PAYATAS ESTATE IMPROVEMENT CO., PETITIONER AND APPELLANT, VS. MARIANO TUASON, AUGUSTO TUASON ET AL., OPPOSITORS AND APPELLEES.

Maria de la Conception Martinez Caiias was originally the owner of
the so-called Payatas estate, the principal part of which was bounded
on the east by the Mariquina River. The so-called Mariquina estate
adjoined the river on the other side and belonged to the Tuasons.

In 1904, shortly after the initiation of the Torrens system of land
registration, Maria de la Concepcion Caiias had the property surveyed
and obtained a certificate of title to the same. Later on, the land,
consisting of three parcels, A, B and C, was sold by her to the Payatas
Estate Improvement Company. In 1920 another survey was made for
subdivision purposes, and on October 15, 1924, the subdivision plans
were submitted to the Court of First Instance of Rizal for approval. In
the motion accompanying the plans, it was stated:

“1. That as shown by the transfer certificate of
title No. 8691 issued by the register of deeds of Rizal, Philippine
Islands, said company (the Payatas Estate Improvement Company) is the
owner of the hacienda, known under the name of ‘Payatas,’ situated in the municipality of San Mateo and Montalban of said province.

“2.
That in 1920 and 1921 said hacienda was surveyed by the surveyor
Salvador N. Tolentino, dividing it in two parcels, the first portion
being subdivided in 124 lots according to plan P. S. U. 24733, and the
second portion being subdivided in 149 lots according to plan P. S. U.
32686. Both plans had already been approved by the Director of Lands.”

Before action on the motion was taken by the court, the plans were
submitted to the General Land Registration Office for examination.
After such examination, attention was called to the fact that the
rivers, esteros, roads and some portions of land—which were within the
original plan had been excluded and that the total area of the land
included in the subdivision plans was only 4,839 hectares, 88 ares and
3 centares instead of 5,122 hectares, 84 ares and 35 centares as shown
by the plan upon which the original decree was issued. The surveyor who
prepared the plans explained that the difference in area was due “(1)
to his conforming to the adjoining decreed old surveys, (2) to the
exclusion of rivers and creeks inside the estate, and (3) to the
erosion on the bank of Montalban-San Mateo river before the new survey,
P. S. U. 24733, was executed.”

On October 25, 1924, the Payatas Estate Improvement Company filed
another motion in which it asked that transfer certificate of title No.
8691 be cancelled as to parcels A and C but not in regard to parcel B,
the latter not being included in the subdivision. Two days later, the
Court of First Instance approved the subdivision and gave instructions
to the register of deeds in accordance with the Improvement Company’s
last motion.

The register of deeds complied fully with the order of the court,
and certificates of title were issued accordingly, but on March 18,
1925, the Payatas Estate Improvement Company filed another motion
alleging that the area of the subdivided land, parcels A and C,
together with parcel B, did not include all the land to which the
company was entitled and which was included in the plan Exhibit A upon
which the final decree was issued in 1905. The motion was accompanied
by a plan (P. S. U. 45292) of two strips of land situated along the
eastern side of the Mariquina River and embracing a little over 22
hectares, and the company asked that a certificate of title be issued
in its favor in accordance with that plan.

The motion was opposed by the Tuasons and after hearing, the court
below denied it, principally on the ground that a motion in the land
registration record was not the proper action in a case such as this.
From this order the Payatas Estate Improvement Company appealed.

The controversy in the present case seems to be due to the erroneous
conception that article 366 of the Civil Code does not apply to Torrens
registered land. That article provides that “any accretions which the
banks of rivers may gradually receive from the effect of the current
belong to the owners of the estates bordering thereon.” Accretions of
that character are natural incidents to land bordering on running
streams and are not affected by the registration laws. It follows that
registration does not protect the riparian owner against diminution of
the area of his land through gradual changes in the course of the
adjoining stream.

At the points where the land now in question is situated, the
Mariquina River separates the Payatas estate from the Mariquina esfcate
and constitutes the boundary between the two estates. According to plan
P. S. U. 45292, the river has changed its course to the prejudice of
the Payatas estate on the western side of the stream and to the benefit
of the Mariquina estate by increasing the latter’s area, and the 22
hectares now in controversy which formerly were on the Payatas side of
the river are now on the Mariquina estate side. Assuming this to be
true—and it will not be denied by the appellant—the case reduces itself
to the question whether the change in the course of the river was
caused by accretion and erosion or whether it had occurred through
avulsion. There is no direct evidence on this point, but according to
the decision of this court in the case of Martinez Canas vs.
Tuason (5 Phil., 688), the presumption is that the change was gradual
and caused by erosion of the Payatas bank of the river and consequent
accretion to the Mariquina estate. It follows that the land in question
is now a part of that estate and no longer pertains to the Payatas
estate.

We may say in passing that the Martinez Canas vs. Tuason
case was also a boundary dispute between the owners of the two estates,
in which dispute the Tuasons claimed 30 hectares of land which had been
shifted over to the Payatas estate side of the Mariquina River. Though
the. evidence for the owners of the Mariquina estate was much stronger
than that for the owner of the Payatas estate in the present case, this
court, nevertheless, held that the owner of the Payatas estate had
acquired title to the land by accretion.

We cannot quite agree with the court below that the matter before us
may not be properly dealt with and determined under section 112 of the
Land Registration Act; that section covers a wide range and undoubtedly
embraces questions such as those raised in this case. That, however,
does not necessarily mean that said questions might not also have been
ventilated in a separate action.

For the reasons stated, the motion in question is denied, and it is
declared that the land in dispute is now an integral part of the
aforesaid Mariquina estate. The appellant will pay the costs of this
instance. So ordered.

Johnson, Street, Johns, Romualdez, and Villa-Real, JJ., concur.

MALCOLM, J.:

My vote is to affirm the order appealed from in its result.