G.R. No. 30981. March 02, 1929
ESTEBAN MONTERAMOS ET AL., PETITIONERS, VS. HONORABLE ISIDRO PAREDES, JUDGE OF FIRST INSTANCE OF LAGUNA, AND INES ANGEL, RESPONDENTS.
STREET, J.:
four petitioners seek to abrogate an order of the respondent judge,
dated December 8, 1928, in the Intestacy of Potenciano Sanvictores,
deceased, wherein execution is directed to issue against the
petitioners for the purpose of making the principal sum! of P560, plus
P63 of costs, in favor of one Ines Angel. The cause is now before us
for determination upon the petition and the answer of the respondents,
with the corresponding exhibits.
The first pair of the petitioners in this case, namely, Esteban
Monteramos and Andres Cabantog, became sureties, onl May 18,1918, upon
the bond of Romualdo Alampay, as administrator of the estate of
Potenciano Sanvictores, deceased, in civil case No. 1874, of the Court
of First Instance of Laguna. While Alampay was serving as administrator
he applied to the court for leave to sell a certain parcel of real
property as pertaining to the estate of his intestate; and the court
having acceded to the petition, said parcel was sold on March 15, 1919,
to Ines Angel, for the sum of P560, which was paid in cash. The
proceeds of this sale, after coming to the hands of Alampay, were
applied by him to the purposes of the administration.
Romualdo Alampay, the first administrator, was removed from office
in the year 1923, and one’Gerardo Revolteado was appointed as his
successor. The second pair of petitioners in1 this case, namely, Pablo
Pamilacan and Sebastian Kalakas, became sureties on the bond of the new
administrator.
Ines Angel, the purchaser of the parcel at the sale above-mentioned,
was unable to get possession, owing to the fact that it was then in the
adverse possession of Irene Pefia and others. For this reason Ines
Angel instituted an action of revindication against the occupants
(civil case No. 2940, of the Court of First Instance of Laguna). In
this action Romualdo Alampay, ex-administrator of the estate of
Potenciano Sanvictores, and Gerardo Revolteado, the then administrator
of the same estate, were made defendants for the purposes of holding
them liable upon their warranty in case the plaintiff should fail in
the action.
In the year 1925 said case was decided in the Court of First
Instance, it being declared that the parcel which had been sold to Ines
Angel did not belong to the estate of Potenciano Sanvictores, The
defendants in said action, Irene Pena and others were therefore
absolved from the complaint, and at the same time the defendants
Romualdo Alampay and Gerardo Revolteado, ex-administrator and
administrator, respectively, of the estate of Potenciano Sanvictores,
were ordered to return to Ines Angel the sum of P560 which she had paid
for the land, with legal interest, and with costs. Upon appeal to the
Supreme Court said judgment was affirmed.[1]
In the course of his decision in the case above-mentioned, the trial
judge stated that Romualdo Alampay had acted with malice in asking
judicial authorization for the sale of the property; for, said the
court, he knew that this lot was and had been in the possession, of
Irene Pena for a long time prior to the presentation of the petition
and this fact was apparent from his own inventory. We do not feel very
confident that this observation was entirely justified, since the title
to the property seems to have been really in a state of doubt, as is
manifest from the efforts that were necessary for the court to
demonstrate that the property really belonged to the occupants.
Moreover, when the case reached
this court upon appeal, the author of the decision affirming the
judgment expressed an individual doubt as to whether the appealed
decision ought to stand. The point, however, need not detain us, as it
exerts no decisive influence on the case.
To proceed to matters more vital we find that when the record in the
civil case No. 2940 was returned to the Court of First Instance of
Laguna, execution was sued out in favor of Ines Angel against Romualdo
Alampay and Gerardo Revolteado, but this execution proved unfruitful
for lack of property pertaining to the persons against whom the process
was directed. The creditor in the execution then moved the court, in
the intestacy proceedings, to order execution against the two sets of
bondsmen of Alampay and Revolteado, that is, against the four
petitioners in this case. To this motion the respondent judge acceded
in the order dated December 8, 1928, which is the subject of the
present petition.
Upon the facts above stated, three questions present themselves for
consideration, namely, first whether the sureties on the official bond
of an administrator are liable for the proceeds of property sold as
pertaining to the estate in administration but as to which the title
fails, after such proceeds have been received by the administrator and
duly accounted for in course of the administration; secondly, whether a
judgment for a sum of money against two individuals as ex-administrator
and administrator respectively of the estate of a deceased person can
be executed against the sureties on the official bonds of such
ex-administrator and administrator; and, thirdly, supposing the
bondsmen to be so liable, have the proper steps been taken in the
intestate proceeding to justify the issuance of execution against them?
Upon the first of these questions it is quite apparent that the
first set of sureties are not legally liable for money which their
principal, Romualdo Alampay, received in ordinary course as pertaining
ten the estate in administration, and which said principal applied to
the purposes of administration according to the requirements of law.
The obligations of the sureties on the bond of an administrator are
defined in section 643 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the most
pertinent part of which is found in paragraph No. 2. Under that
provision the bondsmen must answer according to law for the proper
application of property pertaining to the estate. In the case before us
property was sold, as pertaining to the estate, by authority of the
court having charge of the administrative proceedings; and the proceeds
of the property, as clearly appears from Exhibit 2, were applied to the
legitimate purposes of administration. The money paid by Ines Angel was
received by Alampay in the character” of administrator, and as such he
has properly accounted for it, and his accounts have been duly approved
by the court. There has been no embezzlement or waste by said
administrator for which he could be held liable to the estate. The
obligation of the bondsmen goes only to the proper conduct of the
administrator, in his official character, and more especially to the
proper application of the assets pertaining to the estate.
It is true that in No. 4 of section 643 of the Code of Civil
Procedure it is declared that the bond of the administrator shall be
conditioned for the performance by him of all orders and decrees of the
court by him to be performed. But this must be understood as having
reference to orders to .be performed in the character of,
administrator; and although the two administrators in this case were in
effect ordered to refund the sum of P560 to Ines Angel, the
circumstance that all assets which have come to the hands of either
have been fully administered, supplies a complete answer to that order.
With respect to the second administrator, Gerardo Revolteado, it
appears that the money which the court has ordered to be returned to
Ines Angel never touched his hands at all, having been administered
under the regime of his predecessor; and although the order for this
refund ought to have been complied with by Revolteado
out of any available assets of the estate, nevertheless the want of
such assets would have been a sufficient answer to the effort to make
him personally liable. It must, however, be remembered in this
connection that we are not now concerned with the question of the
liability of the administrator and ex-administrator, either in their
personal or official character, because they are not parties to this
proceeding; and liability in any character is apparently indifferent to
them since an execution against them has been returned “nulla bona“.
With respect to the second question, we are of the opinion that the
judgment entered in civil case No. 2940, entitled Ines Angel vs.
Irene Pefia et al., against Romualdo Alampay and Gerardo Revolteado, as
ex-administrator and administrator respectively of Potenciano
Sanvictores, was, as the respondent judge at one time ruled, a judgment
that ought to have been paid out of the assets of the estate; and
inasmuch as there are now no assets pertaining to the estate available
for the payment of said judgment, the remedy of Ines Angel, in so far
as the process of execution against the present petitioners is
concerned, must remain fruitless.
Upon the third point, that is, as to the manner in which the
petitioners, as sureties, have been impleaded in the administration
proceeding, it will be noted that the original judgment under which
they have been declared liable was entered, not in the intestacy
proceedings to which the petitioners were virtual parties, but in an
independent action to which the petitioners were not parties.
Manifestly the proper course to pursue in order to establish their
liability, supposing liability to exist, was to institute an original
action against them upon their bond or to obtain an order from the
court in the administration proceedings requiring the petitioners to
appear and show cause why execution should not issue against them. The
petitioners were certainly entitled to be heard in some way before
execution could properly be issued against them; and it is not clear
that the motion of Ines Angel, dated September 26, 1928, in which she
asked the court to direct the sheriff to levy upon the property of the
petitioners, was a proper method to raise the,question of their
liability. But it is unnecessary to unravel this knot, because, as we
have already shown, the liability involved was not one for which the
petitioners were responsible under the terms of their bond.
From what has been said it is apparent that the respondent court
acted in excess of its jurisdiction in ordering execution to issue. The
petition must therefore be granted; the order complained of will be, as
it hereby is, set aside; and the temporary injunction issued by this
court against the carrying into effect of the execution under said
order will be made permanent. So ordered, with costs against
the respondent Ines Angel.
Johnson, Malcolm, Villamor, Ostrand, Johns, Romualdez, and Villa-Real, JJ., concur.
[1] Angel vs. Pua Cose, G. R. No. 24155, promulgated November 9,
1925, not reported.