THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. SALAMUDDIN NO. 1, PANGILAN, LAJIM, IMADI AND IGASAN, DEFENDANTS AND APPELLANTS.

This appeal was taken from the judgment of the Court of First
Instance of Jolo imposing upon Pangilan, Imadi and Igasan, twenty years
cadena temporal with the corresponding accessory penalties, and upon
Lajim and Salamuddin No. 1, life imprisonment, also with the accessory
penalties besides the joint and several obligation of all of them to
indemnify the heirs of the deceased Kalon for the latter’s death, in
the sum of P1,000 and the party stolen from, Tan Chin Chuan, in the
amount of P1,500, the value of the stolen property, plus the costs, for
the crime of robbery with homicide.

Although all the aforesaid defendants are now appellants, their
counsel confines his remarks to Salamuddin No. 1, Pangilan and Imadi in
so far as they are found guilty of homicide and sentenced as
aforementioned, and said counsel does not discuss either the
sufficiency of the evidence of conviction of all the appellants or the
penalty imposed upon the two, Lajim and Igasan.

Counsel contends that as the defendants only conspired to rob and
not to kill Kalon, and as appellants Salamuddin No. 1, Pangilan and
Imadi did not attack the said deceased, these three should only answer
for the robbery and not the homicide; and in support of this
contention, the case of People vs. Basisten (47 Phil., 493), is cited.

It should be borne in mind that dn said case of People vs.
Basisten, it clearly appeared that the homicide committed by Emilio
Huesca on the person of Nicolas Soldevilla, one of the occupants of the
assaulted house, did not enter into the common plan of the aggressors.
What happened in that case is that when the malefactors arrived at the
house Nicolas Soldevilla fell upon his knees and told the aggressors
that all the occupants in that house surrendered. Thus, without more
difficulty, the malefactors proceeded to take possession of the goods
in the house. At that moment, and without any known motive, Emilio
Huesca stabbed Nicolas Soldevilla with a bolo in the abdomen, the
others not being aware of such attack made by their companion Emilio
Huesca. Hence the killing of Nicolas Soldevilla was not necessary for
the execution of the common purpose to rob, nor was it an incident to
the said robbery, neither to facilitate it nor to defend the possession
of the property taken—that killing could not be looked upon in any way
as a part of the common scheme to commit the robbery.

In the case before us the deceased Kalon stopped and attacked the
offenders when the latter had already come out of the store where the
robbery was committed and were carrying away the stolen goods. Two or
three of them, doubtless those who were nearest, returned Kalon’s
attack and killed him. That act was done in order to repel an
aggression which, had it been effective, would have endangered the
whole success of the robbery committed ; it was done, in the final
analysis, in order to defend the possession of the stolen property. It
was therefore an act which tended to ensure the practical termination
of the robbery, to secure to the robbers the possession and enjoyment
of the goods taken. And it has been held time and again by this court
that each conspirator answers for all the acts of the others committed
for this accomplishment of the common purpose. (U. S. vs. Estabillo, 11 Phil., 150; U. S. vs. Ipil, 27 Phil., 530; People vs. Cabrera, 43 Phil., 64.)

In the aforementioned case of People vs. Basisten, the
homicide then, was not, and could not be, looked upon as if it were
committed for the accomplishment of the common purpose, while in the
present case, the homicide was committed for the complete and effective
carrying out of the
preconcerted robbery. For this reason, said doctrine is not applicable hereto.

The crime alleged and proven is that defined in article 502 of the
Penal Code in connection with paragraph 1 of article 503 of the same
Code. There were present in the crime the aggravating circumstances of
dwelling, nocturnity and band, and with respect to the defendants
Pangilan
and Igasan, the extenuating circumstance of age, as both of them were
over 15 and under 18 years of age when the crime was committed.

We find no error in the judgment appealed from nor any abuse of
discretion on the part of the lower court in taking into account in
favor of the defendants the provisions of section 106 of the
Administrative Code of Mindanao and Jolo.

The judgment appealed from is affirmed, with costs against the appellants. So ordered.

Johnson, Street, Malcolm, Villamor, Ostrand, Johns, and Villa-Real, JJ., concur.