G.R. No. 30179. November 16, 1928
ANTONIO CASTRO REVILLA, AS GUARDIAN OF THE MINORS LUZ AND AMPARO FANLO Y SANZ, PETITIONER, VS. LEONARDO GARDUÑO, JUDGE OF FIRST INSTANCE OF ROMBLON, ET AL., RESPONDENTS.
OSTRAND, J.:
respondent judge to reopen an order dated March 16, 1928, and to receive
additional evidence in support of certain allegations made by the herein
petitioner. The order in question reads as follows:
“Se trata de una motion presentada en 26 de enero de 1928 por
el tutor Antonio Castro Revilla de las menores Luz y Amparo apellidados Fanlo y
Sanz, y otra adicional de 24 de febrero de este mismo ano, presentada por el
mismo tutor y por Leonor Sanz y los esposos Pilar Sanz y Candido Fanlo en las
que por las razones expresadas en las mismas, piden la nulidad del auto de este
Juzgado de fecha 15 de octubre de 1917 aprobando el convenio de particidn
extrajudicial entre los herederos. No vamos por ahora a considerar las mociones
por sus fundamentos. Simplemente vamos a resolver si procede admitir o no dichas
mociones.“El auto, cuya nulidad se pidef fue dictado en 15 de octubre de
1917 por el que entonces presidia este Juzgado Hon. Fermin Mariano.“Han transcurrido desde entonces diez afios, tres meses y diez
y seis dias. Este auto esta firme y ejecutorio. Nadie ha apelado y nadie se ha
excepcionado siquiera del mismo. Permitir que, despues de mas de diez anos como
sucede en el presente caso, un auto del Juzgado firme y ejecutorio sea
reconsiderado, seria abrir las puertas del Juzgado a aquella practica de
entonces de eternizar los asuntos en perjuicio de la pronta administration de
justicia, practica que no esta ahora permitida ni tolerada por nuestras leyes.
Para algo se han aprobado las leyes procesales y establecido los reglamentos de
los juzgados; unas y otros deben ser cumplidos y observados.“Por tanto, el Juzgado es de opini6n de que no procede
considerar las mociones.“Asi se ordena.”
Mandamus is a high prerogative writ, and, as a general rule,
will not lie where there is another plain, speedy, and adequate remedy at law.
As will be readily seen, the order quoted is not merely interlocutory or
incidental; as far as the Court of First Instance is concerned, it is a final
determination of the proceedings initiated by the motions referred to in the
order. In these circumstances, an appeal, and not a petition for a writ of
mandamus, would be the proper remedy.
It is true that where an inferior court refuses to exercise its
jurisdiction, a writ of mandamus is a proper remedy to compel the court to act,
and it has also been held that if a court has erroneously decided some question
of law or of practice, presented as a preliminary objection, and upon such
erroneous construction has refused to go into the merits of the case, mandamus
will lie to compel it to proceed (High on Extraordinary Legal Remedies, sec.
151). But that is far from being this case. Here there has been no violation of
the rules of practise; the motions in question were duly heard, stipulations or
admissions of more or less essential facts were made, and lengthy arguments
delivered by counsel (see respondents’ Exhibit 1). The resulting order must
therefore be regarded as a decision upon the merits in accordance with the views
of the court below. The respondent judge may have erred in declining to receive
oral evidence as to the coersive measures alleged to have been brought to bear
upon Rosario Sanz, the mother of the minors Luz and Amparo Fanlo, in order to
obtain her consent to the partition of the estate of the deceased, but if such
error there be, it cannot be controlled by mandamus but must be corrected by
appeal.
In view of the circumstances stated, it is unnecessary here to
go into the merits of the case, but we may observe that there is nothing in the
record to show that the partition in question was unjust to the herein
petitioners. The fact that the deceased Pedro Sanz in his will devised and
bequeathed the property partitioned to only three of his heirs was not
necessarily conclusive as against the other legitimate heirs; the probate of a
will is conclusive only as to its due execution and as to the testamentary
capacity of the testator, but not as to the validity of any provisions made in
the will (secs. 625 and 634, Code of Civil Procedure; Castañeda vs. Alemany, 3
Phil., 426).
The petition for a writ of mandamus is denied with the costs
against the petitioners. So ordered.
Johnson, Street, Villamor, Romualdez, and Villa-Real, JJ.,
concur.