INTESTATE ESTATE OF JACINTO BAUN, DECEASED. SIMPLICIO BAUN, ADMINISTRATOR AND APPELLEE, VS. HEIRS OF THE DECEASED JACINTO BAUN, OPPOSITORS AND APPELLANTS.

This is an appeal from an order of the Court of First Instance of
Tarlac, dated September 12, 1928, sustaining the validity of the sale
made by the administrator of the estate of Jacinto Baun, of a piece or
parcel of land together with the machinery and building thereon
belonging to said estate, and denying the motion of the heirs to set
aside said sale.

The following facts are not in dispute:

(1) On May 31, 1928, the administrator of the estate
filed a motion, requesting authority to sell personal and real
properties of the estate, in order to pay its debts. The motion alleged
(a) that the estate was indebted to the Asociacion Cooperatives del Credito Rural de Tarlac in the sum of P1,000, with interest at 10 per cent from February 11, 1925; (b) that it was also indebted to Manuel Urquico in the sum of P7,412.22, with interest at 12 per cent from November 1, 1927; and (c) that the estate was without sufficient funds to meet said obligations.

(2)
On June 1, 1928, the heirs of the estate, with the exception of Damiana
Manankil, widow of the deceased, filed their written conformity to the
proposed sale of the only real property of the estate described in the
inventory, consisting of a parcel of land and the machinery and
building thereon. They also stated that Genara Pineda offered P20,000
for said property and that they considered said offer as most
advantageous and beneficial to their interest. Said written conformity
was signed by Alejandro Calma in his own behalf and as guardian of the
minors Guillermo and Simeona Calma, and by Celedonia Baun, with the
consent of her husband Lorenzo Mallari.

(3) On June 15,1928, the court appointed Jose P. Fausto, an attorney at law, as guardian ad litem
of the minors Guillermo and Simeona Calma, heirs of Jacinto Baun, with
special reference to the proposed sale of the real property of the
estate.

(4) Some time thereafter said guardian ad litem
filed his report, recommending favorably the proposed sale of the land
and the machinery and building thereon to Genara Pineda at the price
offered by her.

(5) On June 29, 1928, the court authorized
the administrator of the estate to sell the property of the deceased in
the form and manner most advantageous to the estate. The pertinent part
of the order of the court said: ‘Tor la presente queda autorizado el
referido administrador para vender los bienes del aludido finado en la
forma que crea procedente y ventajosa para los fines arriba indicados.”

(6)
On July 6, 1928, Simplicio Baun, the administrator of the estate, filed
a petition requesting approval by the court of the sale of said real
property to Pedro Santos for the sum of P22,000. The administrator sold
the property to said vendee, who gave a better price than that offered
by Genara Pineda, which was for P20,000 only, as above stated.

(7)
On July 7, 1928, the court approved said sale, and on July 10, 1928,
ordered the vendee Pedro Santos to immediately deliver to the
administrator of the estate the price of the property amounting to
P22,000.

(8) On July 16, 1928, the heirs of the estate filed
a motion praying that the sale of the property as well as the decree of
the court approving the same be set aside on the following grounds: (a) That the administrator sold the real property of the estate without having first sold the personal property; (b)
that Damiana Manankil, the widow of the deceased, who was also an heir
of the estate, did not give her conformity or consent to said sale; (c)
that no notice of the hearing of the application for authority to sell
the property of the estate was served upon the heirs, either personally
or by publication, as required by section 722, paragraph 3, of the Code
of Civil Procedure; and (d) that no hearing was held on said application of the administrator.

The administrator filed his answer to the motion, alleging (1) that
said real property was sold because the personal property of the
deceased was insufficient to meet the obligations of the estate; (2)
that the real property of the estate was sold upon the initiative and
with the written consent of the heirs and consequently they are now
estopped from attacking the validity of said sale; (3) that notice of
the hearing of the application for authority to sell the property of
the estate was not necessary inasmuch as the requirements of the law
had been virtually satisfied by the written consent of the heirs to the
sale; and (4) that the written consent of all of the heirs was not
necessary because the law does not specifically require the consent in
writing of all of the heirs.

Upon the foregoing facts and the issue raised by the motion and
answer as above stated, the Honorable Cayetano Lukban, judge, on
September 12, 1928, issued an order sustaining the validity of the sale
to Pedro Santos of said land and the machinery and building thereon for
the sum of P22,000, and denied the motion of the heirs to set aside
said sale. The pertinent parts of said order read as follows:

“El administrador aqui nombrado, enter ado de que se
le autorizaba vender bienes del intestado, entre elios el susodicho
inmueble, en la forma que era procedente y ventajosa, dando pruebas de
lealtad a sus obligaciones como tal, en lugar de proceder
automaticamente a la venta, busco compradores con mejores ofertas. En
efecto, encontro al referido Pedro Santos, de Porac, Pampanga, quien
ofrecio mejor precio. Se otorgo la venta a favor de este senor. Previa
recomendacion favorable del curador ad litem, dicha venta fue
aprobada por el Juzgado, y consecuentemente, se pago en su totalidad el
precio de la venta, depositandose parte en Ja Escribania de este
Juzgado, y parte en el Banco Postal de Ahorros.

“Consta
ademas en los inventarios presentados por el administrador y los
comisionados de avaluo y reclamaciones nombrados en esta actuacion que
el presente intestado carece de suficientes bienes muebles que puedan
ser vendidos para el pago de las obligaciones de este intestado. Tales
obligaciones devengaban intereses que, con el tiempo y sumados al
capital caso de no efectuarse oportunamente su pago, importarian lo
bastante para acabar con todos los bienes de este intestado y no dejar
nada a los herederos.

“Teniendo en cuenta estas
circunstancias, y sobre todo, la conformidad de los herederos; el
Juzgado es de opinion que carece de importancia la contention de que la
alegada viuda no haya dado su conformidad a la venta. Porque, aun
cuando la misma hubiese opuesto, su oposicion no hubiera podido
prosperar o prevalecer frente a la conformidad a la venta por parte de
los herederos y del curador ad litem.

“Por todas
estas considerations, no ha lugar a la petition formulada por dichos
herederos, al efecto de que se anule o rescinda la referida venta.”

The case is now before us on appeal by the heirs from said order.

The appellants now submit a number of propositions in which they
attempt to show that the lower court erred in not declaring said sale
null and void. One of said propositions is:

“That the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure,
regulating the sale of the estate of the deceased and prescribing
certain formalities, were not complied with in the sale of the real
property in question, and consequently the sale is null and void.”

In this jurisdiction, by virtue of the provisions of articles 657
and 661 of the Civil Code, the heirs succeed to all the rights and
obligations of the decedent “by the mere fact of his death.” The rights
to the succession of a person are transmitted from the moment of his
death.” In other words, the heirs succeed immediately to all the rights
and obligations of the ancestor by the mere fact of the death of the
ancestor. From the death of the ancestor the heirs are the absolute
owners of his property, subject to the rights and obligations of the
ancestor, and they cannot be deprived of their rights thereto except by
the methods provided for by law.

The only law providing for the sale of the property which formerly
belonged to the deceased and prescribing the formalities antecedent to
said sale, is found in sections 714 and 722 of the Code of Civil
Procedure. Said sections read as follows:

“SEC. 714. Realty may be sold or encumbered though personalty not exhausted.—When
the personal estate of the deceased is not sufficient to pay the debts
and charges of administration without injuring the business of those
interested in the estate, or otherwise prejudicing their interest, and
where a testator has not otherwise made sufficient provision for the
payment of such debts and charges, the court, on application of the
executor or administrator with the consent and approbation, in writing,
of the heirs, devisees, and legatees, residing in the Philippine
Islands, may grant a license to the executor or administrator to sell,
mortgage or otherwise encumber for that purpose real, in lieu of
personal estate, * * *

“SEC. 722. Regulations for license to sell.—When
an executor or administrator considers it necessary or beneficial to
sell real or personal estate, in cases provided by law, he may make
application to the court having jurisdiction of the estate, and such
court may grant license, when it appears necessary or beneficial, under
the following regulations:

“1. The executor or administrator
shall present to the court his petition in writing, setting forth the
amount of debts due from the deceased, with charges of administration,
the value of the personal estate, situation of the estate to be sold,
or such other facts as show that the sale is necessary or beneficial;

“2.
In case where the consent of heirs, devisees, and legatees is required,
the executor or administrator shall produce to the court their assent
in writing, and signed by such heirs, devisees, or legatees, or by the
guardians of such as are minors or otherwise under guardianship;

“3.
The court shall thereupon appoint a time and place of hearing for
deciding upon such application, and shall require notice to be given of
such application, and of the time and place of hearing to the persons
interested; which notice shall state the nature of the application and
the reason for the same, the time and place of hearing, and shall be
published three weeks successively previous thereto, in a newspaper of
general circulation in the neighborhood of those interested, to be
designated by the court; and the court may order such further notice as
is adjudged proper. If personal notice is given to the persons
interested, the public notice may be dispensed with;

* * * * * * *

“5.
If the proof produced satisfies the court and if the regulations in the
first four subdivisions of this section are complied with, the court
may, by decree, authorize the executor or administrator to sell such
part of the estate as is deemed necessary, either at public or private
sale, as would be most beneficial to all parties concerned, and furnish
the executor or administrator with certified copy of such license or
order of sale;”

From the foregoing provisions of law, in relation with the facts of
the present case, we are of the opinion that the requisites of the law
were not complied with in the sale in question. Section 714 and
paragraph 2 of section 722 of the Code of Civil Procedure require “the
consent and approbation, in writing, of the heirs, devisees and
legatees, signed by such heirs, devisees or legatees.”

In the instant case the written consent of the widow Damiana
Manankil, who was also an heir of the deceased, to the application of
the administrator for authority to sell the property of the estate, was
not obtained. We are of the opinion that the consent of all of the
heirs is necessary because each and every one of them is interested in
the estate and because the law does not state that the consent of the
majority of the heirs is sufficient to bind all of the heirs. The
phrase “the consent and approbation, in writing, of the heirs, devisees
and legatees,” used in section 714 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
cannot be susceptible of any other interpretation than that the consent
of all the heirs, etc. is necessary.

Furthermore, the widow Damiana Manankil was not notified of the
application of the administrator for authority to sell the property of
the estate, neither was said application set for hearing as required in
paragraph 3 of section 722 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Paragraph 5
of section 722 requires a compliance with the formalities as to written
consent of heirs, notice of hearing of the application, and hearing of
the application before a decree authorizing the sale may be issued.
Therefore, the decree of the lower court of June 29, 1928, authorizing
the sale of the property in question is not in conformity with the
provisions of sections 714 and 722 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
because (1) the written consent of all of the heirs was not obtained,
(2) the heirs were not notified of the hearing on said application, and
(3) no hearing was held on said application; and, consequently, the
sale of the property of the estate, effected by the administrator in
pursuance of said decree of the court, is null and void. The appellee
contends that those requirements of the law apply only to testate
succession. We are of the opinion that they are applicable to.both
testate and intestate successions, because in both cases the heirs are
entitled to be given an opportunity to be heard and to protect their
rights and interest in the estate.

The appellee contends that the appellants are estopped from
questioning or attacking the validity of the sale in question, inasmuch
as said sale was made with their consent. This contention cannot be
sustained. We have already shown that one of the heirs did not consent
to the sale and that the lower court failed to comply with the
formalities of the law.

It will be remembered that the property in question belongs to the
heirs absolutely, subject to the payment of the debts of the ancestor.
Sections 714 and 722 of Act No. 190 provide for the sale of the
property belonging to the heirs. We are of the opinion that the
procedure prescribed by said sections for the sale of property under
these conditions must be strictly construed. When the jurisdiction of a
court over the land of a decedent exists only for the purpose of sale
upon certain conditions, these conditions must be present before the
court can act. (Root vs. McFerrin, 37 Miss., 17 [75 Am. Bee.,
49].) So that, if the order of the court for the sale of the land of a
decedent is made when the circumstances do not exist, which must concur
as the basis of the order, there is lack of jurisdiction and the sale
is therefore illegal. Sections 714 and 722 of Act No. 190 expressly
provide the conditions under which the sale of the property of the
heirs may be made. Such statute must be followed strictly. (Doe vs. Roe, 48 Am. Dec., 216.)

The Supreme Court of the United States, in the case of Thatcher vs.
Powell (6 Wheaton, 119, 123) said: “That no individual or public
officer can sell and convey a good title to the land of another, unless
authorized so to do by express law, is one of those self-evident
propositions to which the mind assents without hesitation; and that the
person invested with such a power must pursue with precision the course
prescribed by law, or Ms act is invalid, is a principle which has been
repeatedly recognized in this court.” (Black vs. Nygren, 8 Phil., 205,)

From the foregoing authorities we must conclude that inasmuch as the
lower court failed to comply strictly with the procedure marked out by
the law, the sale of the property in Question is illegal and null and
void.

It being true that the heirs succeed to the property of the ancestor
with the obligations of the ancestor against it, they cannot refuse to
give their consent to the sale of the property for the purpose of
paying said obligations and thereby defeat their payment; and when said
obligations are properly allowed against the estate, such property may
be subjected to their, payment. The heirs cannot defeat the payment of
the obligations and still retain the property. If they insist upon
retaining the property, they must pay the existing obligations against
the estate. The property belongs to them subject to the payment of the
obligations, and they are bound to pay the indebtedness existing
against the estate. (Sec. 731, Act No. 190.) The heirs cannot, by any
act of their own, or by agreement among themselves, impair the right of
the creditors to recover their claim from the estate. The hereditary
property remains liable for the debts of the decedent, and the heirs
and distributees may be compelled to pay the same in proportion to the
share received by them from the estate. (Pavia vs. De la Rosa, 8 Phil, 70; Lopez vs. Enriquez, 16 Phil., 336; Fabie vs. Yulo, 24 Phil., 240.)

In the present case it is true that the heirs, after the sale of the
property in pursuance of the order of the court, and after said sale
had been approved by the court, made a deposit with the clerk of a sum
of money sufficient to pay the existing indebtedness. We are at a loss
to understand why the lower court did not even then accept the offer
made by the heirs to pay the indebtedness and thereby save the estate
from the further expense of litigation, in accordance with the
provisions of the law. Had that been done, the long litigation which
has followed would have been rendered unnecessary, at a great saving of
expense to the estate.

The heir legally succeeds the deceased, from whom he derives his
right and title, but only after the liquidation of the estate, the
payment of the debts of the same, and the adjudication of the residue
of the estate of the deceased; and in the meantime the only person in
charge by law to attend to all claims against the estate of the
deceased debtor is the executor or administrator appointed by the
court. (Pavia vs. De la Rosa, 8 Phil., 70.)

Therefore, in view of what precedes, the order appealed from is
hereby reversed, the sale is hereby declared null and void; and the
record is hereby remanded to the lower court with direction that, after
a citation of all of the heirs including Catalina Tejeiro and all of
the other creditors and Pedro Santos, and after giving them an
opportunity to be heard, it issue such orders in harmony with this
decision as will, in equity and justice, protect the interest of all
parties concerned, to the end that the estate of Jacinto Baun may be
finally settled and terminated. The appellants are also hereby ordered
to deposit with the lower court such additional amount as may be found
necessary to pay in full all the indebtedness and obligations of the
estate, including the interest thereof; or, otherwise, the court shall
proceed to sell the property of the estate for the purpose of paying
said indebtedness. And without any finding as to costs, it is so
ordered.

Avanceña, C. J., Street, Villamor, Johns, and Villa-Real, JJ., concur.