G.R. No. 30685. July 29, 1929
RATAN SINGH, PETITIONER AND APPELLANT, VS. THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, OPPONENT AND APPELLEE.
JOHNSON, J.:
citizenship under Act No. 2927 in the Court of First Instance of the
Province of Zambales, praying that he be naturalized as citizen of the
Philippine Islands. He alleged that he was born at Sangtipur,
Jullunder, Punjab, India, and was a subject of Great Britain; that he
had all of the qualifications required by the Naturalization Law (Act
No. 2927) as to age, residence, education, conduct; and that he did not
have any of the disqualifications specified in said Act.
After due notice, the hearing was held on March 10, 1928. At the
commencement of the hearing the provincial fiscal of Zambales moved
that the application be dismissed on the ground that the petitioner was
not possessed of the qualifications required by law, in order to be
naturalized as citizen of the United States. The motion was denied.
After hearing the evidence presented by the petitioner the Honorable
Leopoldo Rovira, judge, in a very carefully prepared opinion containing
a full discussion of the facts and the law, arrived at the conclusion
that the petitioner was not qualified to become a naturalized citizen
of the Philippine Islands, under the provisions of section 1, paragraph
(c) of Act No. 2927, in relation with section 3 of the Act of
Congress of February 5, 1917; and rendered a judgment against the
petitioner, dismissing his application. From that judgment the
petitioner appealed.
Counsel for appellant now contends that the lower court erred:
- In holding that the Province of Baluchistan (India) is not
included in the exceptions specified in section 3 of the Act of
Congress of February 5, 1917; and - In holding that the petitioner is not qualified to become a citizen of the Philippine Islands.
The evidence presented by the petitioner shows that he is a British
subject; that he was born in Sangtipur, Jullunder, Province of Punjab,
India; that his parents were natives and residents of Kohek, Province
of Baluchistan, India; that before coming to the Philippine Islands on
February 5, 1911, he was also a resident of said place; that he had all
of the other qualifications required by Act No. 2927 as to age,
education, moral conduct, etc., and that he did not have any of the
disqualifications specified in said Act.
Section 1 of Act No. 2927, entitled “The Naturalization Law,”
enumerates the classes of persons who may acquire Philippine
citizenship. They are:
“(a) Natives of the Philippines who are not citizens thereof under the Jones Law;
“(b) Natives of the other insular possessions of the United States;
“(c)
Citizens of the United States, or foreigners who under the laws of the
United States may become citizens of said country if residing therein.”
It is evident that the petitioner does not come within the classes specified in paragraphs (a) and (b). The question therefore is, whether or not he is included in the class of persons mentioned in paragraph (c)
of section 1 of Act No. 2927. Or, more specifically: Is the petitioner
a foreigner who, under the laws of the United States, may become a
citizen of that country if residing therein?
The law of the United States regulating the immigration of aliens to
the United States and their residence therein, is found in the Act of
Congress of February 5, 1917, which was expressly made applicable to
the Philippine Islands. (Vol. 39, Part 1, U. S. Stat. at Large, pp.
874-876.) Section 3 of said Act excludes from admission into the United
States various classes of persons, among which are the following:
” * * * natives of any country, province, or
dependency situate on the Continent of Asia west of the one hundred and
tenth (110th) meridian of longitude east from Greenwich and east of the
fiftieth (50th) meridian of longitude east from Greenwich and south of
the fiftieth (50th) parallel of latitude north, * * *.”
Said section 3, however, establishes an exception in favor of persons who are natives of—
“That portion of said territory (Continent of Asia)
situate between the fiftieth (50th) and the sixty-fourth (64th)
meridians of longitude east from Greenwich and the twenty-fourth (24th)
and thirty-eighth (38th) parallels of latitude north, * * *.” (Vol. 39,
Part 1, U. S. Stat. at Large, p. 876.)
From the above-quoted provisions of the Act of Congress of February
5, 1917, it clearly appears that natives of the Continent of Asia
within specified limits are excluded from admission into the United
States, with the exception of natives of that portion of said Continent
“situate between the fiftieth (50th) and sixty-fourth (64th) meridians
of longitude east from Greenwich and the twenty-fourth (24th) and
thirty-eighth (38th) parallels of latitude north.”
Counsel contends in his two assignments of error that the appellant
is a native of Kohek, Province of Baluchistan, India, because his
parents were natives of that place; that the Province of Baluchistan is
found between the 50th and the 64th meridians of longitude east from
Greenwich and the 24th and 38th parallels of latitude north; that,
therefore, the appellant is a native of a territory whose residents are
not excluded from admission into the United States under the provisions
of the saving clause of section 3 of the Act of Congress of February 5,
1917, above quoted; and that, consequently, the appellant is qualified
to become a citizen of the United States under said Act of Congress,
and also of the Philippine Islands under the provisions of Act No. 2927
of the Philippine Legislature in relation with said Act of Congress.
There is absolutely no proof in the record to show that the town of
Kohek, Province of Baluchistan, is found in that portion of the Asiatic
Continent, whose natives are not excluded from admission into the
United States. We have consulted the map of India, particularly the
Province of Baluchistan (Vol. 14, Encyc. Britannica, 11th ed. between
pp. 376 and 377) for the purpose of verifying the assertion of
appellant’s counsel. We found, however, that the Province of
Baluchistan is inside the specified limits of Asia, whose natives are
excluded from admission into the United States, and is outside of the
“territory situate between the fiftieth (50th) and the sixty-fourth
(64th) meridians of longitude east from Greenwich and the twenty-fourth
(24th) and thirty-eighth (38th) parallels of latitude north/’ whose
natives are not excluded from admission into the United States, with
the exception of a very small portion thereof on the northwest. But
neither in this portion nor in any other place of the Province of
Baluchistan did we find a place called Kohek. The appellant has thus
utterly failed to show that he is a native of a place whose residents
may be admitted into the United States and may become citizens thereof.
And moreover, the petitioner being a British subject, we are of the opinion that the principle of jus soli, and not that of jus sanguinis, should be applied in his case. Tn England questions of citizenship are governed by the principle of jus soli.
Therefore, in view of the fact that the appellant was born in the
Province of Punjab, India, he is disqualified from becoming a citizen
of the United States and consequently of the Philippine Islands. In the
case of United States vs. Bhagat Singh Thind (261 U. S. Rep.,
204) the Supreme Court of the United States held that natives of the
Province of Punjab, India cannot be naturalized as citizens of the
United States. The court said:
“A high caste Hindu, of full Indian blood,Jborn at
Amrit Sar, Punjab, India, is not a ‘white person,’ within the meaning
of Rev. Stats., sec. 2169, relating to naturalization of aliens.“The
action of Congress in excluding from admission to this country all
natives of Asia within designated limits including all of India, is
evidence of a like attitude toward naturalization of Asians within
those limits.” (United States vs. Bhagat Singh Thind, 261 U. S. Rep., 204.)
The foregoing refutes conclusively the two assignments of error made
by the appellant. The petitioner has failed entirely to establish his
case and his application should be and is hereby denied.
The judgment appealed from is, therefore, hereby affirmed with costs. So ordered.
Avanceña, C. J., Street, Villamor, Johns, Romualdez, and Villa-Real, JJ., concur.