THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE VS. MODESTO SILANG CRUZ, DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT.

As guilty of homicide with two extenuating circumstances, the defendant was sentenced to six years and one day of prision mayor, P300 indemnity to the heirs of the deceased, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and costs.

The defense opposes said judgment because the trial court admitted
document Exhibit A as an ante-mortem statement; did not find that the
defendant acted in self-defense; and did not acquit him.

It is true that in Exhibit A, Calixto Perea, the wounded man, did
not state that he had given up all hope of living-; but the evidence
shows that he was in a very serious condition, so much so that while
testifying, he asked the justice of the peace to let him rest, because
he felt very ill on account of his wounds. And Calixto Perea died a few
hours later. From the circumstances of the case we believe it may be
deduced with certainty that, although he did not express in so many
words that he felt he was dying and that he had lost all hope of
surviving the mishap, still he was of that conviction. And this is
sufficient for its admissibility as an ante-mortem statement, as held
by this court in the case of People vs. Chan Lin Wat (50 Phil., 182).

Inasmuch as it is not disputed that said Calixto Perea was killed by
the defendant, it is incumbent on the latter to establish clearly and
sufficiently that he committed the act in self-defense (U. S. vs. Coronel, 30 Phil., 112; and People vs.
Baguio, 43 Phil., 683), and this defense has not been proved in these
proceedings. Therefore, this homicide, of which the defendant is
undoubtedly guilty, remains without an explanation compatible with the
innocence of said accused.”He must therefore answer for that death
before the law.

With respect to the extenuating circumstances admitted by the trial
court, the Attorney-General states the following in his brief:

“* * *We do not agree with the trial court that the
appellant, in inflicting the wounds that caused the death of the
deceased, acted from an impulse so powerful as to produce passion and
obfuscation, simply because the deceased favored his friend Cornelio
Enriquez’s, courting of Asuncion Hernandez, whom the appellant also
courted. Neither may the third extenuating circumstance of article 9 of
the Penal Code be considered in favor of the defendant, for; taking
into account the wound in the deceased’s abdomen, and the weapon used
by the appellant, the intent to kill is manifest.”

We find these observations of the Attorney-General correct and well-founded in the record.

Touching the passion and obfuscation, the fact that the deceased
favored a rival of the defendant in his courtship of the young woman,
Asuncion Hernandez, does not constitute a legitimate and sufficient
cause of that passion and obfuscation which mitigates the guilt. As was
held in the cases of United States vs. Herrera (13 Phil., 583), and United States vs.
Fitzgerald (2 Phil., 419), the accused must have been actuated by such
causes, both strong and powerful, as naturally produced passion and
obfuscation, and those causes which merely give rise to the excitement
inherent in combatants are not sufficient. Furthermore, the obfuscation
must originate from lawful feelings (U. S. vs. Flores, 28
Phil., 29). The act of the deceased was not enough to obfuscate the
defendant, nor did the latter have any right to prevent others from
courting the Hernandez girl, or the deceased from favoring said
courtship.

With respect to the mitigating circumstance of lack of intent to
commit so great a wrong as that committed, it cannot be deemed present,
considering the weapon employed by the defendant and the part of the
deceased’s body upon which it had been used. There is no great or
obvious disproportion between the means and circumstances of the attack
and the consequences thereof (U. S. vs. Rodriguez, 23 Phil., 22).

And there being no aggravating circumstance to be taken into
consideration, the penalty must be imposed in its medium degree, as
recommended by the Attorney-General according to the provisions of
article 81, rule 1, of the Penal Code.

Wherefore, the judgment appealed from is modified, and the defendant
is held guilty of the crime of homicide penalized in article 404 of the
Penal Code, without any modifying circumstance, and he is hereby
sentenced to fourteen years, eight months, and one day of reclusion
temporal, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the amount of
P1,000, to suffer the accessory penalties provided in article 59 of the
Penal Code, and to pay the costs of both instances. So ordered.

Avanceña, C. J., Johnson, Street, Villamor, Johns, and Villa-Real, JJ., concur.