FELIX ARAMBULO, PETITIONER, VS. THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF LAGUNA AND THE MUNICIPALITY OF SANTA ROSA, LAGUNA, RESPONDENTS.

Felix Arambulo filed this petition for a writ of certiorari against
the Court of First Instance of Laguna and the municipality of Santa
Rosa, Laguna, praying that, after proper legal proceedings, the decree
of the respondent court of May 16, 1929, ordering execution of the
judgment of said court rendered on November 27, 1914, be declared null
and void.

As all the pertinent facts necessary for the decision of the
question of law raised herein appear in the petition for certiorari and
the documents attached thereto, as well as in the answer filed by the
respondents and the documents attached thereto, there is no necessity
for ordering the transmission to this court of the record of civil case
No. 1725 of the Court of First Instance of Laguna, for recovery of
possession, wherein the order whose annulment is prayed for herein, was
entered.

The pertinent facts necessary for the decision of the instant petition are as follows:

On November 27, 1914, the respondent Court of First
Instance of Laguna rendered judgment in civil case No. 1725 of said
court, the other respondent, the municipality of Santa Rosa, Laguna,
being the plaintiff, and the petitioner herein, Felix Arambulo, being
the defendant, declaring the defendant in default, and ordering him to
vacate the land in question.

The judgment having become final
and subject to execution, the provincial fiscal of Laguna, acting in
behalf of the municipality of Santa Rosa, Laguna, filed a motion in
said court on March 24, 1915, praying that a writ of execution of said
judgment be issued to the provincial sheriff of Laguna.

As no
writ of execution was issued by said court, the provincial fiscal of
Laguna, acting in behalf of the municipality of Santa Rosa, Laguna,
filed a new motion on May 7, 1929, praying for a writ of execution of
the judgment, rendered on November 27, 1914.

Passing upon
said motion, the Honorable Mariano A. Albert, vacation judge, entered
an order on May 16, 1929, declaring that the period of prescription had
been interrupted by the filing of the motion of March 24, 1915, and
ordered the clerk of the Court of First Instance of Laguna to issue a
writ of execution in pursuance of the decision, in favor of the
plaintiff in the judgment of November 27, 1914, with the costs of the
action.

It is this last order that the instant petition for certiorari seeks to annul.

Section 443 of Act No. 190, known as the Code of Civil Procedure, provides the following:

“SEC. 443. When execution may issue.—The
party in whose favor judginent is given, may, at any time within five
years after the entry thereof, have a writ of execution issued for its
enforcement, as hereinafter provided.”

According to the above-quoted legal provision, the party in whose
favor judgment is given may, at any time within five years after the
entry thereof, have a writ of execution issued for its enforcement. In
its ordinary meaning, the word “have” signifies to obtain, to procure,
to secure something, and involves the idea of asking or praying for it.  The law does not say that the party in whose favor judgment is
rendered may simply “pray for” but may “have” a writ of execution
issued within the five years after the date of its entry.

In the case at bar, the respondent municipality of Santa Rosa,
Laguna, only prayed for the execution of the judgment rendered on
November 27, 1914, in its favor within the five years after the date of
entry thereof, and did not take the necessary steps to obtain said
execution within said period; it was only on May 7, 1929, or about
fourteen years later, that it reiterated said prayer and obtained the
corresponding writ of execution beyond the time fixed by law.

In the case of Compañia General de Tabacos vs. Martinez (17
Phil., 160), wherein the question of the interruption of the statute of
limitations on the execution of a judgment was raised, this court laid
down the following doctrine:

“Interruption of statute of limitations.—Inasmuch
as an order to stay proceedings does not operate to suspend the running
of the statute of limitations, a fortiori the mere presenting of a
petition asking the court below to direct the register of deeds to
furnish the court certain information, as in this case, should not
operate to suspend the five-year limitation. (Buell vs. Buell, 92 Cal., 393.)”

In accordance with the above-quoted doctrine, the mere filing of the
motion on March 24, 1915 for the issuance of a writ of execution of the
judgment dated November 27, 1914, by the municipality of Santa Rosa,
Laguna, without taking the necessary steps to obtain said order, did
not interrupt the course of the prescription, and as such petition was
not taken up again until May 7, 1929, that is, fourteen years later,
the order issued granting said petition was rendered after the
five-year limitation for the issuance of the writ of execution, when
the court no longer had jurisdiction to do it.

For the foregoing considerations, we are of opinion and so hold,
that the mere filing of a motion praying for a writ of execution of a
judgment, without having taken the necessary steps to obtain said
execution, does not interrupt the five-year period fixed by law for the
prescription of the execution of a judgment, and that the order
granting said motion entered after said period had elapsed, is null and
void for lack of jurisdiction.

By virtue whereof, the order of the respondent court dated May 16,
1929, is hereby declared null and void, for lack of jurisdiction,
without special pronouncement as to costs. So ordered.

Avanceña, C. J., Johnson, Street, Villamor, Johns, and Romualdez, JJ., concur.