JAO YAN ON BEHALF OF TEE LIOK HUY,PETITIONER AND APPELLEE, VS. THE INSULAR COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS, RESPONDENT AND APPELLANT.

The petitioner presented the evidence of himself and Tee Liok Huy,
both of whom testified that they were married in China, as a result of
which they had two children, and in its opinion the lower court said:

“The uncontradicted evidence of Jao Yan (or Hao Yan)
is that he is married to petitioner Tee Liok Huy, by whom he has had
two children. The wife’s testimony corroborates this.”

The lower court also said:

“The other ground for excluding the petitioner is
that Chinese wives do not travel alone. Times change. When the
undisputed evidence shows the immigrant to be the wife of a Chinaman
lawfully in the country, it should be dangerous to exclude her on
account of a highly technical presumption that in 1928, Chinese married
women never travelled alone.”

It is conceded that the only testimony of the marriage is that of
the alleged husband and wife, and that no documentary or written
evidence was submitted. Neither is there any other oral nor
corroborating proof of any kind of the marriage.

The Attorney-General says:

“The customs authorities are not required to accept,
as true, statements made by an alien applicant or by his witnesses.
(Lim Cheng vs. Collector of Customs, 42 Phil., 876, 879; Tan Chin Hin vs. Collector of Customs, 27 Phil., 521; Gnilo vs. Collector of Customs, 32 Phil., 100; Ekiu vs.
U. S., 142 U. S., 651.) Even though such statements are given under
oath, the immigration officials are not required to accept them as
true. (Jao Igco vs. Shuster, 10 Phil., 448; Tan Puy vs. Collector of Customs, 36 Phil., 900; Lim Cheng vs. Collector of Customs, supra; Chin Low vs.
U. S., 18 Sup. Court Report, 201.)” Again, this court held, in an
opinion promulgated March 21, 1929, in the case of Antonio Chua Chiaco,
in behalf of Ong Tio, petitioner, vs. Collector of Customs (53 Phil., 31), that:

“The
decision of the board from which the appeal was taken finds in
substance, and the brief of the Attorney-General assumes, that the
petitioner and Ong Tio are husband and wife. The only proof on that
point is the oral testimony of the petitioner and Ong Tio, both of whom
testified that they were legally married according to the Chinese
customs in Teng Tang, China, on February 10, 1927. That is the only
evidence of their marriage, the legal proof of which is not contested
by the Attorney-General. Be that as it may, in this class of cases, to
prevent fraud and collusion, the evidence of the contracting parties
should be corroborated by that of some other person or some official
certificate. In other words, there should be some other competent
evidence of a convincing nature which corroborates that of the
contracting parties as to the existence of the marriage.”

That is to say, where the only evidence of the marriage is that of
the contracting parties, which is not clear and convincing, and there
is no documentary proof or corroborating evidence, the customs
authorities are not legally bound to accept the evidence of the
contracting parties as conclusive proof of their marriage in China. In
case of any doubt, as in this case, they may well require documentary
proof of the marriage or corroborating evidence of a clear and
convincing nature.

We are clearly of the opinion that the errors assigned are well
taken. The judgment of the lower court is reversed and the petition
dismissed, with costs. So ordered.

Avanceña, C. J., Johnson, Street, Malcolm, Ostrand, and Villa-Real, JJ., concur.