituality does not consist of the former crimes but of the last one
committed by the appellant. Habituality consists in the repetition of
an act.”

With regard to the constitutionality of Act No. 3397, it suffices to
say that such question, referring to acts of similar import had already
been resolved by the Supreme Court of the United States in the case of
Graham vs. West Virginia (56 Law. ed., 917), wherein it was held:

“The propriety of inflicting severer punishment upon
old offenders has long been recognized in this country and in England.
They are not punished the second time for the earlier offense, but the
repetition of criminal conduct aggravates their guilt and justifies
heavier penalties when they are again convicted. Statutes providing for
such increased punishment were enacted in Virginia and New York as
early as 1796 and in Massachusetts in 1804; and there have been
numerous acts of similar import in many states. This legislation has
uniformly been sustained in the state courts.”

The foregoing doctrine was cited and quoted with approval in the
case decided by this court on September 21, 1923, regarding the former
Act No. 3062, as well as in the case of People vs. Nayco (45 Phil., 167), with reference to habitual delinquency.

It does not constitute a violation of any constitutional guaranty
for the state to repress depravity in those cases where its efforts at
reform, by means of ordinary penalties, have failed. Modern legislation
against habitual delinquency, as stated above, provides punishment only
for the last crime committed by the accused, for which he is
prosecuted; and it is within the power of the Legislature to direct
that, in fixing the corresponding penalty for such crime, the degree of
depravity of the accused, as shown by his persistence in his criminal
career, be taken into consideration.

“Aside from the offender and his victim there is
always another party concerned in every crime committed—the state; and
it does no violence to any constitutional guaranty for the state to rid
itself of depravity when its efforts to reform have failed. The true
ground upon which these statutes are sustained is, that the punishment
is awarded for the second offense only, and that in determining the
amount or nature of the penalty to be inflicted, the legislature may
require the courts to take into consideration the persistence of the
defendant in his criminal course.”

“8. Herndon vs. Com., 105 Ky., 197; 48 S. W., 989; 88 A. S. R., 303; State vs. Le Pitre, 54 Wash., 166; 103 Pac., 27; 18 Ann. Cas., 922.

“Notes: 64 A. S. R., 378; 18 Ann. Cas., 923, 925.

“9. Graham vs. West Virginia, 224 U. S., 616; 32 S. Ct. 583; 56 U.S. (Law. ed.), 917.

“Note: 37 A. S. R., 589.” (8 R. C. L., 271.)

There being no merit in the assignment of errors, the judgment
appealed from is hereby affirmed, with the understanding that the
accused should suffer the accessory penalties provided in article 58 of
the Penal Code in this case, with costs. So ordered.

Avanceña, C. J., Johnson, Street, Malcolm, Villamor, Ostrand, and Johns, JJ., concur.

^[1] Promulgated April 21, 1928, not reported.