PO SUN TUN, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANT, VS. W. S. PRICE AND THE PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT OF LEYTE, DEFENDANTS AND APPELLEES.

On November 29, 1921, Gabino Barreto P. Po Ejap was the owner of a
certain parcel of land situated in the municipality of Tacloban,
Province of Leyte. On the. date mentioned, he sold the land to Po Tecsi
for the sum of P8,000. On June 21, 1923, Po mortgaged the land to W. S.
Price in the amount of P17,000. The mortgage was duly noted in the
office of the register of deeds of Leyte on August 18th of the same
year. On December 17, 1924, Po executed a deed of sale of the land to
Price in consideration of P17,000. This sale was recorded with the
register of deeds on January 22, 1925. Price in turn, with the consent
of his wife, sold the land on February 16, 1927, to the Province of
Leyte for P20,570.

In connection with the above facts, it should further be stated that
when the Tacloban Cadastral Case was before the courts in 1918, this
land was claimed by Gabino Barreto P. Po Ejap acting through his agent,
Po Tecsi, but subsequently on motion the names of Mr. and Mrs. Price
were substituted as claimants. On March 17, 1927, the original
certificate of title was issued in the name of the spouses Price.
Later, the proper transfer certificate of title was provided for the
Province of Leyte.

Returning again to the original date of November 29, 1921, on that
date Po Tecsi gave a general power of attorney including the right to
sell to Gabino Barreto P. Po Ejap. Acting under this power, Gabino sold
the land on November 22, 1923, for P8,000 to Jose H. Katigbak. On this
document there appears on the upper right-hand margin the following:
“Register of Deeds, Received, Dec. 15, 1923, Province of Leyte.” In
turn Jose H. Katigbak transferred the property to Po Sun Tun on October
12,1927, for P8,000.

Further explaining the relationship of the parties, it should be
taken into consideration that Gabino Barreto P. Po Ejap and Po Tecsi,
between whom was the original transaction and between whom was the
provision made for the power of attorney, are brothers. Gabino Barreto
P. Po Ejap and Po Sun Tun, the first the original vendor, and the
latter the person to whom the property eventually returned pursuant to
the power of attorney, are father and son.” As to the possession of the
property, it has been under the control of Price and the Provincial
Government of Leyte and has not been under the material control of Po
Sun Tun.

Predicated on these facts, Po Sun Tun began an action in the Court
of First Instance of Leyte to gain the possession of the property and
to secure damages in the amount of P3,600. Judge Causing sitting in
first instance decided the case on the pleadings and the evidence,
absolving the defendants W. S. Price and the Province of Leyte from the
complaint, with costs against the plaintiff. The principal error
assigned on appeal by the plaintiff in connection with this judgment is
that the trial judge erred in finding that the deed, Exhibit D, in
favor of Jose H. Katigbak had not been registered in the corresponding
registry of property.

The provision of law relied upon by the trial judge as authority for
his decision was the second paragraph of article 1473 of the Civil
Code, which provides that if the same thing should have been sold to
different vendees, “Si fuere inmueble, la propiedad pertenecera al
adquirente que antes la haya inscrito en el Registro,” or, as
translated by Fisher, “Should it be real property, it shall belong to
the purchaser who first recorded it in the Registry of Deeds.”
Recalling that the deed of Po Tecsi to Price was duly registered on
January 22, 1925, and that thereafter a Torrens title was obtained in
the name of Price, and that the deed of Gabino Barreto P. Po Ejap to
Jose H. Katigbak has noted on it “Register of Deeds, Received, Dec.
15,1923, Province of Leyte,” can it be said that within the meaning of
the law this latter deed was ever recorded?

We are clearly of the opinion that it was riot. The law and the
authorities are overwhelmingly demonstrative of this statement. The
mere presentation to the office of the register of deeds of a document
on which acknowledgment of receipt is written is not equivalent to
recording or registering the real property. Escriche says that
registration, in its juridical aspect, must be understood as the entry
made in a book or public registry of deeds. (See Altavas, Land
Registration in the Philippine Islands, 2d ed., p. 151.) Soler and
Castello in their Dicciondrio de Legislacidn Hvpotecaria y Notarial,
vol. II, p. 185, state:

“Registration in general, as the law uses the word,
means any entry made in the books of the Registry, including both
registration in its ordinary and strict sense, and cancellation,
annotation, and even the marginal notes. In its strict acceptation, it
is the entry made in the Registry which records solemnly and
permanently the right of ownership and other real rights.”

The American authorities conform in this respect to the Spanish
authorities for of the term “To register” it has been said that it
means to “enter in a register; to record formally and distinctly; to
enroll; to enter in a list” (Reck vs. Phenix Ins. Co. [1889], 7 N. Y. Supp., 492; 54 Hun., 637; Harriman vs.
Woburn Electric Light Co. [1895], 163 Mass., 85). If any doubt remained
on the subject, it would be dispelled by turning to Act No. 2837
amendatory of section 194 of the Administrative Code, and recalling
that it is therein provided that “No instrument or deed establishing,
transmitting, acknowledging, modifying or extinguishing rights with
respect to real estate not registered under the provisions of Act
Numbered Four hundred and ninety-six, entitled ‘The Land Registration’
and its amendments, shall be valid, except as between the parties
thereto, until such instrument or deed has been registered, in the manner hereinafter prescribed,
in the office of the register of deeds for the province or city where
the real estate lies.” (There follows in the law the requirements
regarding the books which it is the duty of the register of deeds to
keep and use.)

It results as a matter of course since the deed made by Gabino
Barreto P. Po Ejap in favor of Jose H. Katigbak was not only not first
recorded in the registry of deeds but never legally so recorded, and
since the purchaser who did record his deed was Price, who secured a
Torrens title and transferred the same to the Province of Leyte, that
Po Sun Tun, the holder of a defeasible title, has no legal rights as
against Price and the Province of Leyte, the holders of indefeasible
titles. Also, if necessary, it could be ruled that within the meaning
of section 38 of the Land Registration Law, Price and the Province of
Leyte are innocent purchasers for value of the disputed property.

Finding the judgment appealed from to be correct from all points of
view, it will be affirmed, with the costs of this instance against the
appellant.

Avanceña, C. J., Johnson, Street, Ostrand, Johns, Romualdez, and Villa-Real, JJ., concur.