NICOLAS RAFOLS, PETITIONER, VS. GUILLERMO F. PABLO, AUXILIARY JUDGE OF FIRST INSTANCE OF THE TWENTIETH JUDICIAL DISTRICT, RESPONDENT.

This is an original petition, addressed to this court, for a writ of
prohibition to restrain the respondent, Guillermo F. Pablo, as Auxiliary Judge
of the Court of First Instance of Cebu (Twentieth Judicial District), from
trying criminal case No. 9743 of said court; and the cause is now before us for
determination upon petition and answer.

The case raises a single question of law, which is, Whether the Secretary of
Justice may lawfully authorize, or direct, an Auxiliary Judge of First Instance
to take cognizance of, and try a case that has already been regularly assigned
to another judge presiding in one of two salas of which the particular court is
composed? The facts out of which the case arises are briefly these: On March
10,1927, the Secretary of Justice promulgated Administrative Order No. 23,
prescribing the method for distributing the business of the Court of First
Instance of the Twentieth Judicial District among the three judges pertaining to
said court, consisting of two Judges of First Instance and the Auxiliary Judge
of First Instance. Pursuant to this order, criminal case No. 9743 was assigned
first, to Judge J. C. Vickers, presiding in the First Sala, but the case was
subsequently transferred to the Second Sala, where Judge Jose de la Rama
presides. No question is made as to the regularity of this transfer. While the
case was thus resting in the court of Judge De la Rama, the Honorable Luis P.
Torres, Acting Secretary of Justice, requested Honorable Guillermo F. Pablo,
Auxiliary Judge of First Instance of said court, to take charge of the trial or
disposition of said case, in view of the fact that it had remained untried on
the docket of the court for a long time.

Pursuant to this request, the aforesaid judge assumed cognizance of the case,
and it is admitted by the petitioner herein that Judge Pablo now has the case
before him, it being alleged that he had made orders in the case and set the
same for trial before him. From a copy of an order of August 18, 1928, made by
Judge De la Rama—which may or may not be properly before us—we gather that in
the latter part of June, 1928, Judge De la Rama, before whom the case had been
pending, made an order transferring case No. 9743 to Judge Pablo, the Auxiliary
Judge, but said order having been lost, the order of August 18, 1928, was made
by Judge De la Rama confirming and ratifying said lost order. Whether or not any
such order of transfer was actually made by Judge De la Rama we consider of no
moment, since if the Secretary of Justice had authority to direct the transfer
of the case to the Auxiliary Judge, and the latter has in fact assumed
cognizance of the case, even without the participation of Judge De la Rama, no
order of transfer by Judge De la Rama would be necessary. The assumption of
jurisdiction over the case by Judge Pablo, in response to the request of the
Secretary of Justice, is equivalent to a transfer by direction of the Secretary.
The question therefore remains, as before, whether or not the Secretary of
Justice, in the exercise of his supervision over the work of the courts, has
authority to transfer a case from one of the salas to the court of the Auxiliary
Judge.

Upon examining the pertinent provisions of law, we discover no
reason to doubt that the Secretary of Justice has lawfully exercised his
administrative authority in requesting Judge Pablo to assume charge of criminal
case No. 9743, with the result that the case is now lawfully pending before said
judge. In the first place, the supervision over Courts of First Instance, in the
administrative sense, is vested by law in the Department of Justice, which is
presided over by the Secretary of Justice (Adm. Code, secs. 84, 76); and among
the specific administrative powers conferred upon a department head is that of
giving instructions, not contrary to law, necessary to regulate the proper
working and harmonious and efficient administration of each and all of the
offices and dependencies of his Department, and for the strict enforcement and
proper execution of the laws relative to matters under the jurisdiction of said
Department (Adm. Code, sec. 79 [B], as amended by sec. 2, Act No. 2803). In the
second place, by another provision of the Code, it is declared that the
Auxiliary Judges of First Instance shall, at the direction of the Secretary of
Justice, assist any District Judge (Adm. Code, sec. 157, as amended by sec. 1,
Act No. 3107). But the Courts of First Instance are chiefly occupied with the
hearing and determination of causes; and it is obvious that the assistance to be
rendered by Auxiliary Judges of First Instance must consist mainly in the work
of hearing and determining causes. The Secretary of Justice, under the
provisions above cited, consequently has the power to authorize or direct the
Auxiliary Judge to assume cognizance of, and try any particular case pending
before a Judge of First Instance, when, in the opinion of the Secretary, such
step is required for the “harmonious and efficient administration” of the work
of the court. Whether or not such a condition exists, with respect to a
particular case, as to “require the exercise of this power, is a matter
exclusively for the determination of the Secretary.

But it is insisted that the power of the Secretary of Justice to give
particular direction in the matter now under consideration has been taken away
by reason of the fact that he has, in Administrative Order No. 23, of March 10,
1927, prescribed a general method to be followed in the distribution of judicial
business among the three judges attached to the Court of First Instance of the
Twentieth Judicial District. In this connection reliance is placed upon the
closing words in the last paragraph of section 154 of the Administrative Code,
as amended by section 1 of Act No. 3107, wherein it is declared that in case of
disagreement between the judges as to the method of distribution of the work,
the Secretary of Justice shall decide, and said Secretary “shall be empowered to
promulgate rules for the purpose of preventing conflicts between the several
branches.” It will be noted, however, that this provision, authorizing the
Secretary of Justice to promulgate rules for the distribution of business among
the different branches of the court deals with the general method for the
distribution of business, and the exercise of the power of making such
regulations does not interfere with the more particular power conferred upon the
Secretary of Justice by other provisions of law which we have already cited. In
other words the two powers are concurrent, and the exercise of one does not
interfere with the exercise of the other.

From what has been said, it is obvious that the authority of the
Administrative Head in the matter now in question has been properly exercised.

The petition must therefore be denied, and it is so ordered, with costs.

Johnson, Malcolm, Villamor, Ostrand, Romualdez, and Villa-Real, JJ., concur.