EMILIANA BALAQUI ET AL., PLAINTIFFS AND APPELLANTS, VS. PLACIDA DONGSO ET AL., DEFENDANTS AND APPELLEES.

This is an appeal taken by the plaintiffs, Emiliana Balaqui and
others, from the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur
dismissing their complaint and absolving the defendants, with costs
against them. In support of their appeal, the appellants assign the
following alleged errors as committed by the court below in its
judgment, to wit:

“1. The lower court erred in not holding that the
gift referred to in Exhibit A, made by Hipolita Balaqui to Placida
Dongso, is void.

“2. The lower court erred in not holding
that the deed of sale, Exhibit E, executed by Placida Dongso in favor
of Teodoro Valdez and others, is null and void.

“3. The lower
court erred in dismissing the complaint with costs against the
plaintiffs, when it should have found that the realty described in the
original and amended complaint, including the house and shed, belongs
to the plaintiffs, who inherited it from Hipolita Balaqui.

“4.
The lower court erred in not ordering the defendants to deliver to the
plaintiffs the property in question together with its fruits from the
date of the complaint, at the rate of one hundred (P100) pesos a year,
plus the costs.

“5. The lower court erred in denying the plaintiffs motion for a new trial.”

The main and basic question to be determined in the instant appeal
is whether or not the donation evidenced by Exhibit A, made by Hipolita
Balaqui in favor of Placida Dongso, is null and void.

The English version of the official Spanish translation (Exhibit
A-l) of the deed of gift Exhibit A, drawn in the Ilocano dialect, is as
follows:

“Know all men by these presents:

“That
I, Hipolita Balaqui, a resident of Candon, Province of Ilocos Sur,
widow, of age, do hereby state that in consideration of the good
services rendered to me by Placida Dongso, married to Antonio Galvez,
from her childhood up to the present time, having lived with me, and
been treated by me as a daughter of mine, I give her as a gratuity or
gift my parcels of land, together with the contents thereof, situated
in the barrio of San Nicolas and San Pedro, of this municipality,
Province of Ilocos Sur, Philippine Islands, the area and boundaries of
which are described as follows: (The two properties in question are
here described.)

“This gift to said Placida Dongso resident
of Candon, Ilocos Sur, Philippine Islands, in recompense for her
services to me, does not pass title to her during my lifetime; but when
I die, she shall be the true owner of the two aforementioned parcels,
including my house and shed thereon, and she shall be rightfully
entitled to transmit them to her children. I also bind myself to answer
to said Placida and her heirs and successors for this property, and
that none shall question or disturb her right.

“Lastly, I
earnestly enjoin said Placida Dongso to cherish my eternal love and
memory after my death, and to try to pray for my soul to Our Blessed
Lord, making use of one-half of the products of the said rice lands, in
case she should obtain any products therefrom, and it is necessary for
my yearly commemoration.

“In witness whereof, I sign or ask
someone to write my name at the foot hereof, because I do not know how
to write, and I stamp my right thumb-print between my name and surname.
At Candon, Ilocos Sur, Philippine Islands, this day, November 18th,
1918.

                        “(With finger-print)           HIPOLITA BALAQUI”

The appellants, dwelling on the words of the fourth paragraph of the
deed of gift just quoted, “does not pass title to her during my
lifetime; but when I die, she shall be the true owner of the two
aforementioned parcels,” contend that the gift in question is a
donation mortis causa, and, the requisites and conditions
indispensable for a will, according to article 620 of the Civil Code,
being lacking is null and void.

Taking the deed above quoted as a whole, it is observed, in the
first place, that Hipolita Balaqui, wishing to reward Placida Dongso
for the latter’s services since said Placida’s childhood, who lived
with her and was treated by her as a daughter, she donated to her two
parcels of land with their improvements; in the second place, it is
noted that in the same deed Hipolita Balaqui guaranteed to Placida
Dongso and her heirs and successors, the right to said property thus
conferred. From the moment Hipolita Balaqui guaranteed the right
granted by her to Placida Dongso to the two parcels of land by virtue
of the deed of gift, she surrendered such right; otherwise there would
be no need to guarantee said right. Therefore, when Hipolita Balaqui
used the words upon which the appellants base their contention that the
gift in question is a donation mortis causa, the donor meant
nothing else than that she reserved of herself the possession and
usufruct of said two parcels of land until her death, at which time the
donee would be able to dispose of them freely.

Furthermore, there is nothing in the deed of gift to show that said
gift was made by Hipolita Balaqui in favor of Placida Dongso in
consideration of her own death.

The Supreme Court of Spain, in its decision of January 28, 1898, held:

“Considering that a donation mortis causa differs, from a donation inter vivos
in that it is made, as its name implies, in consideration of death or
mortal peril, without the donor’s intention to lose the thing or its
free disposal in case of survival, as in testamentary dispositions, and
that such is the definition contained in the laws of the Instituta and the Digesto,
and in law 11, title 4, Partida 5, cited in the first assignment of
error, as well as in article 620 of the Civil Code, in providing that
the gifts to be governed by the rules of testamentary succession are
those taking effect upon the donor’s death; and that donations inter vivos are those made without such consideration, but out of the donor’s pure generosity and the recipient’s deserts, although the subject matter is not delivered at once, or the delivery is to be made post mortem,
which is a simple matter of form and does not change the nature of the
act, and such gifts are irrevocable, especially if without a price and
onerous in character, according to the Laws proem 1, 4, and 6, of the
title and Partida cited.

“Considering that it is to
the latter class that the gift made by Dna, Simona Aboitiz in the
marriage settlements of D. Santiago de Anduiza and Dna. Agueda
Gualberto de Aboitiz, belongs, the 80,000 reales constitutes the dowry
to be delivered upon her death, inasmuch as such gift was made not in
consideration of death or peril, but of the donor’s generosity and wish
to secure the sustenance of the marriage celebrated.”

For the foregoing considerations, and taking into account the
doctrine of the Supreme Court of Spain quoted above, we are of opinion
and so hold, that as the donor guaranteed the right which she conferred
on the donee by virtue of the deed of gift, wherein, in recompense of
the latter’s good services to the former, she donates to her the two
parcels of land with their improvements, said gift is inter vivos and irrevocable, and not mortis causa,
notwithstanding the fact that the donor stated in said deed that she
did not transfer the ownership of the two parcels of land donated, save
upon her death, for such a statement can mean nothing else than that
she only reserved to herself the possession and usufruct of said
property, and because the donor could not very well guarantee the
aforesaid right after her death.

By virtue whereof, and finding no error in the judgment appealed
from, the same is affirmed in its entirety, with costs against the
appellant. So ordered.

Avanceña, C. J., Johnson, Street, Villamor, Johns, and Romualdez, JJ., concur.