DIRECTOR OF LANDS, APPLICANT AND APPELLEE, VS. EUGENIO ABALLA ET AL., CLAIMANTS. LAZARO GARRIDO ET AL., APPELLANTS.

Several claimants included in the above entitled cadastral case,
filed with the court below through their attorney a petition praying
that this case be dismissed, that Act No. 3327 be declared
unconstitutional and the instant cadastral proceeding illegal and of no
effect whatever for failure to comply with the law and the regulations
of the Bureau of Lands, and that the applicant, the Director of Lands
be sentenced to pay the costs.

Their petition is based on the following allegations:

“That Act No, 3327 under the provisions of which the above entitled
petition was begun, prepared, and presented, is void, illegal, and
unconstitutional (1) because it deprives a person of his property
without due process of law and curtails his right to dispose and enjoy
thereof, and (2) because it imposes as penalty, the seizure of
property—which are gross violation of our constitutional rights
guaranteed by the Jones Law and the Philippine Organic Act.

“That even assuming that Act No. 3327 is constitutional, the
cadastral project of Jaro, Leyte, now the object of this petition, is
null, void and illegal (1) because in March 13, 1927, when said
cadastral project together with the amount, conditions, and terms of
payments of the survey fees, was filed with and presented to the
municipal council of Jaro, Leyte, for approval, it was filed by one
Romualdo Añover in the name and representation of the Leyte Cadastral
Surveys, Inc., a corporation which not then existing at that date,
March 13, 1927, and could not therefore, file this cadastral project as
required by Act No. 3327; and (2) because said resolution indorsed to
the Governor-General thru the Director of Lands by the Provincial Board
of Leyte, showing that it was approved and sanctioned by the municipal
council of Jaro, Leyte, is false and has in fact, never been approved
by said body; and (3) because the field work of this cadastral survey
has not been executed in accordance with the regulations of the Bureau
of Lands. And to substantiate the foregoing allegations, we beg leave
of this court to present the corresponding evidence.

“That the herein claimants further contend that without the
fulfillment of the legal formalities required by Act No. 3327 as are
alleged in foregoing paragraphs, all proceeding in this petition cannot
be lawfully carried out; consequently, this court has no jurisdiction
to take cognizance of this case.” (Pages 1, 2 and 3, Bill of
Exceptions.)

Upon consideration of that motion, the Court of First Instance of
Leyte denied the same in its order of May 5, 1929, which is the subject
of this appeal.

Said claimants contend that the lower court erred in holding that
Act No. 3327 was constitutional, and point out that sections 1 and 3
thereof furnish ground for its unconstitutionally.

They allege that said section 1 curtails the right to enter into
contract enjoyed by every property owner and recognized by the Organic
Law of the Philippines and by our statutes, and that said right is
essential and inherent in the right to hold, enjoy, and dispose of
property.

These principles are admitted beyond discussion. But it should not
be forgotten that neither the right to enter into contract nor the
right to acquire, hold, enjoy, and convey property, is an absolute
right. Such rights are subordinate to the police power of the State,
and may be regulated and restricted by the Legislature for the public
weal.

The provisions of section 1 of Act No. 3327, and other provisions of
like nature of said Act are intended to insure a prompt and speedy
proceeding for the registration of titles to land in the Philippines,
and the peculiar provisions of paragraph b, section 1, of said Act,
intended for the same purpose, namely, the public weal through the
speedy registration of land titles, do not unduly abridge the right to
contract freely.

With reference to the compulsory registration of lands, such a
provision is not unconstitutional, because it allows to all parties
interested due process of law. On this point, see the ruling of this
court in the case of Jose vs. Commander of the Philippine Squadron (16
Phil., 62), of Government of the Philippine Islands vs. Municipality of
Binalonan (32 Phil., 634), of Ruymann and Farris vs. Director of Lands
(34 Phil., 428), of Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila vs. Barrio of
Sto. Cristo (39 Phil., 1), of Sena vs. Manila Railroad Co. and Insular
Government (42 Phil., 102). And it is unnecessary to add that the.
prompt registration of titles to land in the Philippines constitutes an
advancement of the public interests, for, besides promoting peace and
good order among landowners in particular and the people in general, it
helps increase the industries of the country, and makes for the
development of the natural resources, with the consequent progress of
the general prosperity. And these ends are pursued in a special manner
by the State through the exercise of its police power (Rubi vs.
Provincial Board of Mindoro, 39 Phil., 660).

The appellants find elements of unconstitutionality also in section
3 of said Act No.. 3327, because it provides that in cases of default
in the payment of the fees for the survey, the same proceedings are to
be followed as in default in the payment of taxes. There is nothing
improper here, considering that this provision is a part of the general
scheme of the law, and that the fees for the survey, with respect to
fixing the amount thereof and the terms, and conditions of payment have
not been left to the will of the corporation of surveyors alone, but
must, according to said Act No. 3327, be submitted to the sanction and
approval of the respective municipal council and provincial board, and
endorsed through the Director of Lands to the Governor-General,
provided the project be reasonable, and the aforesaid details
equitable. Furthermore, said Act No. 3327, in its various provisions,
surrounds the payment of said fees with such guarantees that the public
interest, and the rights of individuals are both duly safeguarded.

As to the manner of collecting said fees, besides the general
consideration that the one provided in this Act is in keeping with the
general scheme thereof which is all intended to promote public weal, it
should be noted that the intervention, inspection, and control
exercised by different departments of the Government over the amount
and other details of said fees which do not belong to the State, must
be, and the law so recognizes it, a protection to the owners of said
survey fees, for justice and equity so demand.

We do not find in the provisions of this Act assailed by the appellants any ground for its alleged unconstitutionally.

The order appealed from is affirmed, with costs against the appellants. So ordered.

Johnson, Street, Malcolm, Villamor, Ostrand, Johns and Villa-Real, JJ., concur.