G.R. No. 31287. December 27, 1929
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF R. H. FRANKEL, DECEASED. ANNA HARTSKE, CLARA WEBBER AND FREMA FISCHLER, PETITIONERS AND APPELLANTS, VS. FRED FRANKEL AND PHILIPPINE TRUST CO., APP…
JOHNS, J.:
court well said, the deposition of Fred Frankel was taken under the
stipulation in which both parties appeared by their respective
attorneys at the stipulated time and place, and propounded their
respective questions to the witness, who made written answers to such
questions, and it appears that the answers were subscribed and sworn to
by the witness. In other words, the deposition was taken under and
pursuant to the terms of the stipulation of the parties, and, hence, is
admissible in evidence. It clearly appears from the deposition that
Herman Frankel died without lineal descendants, and that Fred Frankel
is his only surviving brother, and as such is an heir to the estate of
his deceased brother, Herman Frankel.
Exhibit A, which the lower court held to be fraudulent, is a deed
from Edward A. Carlstrom to the deceased wife of Herman Frankel. It
appears that on the same day that it was executed, Herman Frankel
conveyed the identical property therein described to Edward A.
Carlstrom, and it is contended that such conveyances should be
construed together, and that when so construed, it is apparent that
they were made for the sole purpose and intent of divesting the
conjugal partnership of the property and to vest it in Eugene Fischler,
the deceased wife, and for such reasons, it is null and void as against
public policy.
It appears that Herman Frankel and his wife separated January 8,
1902, and never again lived together as husband and wife. Exhibit A was
executed February 25, 1902, and paragraph 4 of it, which is the
certificate of the notary public, recites:
“4. Mrs. Eugene Fischler, with the license and
consent of her husband, Mr. Herman Frankel, which was asked and
conceded, in this act and in my presence, I, the notary, do give faith
and therefore state: That she accepts this sale in the precise terms in
which it is made by Mr. Edward A. Carlstrom, manifesting that this
present acquisition is made with her own money and does not pertain to
the conjugal partnership gananciales, for which reason her husband,
from whom she has been separated by virtue of an act dated January 8,
1902, formulated before the notary public of this capital, Don Enrique
Barrera y Caldes, only concurs to this instrument so that same may be
inscribed in the corresponding property register, he having manifested
this to me, corroborating that which is said by the signer, that he has
not for himself nor for his heirs any participation in the property the
subject matter of this instrument.”
It also appears that on August 30, 1916, Torrens certificate of
title No. 3374 was issued to and in the name of the deceased wife,
Eugene Fischler, for the identical land described in Exhibit A.
The storm center of that exhibit is whether or not it was made with
a fraudulent intent and purpose to nullify the statute, as the trial
court found. There is some evidence which tends to show that before her
marriage, the deceased wife at one time had about P20,000 of her own
money, and the evidence of Fred Frankel tends to show that at one time
before his marriage, his brother had about P80,000 in money. But in
truth and in fact, there is no oral evidence as to the amount of money,
if any, which either of them had at the time of their marriage, and the
lower court based on legal presumptions found that any property which
either of them had was acquired after marriage, and as such was
conjugal property.
Act No. 496 became a law January 1, 1903, and Exhibit A was executed
on February 25,1902, when the old Spanish Notarial Law was still in
force and effect, under which the certificate of the notary is entitled
to much weight.
It will be noted that in this certificate, the deceased wife says
that she accepts the conveyance from Carlstrom “manifesting that this
present acquisition is made with her own money and does not pertain to
the conjugal partnership gananeiales,” for which reason her husband,
from whom she has been separated since January 8, 1902, as evidenced by
the certificate of the notary public “only concurs to this instrument
so that same may be inscribed in the corresponding property register,
he having manifested this to me, corroborating that which is said by
the signer, that he has not for himself nor for his heirs any
participation in the property the subject matter of this instrument.”
That is to say, that this Spanish notarial certificate recites that the
wife then claimed and asserted that she acquired this property with her
own personal, individual money, and that her husband then confirmed and
corroborated that statement of his wife, and says: “That he has not for
himself nor for his heirs any participation in the property,” and it is
a fact that from and after the execution of Exhibit A, the husband
during his lifetime did not claim or assert any right, title or
interest in or to the property, and that the wife dealt with and
treated it as her sole and exclusive property, and there is no evidence
to overcome or which is in conflict with those notarial recitals.
Construing them as true, we have the statement of the wife made
before the notary that this property was purchased with her own money,
which is also confirmed and corroborated by that of her husband.
Without some evidence, and based upon legal presumptions only, how
can the court find as a fact that the statements of both the husband
and the wife made before a Spanish notary are false and unworthy of
belief, in particular, where for twenty-two years they were confirmed
and approved by the subsequent acts and conduct of both the husband and
the wife?
The following1 provisions of the Civil Code are in point:
“ART. 1381. Paraphernal property is that which the
wife brings in marriage without including it in the dowry and that
which she may acquire after its constitution without adding it to the
dowry.”“ART. 1392. By virtue of the conjugal partnership the
earnings or profits obtained by either of the spouses during1 the
marriage shall belong to the husband and the wife, share and share
alike, upon the dissolution of the marriage.“ART. 1393. The
conjugal partnership shall begin on the same day that the marriage is
celebrated. Any stipulation to the contrary shall be void”.“ART. 1396. The following is the separate property of each of the spouses:
“1. That brought to the marriage as his or her own;
“2. That acquired gratuitously by either of them during the marriage;
“3. That acquired by right of re-purchase or by exchange for other property belonging to one of the spouses only;
“4. That bought with money belonging exclusively to the wife or to the husband.”
“ART.
1407. All the property of the spouses shall be deemed partnership
property in the absence of proof that it belongs exclusively to the
husband or to the wife.”“ART. 1432. In default of a specific
declaration in the marriage contract, no separation of the property of
the spouses shall take place during the marriage except by virtue of a
judicial decree, except in the case provided for by article 50.”“ART.
1458. The husband and the wife cannot sell property to each other,
except in case a separation of property has been agreed upon or when a
judicial separation of such property should have been decreed in
accordance with the provisions of Chapter VI, Title III, of this book”.
Under similar laws, there is good authority for holding that Exhibit
A is valid even as a gift against an heir of the deceased husband.
In the case of Brown vs. Brown (174 Massachusetts, 197; American State Reports, vol. 75, p. 292), that court said:
“Although in this commonwealth there has been much
change in the law regarding the relations of husband and wife and the
power of a married woman to acquire property and make contracts1, yet
it is still the law here that, with certain exceptions as to wearing
apparel and similar articles not material to this case, a married woman
cannot acquire property by gift from her husband, though such a gift
may be so far valid as to give the wife a right to the property at the
death of her husband as against his heirs or executors but not against
his creditors. Property thus given remains the property of the husband
during his life, and may be demanded by him or attached by his
creditors.”
And Marshall vs. Jaquith (134 Massachusetts, 138), the same court said:
“A husband may make a gift of personal property to
his wife, which, if not revoked by him, will, after his death, give her
a valid title to the property against his heirs, if, with the intention
on his part to give it to her, the property is actually delivered to
and retained by her, and no rights of the creditors of the husband are
impaired.”
Be that as it may, upon that point we prefer to base this opinion on
the recitals made in the Spanish notarial certificate above quoted, and
the subsequent acts and conduct of the parties, that the property
described in Exhibit A was purchased by the wife with her own personal
money. There is no evidence to overcome the legal force and effect of
that certificate.
On the record, we are clearly of the opinion that Exhibit A was a
good and valid conveyance to the deceased wife, and that it was and is
legally binding on both the husband and his heirs.
As to the remaining property, both real and personal, for ought that
appears in the record, it was acquired during the marriage, and there
is, no evidence to overcome the statutory presumptions, or which tends
to show that it was the separate and exclusive property of the wife.
The judgment of the lower court as to the real property described in
Exhibit A is reversed, and it is held to be the sole and separate
property of the wife and of her estate. In all other things and
respects, the judgment of the lower court is affirmed, without costs to
either party. So ordered.
Avanceña, C.J., Malcolm, Ostrand, Romualdez, and Villa-Real, JJ., concur.
DISSENTING
STREET, J., in part:
The judgment which is the subject of this appeal should in my
opinion be affirmed in its entirety, and I dissent from so much of the
present decision as holds that the real property covered by Exhibit A
is separate property of the wife. There is admittedly no sufficient
proof that Eugene Fischler owned property in her own right prior to her
marriage to Herman Frankel; and whatever she possessed thereafter must
have been acquired during the marriage regime. Of course the mere
separation of the spouses did not destroy the right of either to
participate in their mutual acquisitions, as in ganancial property. The
sole ground upon which the opinion of the court in this case proceeds,
in holding the aforesaid property to be separate estate of the wife, is
discovered in the recitals of the conveyance, Exhibit A, and in
recitals of the notarial acknowledgment appended thereto. But it
appears that this property originally was held in the name of the
husband, Herman Frankel, and that after he had conveyed it to
Carlstrom, the latter, on the same day, executed the Exhibit A,
conveying the property to the wife, Eugene Fischler, as, separate
property. It is transparent ,that these transactions were consummated
as a mere device to evade the statute, which denies validity to direct
conveyances made by the husband or wife to each other. Carlstrom was
evidently a mere conduit for the purpose of transferring the property
from the husband to the wife. If the law prohibits, as it does, the
husband from conveying property directly to the wife, it is difficult
to see how his heir can be held bound by an admission, evidently
fictitious, inserted in the conveyance of Carlstrom to the wife, that
the property was, purchased by her with means pertaining to her
separate estate. The courts ought not, in my opinion, to grasp at
fictions of thi3 sort for the purpose of diverting ganancial property
from the channel appointed by law for its devolution.