THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. H. JANSSEN, DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT.

H. Janssen appeals to this court from the judgment of the Court of
First Instance of Antique convicting him of a violation of section 2 of
Act No. 3412, and sentencing him to pay a fine of P200, with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency at the rate of one day for every 12
1/2 pesetas, and to pay the court costs.

In support of his appeal, the appellant assigns the following
alleged errors as committed by the court a quo m its decision, to wit:

“The trial court erred:

“1. In holding
that it is the duty of the accused to inquire into and determine the
residence of the bride before solemnizing marriage.

“2. In
finding that the habitual residence of the bride, Juana S. del Rosario
is the municipality of Banga Province of Capiz, and not the
municipality of San Jose, Province of Antique.

“3. In holding that the accused cannot solemnize marriage without
publishing or proclaiming such marriage 10 days prior to the
celebration thereof.

“4. In holding that the accused has violated section 2 of Act No. 3412.

“5. In convicting the accused.”

The following facts were proved at the trial beyond a reasonable doubt:

On December 26, 1928, Pedro N. Cerdena and Juana S. del Rosario
appeared before Reverend Father H. Janssen, a Catholic parish priest of
the municipality of San Jose, Antique, to have their names inscribed in
the marriage registry, Exhibit 3, which was done. On December 30, 1928,
the banns were published in his parish in San Jose, Antique.

As the classes opened on January 7, 1929, the contracting parties
asked the defendant-appellant to marry them before that date. Upon
petition of the defendant-appellant, the Bishop of Jaro issued the
following dispensation on December 29,1928:

“In view of the exposition and petition contained in
the foregoing document, and with the understanding that no obstacle has
been discovered in the investigation made or to be made of the status
and liberty of the contracting parties, Pedro Cerdena, single, of age,
a resident of San Jose, Antique, and Juana S. del Rosario, a native of
Banga, Province of Capiz, residing in San Jose, Antique, single, of
age; dispensation is granted from one call of the banns, as prayed for,
subject to alms ……………. pesos, to be applied to charitable
work and the expenses of divine worship, enjoining the Reverend Parish
Priest of San Jose, Province of Antique, to whom a copy of this decree
shall be transmitted, not to solemnize the marriage under
consideration, without being certain of the status and liberty of both
contracting parties, and that in the realization of said act, no
complaint of any kind shall be made, on any legal ground; and that
otherwise, it is our will that the dispensation be granted.

“Causes: Urgent business of both parties, who being Government employees, cannot await the last call without serious prejudice.”

On the 1st of January, 1929, another proclamation was made to that effect.

On January 4, 1929, the municipal secretary of San Jose, Antique, issued the following authority to solemnize marriage :

“To all those authorized to celebrate marriage:

“You
are hereby authorized to solemnize the marriage of Pedro N. Cerdeiia
and Juana S. del Rosario, in accordance with the rites and ceremonies
of your Church, sect, or religion, and with the laws of the Philippine
Islands.

“Given this day, January 4, 1929, in the, municipality of San Jose, Antique, P. I.

“Attached hereto is a copy of the petition filed by the contracting parties.”

By virtue of the above-quoted dispensation, and in view of said
authority of the municipal secretary of San Jose, Antique, the
defendant-appellant on January 6, 1929, solemnized the marriage of
Pedro N. Cerdeiia to Juana S. del Rosario.

The only question to be decided in this appeal is whether or not the
defendant-appellant violated section 2 of Act No. 3412, the pertinent
part of which reads as follows:

“The municipal secretary or clerk of the municipal
court of Manila, as the case may be, shall post during ten days in a
conspicuous place in the building where he has his office, a notice
setting forth the full names and domiciles of the applicants for
marriage licenses, their respective ages, and the names of their
parents if living or of their guardians if otherwise. At the expiration
of this term, a license shall issue: Provided, however, That
in case any such applicant states in writing and under oath that the
rules and practices of the church, sect, or religion under which such
applicant desires to contract marriage require banns or publications
prior to the solemnization of the marriage, it shall not be necessary
for the municipal secretary to make the publication required in this
paragraph, and in this case the license shall issue immediately after
the filing of the application and shall state the church, sect, or
religion in which the marriage is to be solemnized.”

While it is true that section 2 of Act No. 3412 quoted above,
requires the municipal secretary to post a notice for ten days upon a
conspicuous place of the building where he has his office, setting
forth the names, surnames, and residence of applicants for a license to
contract marriage, their age, the names of their parents, if alive, or
of their guardians, as the case may be, before issuing the license
applied for, the same section contains & proviso to the effect that
when the contracting parties desire to marry in a church which requires
previous proclamation before the celebration of the marriage, there is
no need of said publication. The only doubt is whether said
proclamation must be made during ten days, as in the publication in
case the marriage is not celebrated in a church. The law simply says
that if the marriage takes place in a church whose rules and practices
require proclamation, the license applied for shall at once be issued,
and it does not say that the proclamation required by said church is to
be made during ten days. As section 2 of Act No. 3412 is penal in
character, it should be strictly construed. And as said section does
not require that the proclamation be made during ten days, but that it
is sufficient that the church in which the marriage is to take place
requires a proclamation, it is immaterial how many days said
proclamation is made in.

For the foregoing considerations, we are of opinion and so hold that
the defendant-appellant did not violate section 2 of Act No. 3412 in
solemnizing the marriage of Pedro N. Cerdeiia and Juana S. del Rosario
after two proclamations, before ten days were up, the third
proclamation having been dispensed with by a competent ecclesiastical
authority.

The trial court was also of opinion that the defendant-appellant was
bound to investigate whether the license was issued by an official duly
authorized by law, that is, by the municipal secretary of the
municipality where the woman habitually resides.

The law does not impose this duty upon priests or ministers of
religion. It is sufficient to know that the license has been issued by
a competent official, and it may be presumed from the issuance of said
license that said official has complied with his duty of ascertaining
whether the woman who desires to get married resides habitually in his
municipality. (Act No. 190, sec. 334, No. 14.)

Wherefore, we are of opinion and so hold, that when a marriage is
solemnized by a church, sect, or religion whose rules and practices
require proclamation or publicity, it is not necessary that said
proclamation be made during ten days, unless said rules or practices so
require.

By virtue whereof, the appealed judgment is reversed, and the defendant is absolved from the information, with costs de oficio. So ordered.

Avanceña, C. J., Street, Malcolm, Ostrand, and Johns, JJ., concur.