THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. MAXIMO N. CRUZ, DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT.

This is an appeal taken by Maximo N. Cruz from the judgment of the
Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija convicting him of a violation of
ordinance No. 4, series of 1928, of the municipality of Cabanatuan, and
sentencing him to pay a fine of P200, with subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency, and costs.

In support of his appeal, the appellant assigns the following
alleged errors as committed by the court below in its judgment, to wit:

“1. The lower court erred in not declaring the
zoning ordinance No. 4 of Cabanatuan of 1928 unconstitutional for being
unjust, unreasonable, discriminatory, prohibitive of trade and
depriving the accused equal protection of the laws.

“2. The
lower court erred in not declaring unconstitutional the aforesaid
ordinance as amended by resolution No. 327 of November 16, 1928.

“3. The lower court erred in not declaring the ordinance in question as beyond the power of the municipal council to enact.

“4. The lower court erred in trying and condemning the accused without due process of law.

“5. The lower court erred in not declaring the machine in question to be out of the zone of machineries.”

On account of the close connection between the first and second
assignments of error in appellant’s brief, they will be discussed
together.

Ordinance No. 4, series of 1928, of the municipality of Cabanatuan,
as amended by resolution No. 327 of the council of said municipality,
reads as, follows:

“[No. 23]

“ORDINANCE AMENDING THE ORDINANCE No. 4

“By virtue of the authority of section 2243 (letter [n]) of the Revised Administrative Code, the Municipal Council of Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija, enacts:

“Section 1. Section 2 of the Ordinance No. 4, current series, is hereby amended to read as follows:

”
‘SEC. 2. Any kind of engines are not allowed to be installed within the
limit of the machinery zone as it is clearly defined by section 1 of
the Ordinance No. 4, above-mentioned: Provided, however, That
all kind of engines, machines and apparatus to be used for the
establishment, construction and repairs of any potency of “delco lights
and cinematographs,” are hereby allowed”

“SEC. 2. Any
violation of this ordinance will be punished, upon conviction, with a
fine not less than P50 nor more than P200, or by imprisonment of not
less than 30 nor more than 6 months, with a subsidiary imprisonment at
the rate of W a day.

“SEC. 3. This ordinance shall take
effect upon the approval of the Council, and shall repeal all previous
ordinances and resolutions, or part of the same in conflict with the
present.

“Approved with eight affirmative votes on November 16, 1928.”

The appellant contends that said ordinance, as amended, is
unconstitutional, discriminatory, unreasonable and prohibitive, and
that it deprives the defendant of his right to equal protection of the
laws.

It is a matter definitely settled by both Philippine and American
cases, and the defendant-appellant so admits, that municipal
corporations may, in the exercise of their police power, enact
ordinances or regulations on zonification (43 Corpus Juris, 334).
Within the powers granted to municipal councils in section 2238 of the
Revised Administrative Code, the municipal council of Cabanatuan was
authorized to enact the zonification ordinance with which we are now
concerned.

The question to be decided now is whether said ordinance is illegal and unconstitutional.

The defendant-appellant contends that said ordinance is illegal because section 2243 (n)
of said Revised Administrative Code, only authorizes municipal councils
to regulate the installation of, and to provide for the inspection of
steam boilers within the municipality, and not motor engines, and that
the power to regulate does not include the power to prohibit.

Appellant’s contention that the municipal council of Cabanatuan is only authorized by section 2243 (n)
of the Administrative Code to regulate the installation of steam
boilers, and that the engines in question not being steam but motor
engines, said municipal council exceeded its powers in regulating their
installation, is untenable. Considering the activities of modern life,
and the progress of mechanical engineering, said authority must be
construed to extend to motor engines, since both kinds of engines are
dangerous in their handling and operation, and have the same end,
namely, the development of motive power for industrial purposes.

As to the contention that the power to regulate does not include the
power to prohibit, it will be seen that the ordinance copied above does
not prohibit the installation of motor engines within the municipality
of Cabanatuan but only within the zone therein fixed. If the municipal
council of Cabanatuan is authorized to establish said zone, it is also
authorized to provide what kind of engines may be installed therein. In
banning the installation in said zone of all engines not excepted in
the ordinance, the municipal council of Cabanatuan did no more than
regulate their installation by means of zonification.

As to the contention that said ordinance discriminates in favor of
Delco motor engines for light and cinema^ tograph purposes as against
other motor engines, such discrimination is not unreasonable nor
unjust, for there is a great difference between a motor engine for
sawing wood, and light and cinematograph machinery: the first is a
nuisance due to the noise of its operation; whereas the second actually
furnishes diversion and amusement. Such a classification being just and
reasonable, the ordinance establishing it does not violate the
defendant-appellant’s constitutional right to equality before the law.

With regard to the question, likewise of constitutional right,
whether or not the defendant-appellant has been tried and condemned
without due process of law, inasmuch as he had not been given time to
prepare his defense after having been arraigned, this question has
already oeen decided in the case of McMicking vs. Schields
(238 U. S., 99; 59 Law. ed., 1220, published in 41. Phil., 971),
Moreover, it does not appear that the defendant invoked the right
granted to him by section 30, General Orders, No. 68 to have at least
two days within which to prepare for trial, after arraignment and after
he had entered the plea of not guilty.

For the foregoing considerations, we are of opinion and so hold: (1)
That municipal councils are empowered to enact zonification ordinances
within their jurisdiction in the exercise of their police power; (2)
that within the zones so established, they may determine the kinds of
machinery to be installed therein; (3) that the exception of the Delco
Light and Cinematograph motor engine from all other motor engines for
industrial purposes, is a just and reasonable classification.

By virtue whereof, and there being no error in the sentence appealed
from, the same is affirmed in toto, with costs against the appellant.
So ordered.

Avanceña, C. J., Johnson, Street, Villamor, Johns, Romualdez, JJ., concur.