PHILIPPINE TRUST CO., PETITIONER, VS. FRANCISCO SANTAMARIA, JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF ILOILO, AND F. M. YAPTICO & CO., LTD., RESPONDENTS.

There is no dispute about any material fact. It appears that the
judgments in favor of the petitioner and against F, M. Yaptico &
Co., Ltd., were rendered in the Court of First Instance of Iloilo on
October 19, 1927, from which F. M. Yaptico & Co., Ltd., appealed to
this court which affirmed the judgments.^[1] It also appears
that the petitioner asked for an execution of the judgments pending the
appeal to this court, which was denied, and that after the cases were
affirmed by this court, it again asked for an execution of those
judgments. The petitioner then applied to the court for the appointment
of a receiver upon the ground that F. M. Yaptico & Co., Ltd., was
fraudulently putting its property beyond the reach of its creditors and
the petitioner, in particular. After a hearing, that motion was denied,
and the lower court on June 30, 1929, suspended the execution of the
judgments for four months from June 30, 1929.

Hence, we have this situation: The petitioner obtained its judgments
in the Court of First Instance on October 19, 1927, and although it has
made diligent efforts’ to obtain an execution and enforce its
judgments, from one cause or another, it has been delayed by order of
the court, and in its last and final order, the court suspended the
right of the petitioner to enforce its judgments until October 30,
1929, which would be more than two years after the judgments were
rendered in the lower court, and one year after the judgments were
affirmed by this court. In other words’, for ten months the petitioner
has not been able to obtain and enforce an execution on final
judgments” rendered in this court.

We do not know anything about the whys and wherefores, but suffice
it to say that such proceedings bring the courts into disrepute and
subject them to severe criticism. After a final judgment has been
rendered in this court, in particular, or even in the Court of First
Instance, it is the duty of the court to enforce the judgment according
to its terms, and no court has the power to suspend an execution issued
on a final judgment, except as to matters and things which may have
arisen after the rendition of the judgment, and which would be a valid
defense.

As this court said in Wolf son (Trustee) vs. Del Rosario (Judge) and Fajardo (46 Phil., 41):

“An extension of the time fixed by a judgment which has become final
for the payment of a certain sum of money is in effect a modification
of the judgment and is beyond the jurisdiction of the Court of First
Instance.”

And on page 43, the opinion says:

“On the facts stated, its seems obvious that the
respondent judge exceeded his jurisdiction in recalling the writ of
execution in question. It is very true that the court retains a certain
amount of control over a writ of execution even after it leaves its
hands, but such control is limited and regulated by fairly definite”
rules of law and is not unrestricted. A writ of execution may thus be
quashed when it appears that it has been improvidently issued, or that
it is defective in substance, or is issued against the wrong party, or
that the judgment debt has been paid, or when the writ has been issued
without authority, etc. But the writ will not be recalled by reason of
any defense which could have been made at the time of the trial of the
case, nor can the recall be made so as to practically change the terms
of a judgment which has become final”.

We are clearly of the opinion that the lower court exceeded its
jurisdiction in suspending the execution for the period of four months
from June 30, 1929. We are also of the opinion that upon the facts
shown in this record, it was the duty of the court to appoint a
receiver for the F. M. Yaptico & Co., Ltd., to protect and preserve
its property and assets for the use and benefit of its creditors and,
in particular, this petitioner, under the provisions of section 483 of
the Code of Civil Procedure. The very fact that the judgments in
question were rendered on October 19, 1927, and that no part of them
has yet been paid, and that F. M. Yaptico & Co., Ltd., has so far
been able to defeat the petitioner in the collection of its judgments,
is a very strong and cogent reason why a receiver should be appointed.

It is the order of the court that a writ of mandamus be forthwith
issued as prayed for in the petition, and that the lower court at once
appoint a receiver of all the property and assets of F. M. Yaptico
& Co., Ltd., and that petitioner have judgment for costs. So
ordered.

Avanceña, C. J., Street, Villamor, and Romualdez, JJ., concur.

Johnson, J., reserves his vote.

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^[1] 52 Phil., 276.