FRANCISCO GUTIERREZ ET AL., PLAINTIFFS AND APPELLEES, VS. JUAN CARPIO, DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT.

The litigants herein compromised a civil case on July 13, 1928,
agreeing that if within one month from the date thereof the plaintiffs
failed to repurchase certain land, its ownership would vest in the
defendant.

The question now raised is whether or not the plaintiffs
duly tendered the amount of the reimbursement agreed upon in the proper
form of money to the defendant.

The court below held in the affirmative, but the defendant,
appealing from such judgment, maintains that on August 13, when the
plaintiffs tendered it, the stipulated period had already elapsed; that
the tender of reimbursement made by check is insufficient; and that the
holding of the trial court that the land in question is valued at
P27,000 is groundless.

When did the stipulated month terminate? This is the first point in
controversy, the determination of which depends upon the kind of month
agreed upon by the parties, and on the day from which it should be
counted.

As to the kind of month, it is to be noted that, according to the ruling in the case of Guzman vs.
Lichauco (42 Phil., 291), article 7 of the Civil Code has been modified
by section 13 of the Administrative Code, according to which “month”
now means the civil or calendar month and not the regular thirty-day
month.

And the civil or calendar month is defined as follows:

“The civil or solar month is that which agrees with
the Gregorian calendar; and these months are known by the names of
January, February, March, etc. They are composed of unequal portions of
time * * *.” (Bouvier’s Law Dictionary.)

“A calendar month is
a month as designated in the calendar, without regard to the number of
days it may contain. In commercial transactions it means a month ending
on the day in the succeeding month corresponding to the day in the
preceding month from which the computation began, and if the last month
have not so many days, then on the last day of that month. Daley vs. Anderson, 48 Pac, 839, 840; 7 Wyo., 1; 75 Am. St. Rep., 870 (citing Migotti vs. Colvill, 4 C. P. Div., 233).” (1 Words and Phrases, 943.)

Hence,
this court held in the case of Villegas vs. Capistrano (9 Phil., 416),
that the period of three months counted from February 13 did not expire
on the 12th of the following May.

As to when said month began, said section 13 of the Administrative Code provides as follows:

“In computing any fixed period of time, with
reference to the performance of an act required by law or contract to
be done at a certain time or within a certain limit of time, the day of
date, or day from which the time is reckoned, is to be excluded and the date of performance included, unless otherwise provided.” (Italics ours.)

Similar provisions may be found in article 1130 of the Civil Code, and in section 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

There is nothing in the agreement under discussion providing
otherwise, and according to the phrase therein contained, “one month
from this date,” said date, which was July 13, 1928, is exactly the
date which must be excluded being the “day from which the time is
reckoned,” according to the words of the aforementioned section 13 of
the Administrative Code, which we have italicized above.

Wherefore, that civil month of thirty-one days began on July 14 and
terminated with the end of the thirteenth day of the following August.
And as it has been proved without discussion that the plaintiffs
offered to repurchase the land from the defendant on August 13th, it
follows that such offer was made within the period stipulated.

But the defendant alleges that the offer to repurchase made by check
was legally insufficient. We agree that the payment by check does not per se
have the effect of such payment. (Section 189, Act No. 2031, on
Negotiable Instruments; article 1170, Civil Code; Bryan, Landon Co. vs. American Bank, 7 Phil., 255; and Tan Sunco vs.
Santos, 9 Phil., 44; 21 R. C. L., 60, 61.) But it appears from Felipe
Gutierrez’s testimony that the defendant told him on August 12th that
he would accept the repurchase by check. Felipe Gutierrez is not very
explicit about it, but we deem this to be the drift of his testimony.
The defendant must have so understood it, seeing that he thought it
necessary to rebut said detail in his testimony which, notwithstanding
the defendant’s denial, we hold to be established by a preponderance of
evidence, considering all the circumstances of the case. The defendant
having thus consented to the repurchase by check and having signified
that by reason of such repurchase the plaintiffs could return to their
home, said defendant was in estoppel, and could not, on the following
day, refuse to accept such payment by check, because he induced the
plaintiffs to act upon the belief that he had consented to said manner
of payment.

From this it follows that by virtue of the defendant’s having
consented to that payment by check, which was neither alleged nor
proved to be in any way defective, that offer to repurchase was legally
effective and sufficient to compel the defendant to accept it.

We conclude that the offer to repurchase was made within the
stipulated period and in the form of money accepted by the defendant,
from whose refusal to allow the repurchase in such terms originates the
plaintiffs’ right of action herein.

The last assignment of error touching the value of the land, cannot
be a cause for the reversal of the judgment appealed from for under the
circumstances of the case, it has no bearing on the decision of the
case nor affects the result thereof.

The judgment appealed from is modified, and it is hereby ordered
that the plaintiffs may, within ten days from the date on which this
judgment becomes final, repurchase the land, the subject matter of
these proceedings, through the delivery to the defendant at the
latter’s residence in the municipality of Santa Rita, Pampanga, of the
sum of fourteen thousand six hundred forty three pesos and forty-three
centavos (P14,643.43), Philippine currency (in coin or paper money).
The judgment appealed from is affirmed in all other respects, with
costs against the appellant. So ordered.

Avanceña, C. J., Johnson, Street, Villamor, Johns, and Villa-Real, JJ., concur.