THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, IN BEHALF OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, PETITIONER, VS. THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF TARLAC ET AL., RESPONDENTS.

The ground for this petition for a writ of certiorari is that
the respondent court has exceeded its jurisdiction in ordering the issuance of a
writ of possession in cadastral proceeding No. 15 of the Court of First instance
of Tarlac (G. L. R. O. Record No. 22), entitled the Director of Lands,
applicant, vs. Juliana Abaya et al., claimants, in favor of the herein
respondents surnamed Villa-Abrille, pending the approval in said court of the
bill of exceptions presented by the petitioner, to perfect the appeal taken by
him from the judgment of the respondent court decreeing the adjudication and
registration of the parcels of land in question, and it is prayed that an order
be issued requiring the respondent court to forward and certify to this court
the record of the proceedings in question, in order that they may be reviewed by
this court and that in due time the proceedings had and orders issued with
respect to said writ of possession be held void and of no effect.

For the solution of the question of procedure raised in the
present appeal, the following are the necessary and pertinent facts gathered
from the pleadings and evidence in the record.

The Villa-Abrille brothers, respondents herein, applied for the
confirmation and registration of their title to certain parcels of land in
accordance with the Land Registration Law, which originated proceeding No. 369
(G. L. R. O. Record No. 14366). During the pendency of said registration
proceeding, cadastral proceeding No. 15 was instituted in the Court of First
Instance of Tarlac (G. L. R. O. Record No. 225), in which the Director of Lands
was the applicant and Juliana Abaya and others, the claimants, and which
included the two parcels of land covered by said application, which were also
claimed by the same parties in the aforesaid registration proceeding, each party
alleging to have been in possession of the same. Both cases having been jointly
heard and submitted for decision, the presiding judge of the Court of First
Instance of Tarlac applied for a vacation.

While said proceedings were in this state, the justice of the
peace of the capital of Tarlac, exercising the jurisdiction delegated to him by
the Judge of the Court of First Instance of Tarlac, and upon petition of the
Director of Lands, issued a writ of preliminary injunction ex parte
against the herein respondents, the Villa-Abrille brothers, claimants in said
proceedings, forbidding them to enter upon said lands. Said respondents
immediately moved for the dissolution of the said injunction, but this petition
was denied by the court, which, however, ordered those represented by the
Director of Lands, to give a bond of P12,000 in order that said injunction might
stand.

Upon the return of the Judge of the Court of First Instance
from his vacation, the said respondents, the Villa-Abrille brothers, filed
another motion for the dissolution of the injunction, with a complaint for
indemnity of damages. After the proper evidence had been introduced, the Court
of First Instance of Tarlac rendered judgment in favor of said respondents
awarding them damages, and vacating the writ of preliminary injunction issued on
April 30, 1927, by the justice of the peace of the capital, the Villa-Abrilles
entering upon the possession of the land in question. In order to avoid being
disturbed in the possession of said land, the aforementioned respondents
Villa-Abrille applied for a writ of possession, which was granted by the lower
court, a decree being issued on May 11, 1928, ordering that the possession of
the lands adjudicated to them in the judgment rendered in the cadastral
proceeding be given them, notwithstanding the appeal taken from said judgment,
unless the opponents gave a bond in the sum of P7,000. Counsel for the Director
of Lands took exception to this ruling and filed a motion for reconsideration,
which was denied by the court.

In view of the facts just related, the question arises as to
whether or not the respondent court exceeded its powers in issuing a writ
ordering that the petitioners be placed in the possession of the lands to which
a decree of confirmation and registration of title had been issued in their
favor, which was excepted to by the opponents, who appealed and presented a bill
of exceptions, the approval of which is still pending.

The pertinent part of section 17 of Act No. 496, as amended by
section 3 of Act No. 1680, reads as follows:

“SEC. 17. The Court of Land Registration, in all matters over
which it has jurisdiction, may enforce its orders, judgments, or decrees in the
same manner as orders, judgments, and decrees are enforced in the Courts of
First Instance, including a writ of possession directing the governor or sheriff
of any province, or the sheriff of the City of Manila, to place the applicant in
possession of the property covered by a decree of the court in his favor; * *
*”

The petitioner maintains that this legal provision does not
authorize the issuance of a writ of possession except when there is a final
decree of registration and not a mere confirmation of title subject to an
appeal, and that the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure relative to the
execution of judgments are inapplicable to the writ of possession in
registration cases, citing in support of this contention the case of Manlapas
and Tolentino vs. Llorente (48 Phil., 298), wherein the court said:

“The law has not made applicable to the writ of possession
provided for in section 17 of Act No. 496 and its amendments, the provisions of
the Code of Civil Procedure regarding execution of judgments.”

In said case, the precise questions raised were whether the
successor of an applicant in whose favor a decree of registration had been
issued can ask for the issuance of a writ of possession after five years had
elapsed since said decree had become final, and whether the right to ask for the
execution of said decree through the issuance of a writ of possession had
prescribed.

When this court said, in the above-quoted decision, that the
provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure with respect to the execution of
judgments are inapplicable to the writ of possession, it referred to the time
within which it can be issued, and not to whether or not it can be issued before
the expiration of the period assigned for the filing of the bill of
exceptions.

As to whether or not the word “decree” used in the legal
provision above quoted, refers to the final decree of registration, said legal
provision does not exactly say so. The English text of section 38 of Act No. 496
reads as follows:

“SEC. 38. If the court after hearing finds that the applicant
has title as stated in his application, and proper for registration, a decree of
confirmation and registration shall be entered. * * *”

And the Spanish text of the same law is as follows:

“ART. 38. Si despues de la vista el tribunal estimare que el
titulo del solicitante es tal y como lo manifiesta en la solicitud y que se
puede registrar, dictara el decreto correspondiente que lo legalice y se
procedera a hacer la inscripcion. * * *”

It may be deduced from both texts that the word “decree” refers
not only to the registration but also to the confirmation of the title.

Paragraph 2 of section 10 of Act No. 2347, entitled “An Act
providing for the judicial reorganization of the Courts of First Instance and of
the Court of Land Registration,” provides as follows:

“SEC. 10 * * * * * * *

“In the dispatch of registration cases, the rules and
provisions contained in Act Numbered Four Hundred and ninety-six, the Land
Registration Act, as amended, shall be applied, unless otherwise provided by
this Act. In all matters of procedure not provided in said Act, the rules and
provisions contained in the Code of Procedure in civil actions and special
proceedings shall be applied in so far as the same may be
applicable.”

If, as has been said, the word “decree,” used in section 17 of
Act No. 496, as amended by section 3 of Act No. 1680 quoted above, is used in
section 38 of said Act No. 496, in connection with the confirmation as well as
registration of title, and if said section 17 of Act No. 496, as amended, does
not limit the use of the said word “decree” to the registration, it must be
taken in its general sense and applied, not only to the registration, but also
to the confirmation of title. If this is so, the provisions and rules contained
in the Code of Civil Procedure, especially those in section 144 of said Code,
are applicable to the issuance of writs of possession.

The only legal provision which seemed in conflict with this
conclusion is that contained in section 14 of Act No. 496, as amended by section
4 of Act No. 1108, the pertinent part of which is as follows:

“SEC. 4. Section fourteen of said Act is hereby repealed and a
new section fourteen is hereby inserted, to read as follows:

“SEC. 14. Every order, decision, and decree of the Court of
Land Registration may be reviewed by the Supreme Court in the same manner as an
order, decision, decree, or judgment of a Court of First Instance might be
reviewed, and for that purpose sections one hundred and forty-one, one hundred
and forty-two, one hundred and forty-three, four hundred and ninety-six, four
hundred and ninetyseven (except that portion thereof relating to assessors),
four hundred and ninety-nine, five hundred, five hundred and one, five hundred
and two, five hundred and three, five hundred and four, five hundred and five,
five hundred and six, five hundred and seven, five hundred and eight, five
hundred and nine, five hundred and eleven, five hundred and twelve, five hundred
and thirteen, five hundred and fourteen, five hundred and fifteen, five hundred
and sixteen, and five hundred and seventeen of Act Numbered One hundred and
ninety, entitled ‘An Act providing a Code of Procedure in civil actions and
special proceedings in the Philippine Islands,’ are made applicable to all the
proceedings of the Court of Land Registration and to a review thereof by the
Supreme Court, except as otherwise provided in this section. * *
*”

It will be seen that in enumerating in said section, the
sections of the Code of Civil Procedure applicable to the revision by this court
of any order, judgment, or decree of the Court of Land Registration, section 144
of the Code of Civil Procedure mentioned above was omitted. Upon careful
examination of the purpose of said section, it will be noted that the same
refers to the revision of the orders, judgments and decrees of the Court of Land
Registration. For such revision, the provisions of section 141 of the Code of
Civil Procedure defining exceptions, are necessary; of section 142, which
establish the manner in which they are to be presented; of section 143 which
provide for the manner in which bills of exceptions are to be perfected; of
section 496 which gives the procedure to be followed in the Supreme Court; of
section 497 which gives the questions of law to be reviewed; of section 499,
which provides how a judge who fails to certify bills of exceptions may be
compelled to do so; of section 500 which enumerates the cases wherein bills of
exceptions must be dismissed; of section 501, which prescribes how incomplete
records are to be amended; of section 502 on the effect of dismissing a bill of
exceptions; of section 503 which provides that a judgment is not to be reversed
on technical grounds; of section 504 on the power of the Supreme Court to
designate another judge to hold a new trial of the case; of section 505 on the
procedure to be followed in the new trial; of section 506 on the remission of a
certified copy of the judgment to the Court of First Instance; of section 507 on
the notification of the judgment by the clerk of the Court of First Instance; of
section 508 on the remission to the Court of First Instance of a certified copy
of the Supreme Court’s decision; of section 509 relative to the excepting party
who is not entitled to the reversal with respect to another party; of section
511 referring to extraordinary orders to be enforced by the lower courts; of
section 512 referring to the printing of the bill of exceptions; of section 513
referring to the procedure in case of default caused by fraud, accident, or
mistake; of section 514 referring to the procedure relating to writs of
certiorari; of section 515 referring; to the procedure relative to mandamus; of
section 516 referring to procedure in prohibition proceedings; of section 517
referring to preliminary injunctions in proceedings relating to certiorari,
mandamus and prohibition.

It will be seen that all these sections of the Code of Civil
Procedure refer strictly to the requisites and necessary procedure for the
revision through an appeal as well as through certiorari, mandamus and
prohibition of the orders, judgments and decrees of the Court of Land
Registration.

Moreover, in registration proceedings, whether ordinary or
cadastral, the only question involved is the claimant’s or applicant’s title,
the confirmation and registration of which are sought, and the review of a
decree rendered to that effect has no other object than to see if said judicial
order is in accordance with the facts proven and the law.

The power conferred upon the court by section 144 of the Code
of Civil Procedure that, for special reasons appearing in the bill of
exceptions, and before the expiration of the term for the filing thereof, it may
order that the execution of the judgment be not suspended, is not strictly a
requisite or rule of necessary procedure for the review of an order, judgment or
decree of a Court of Land Registration; hence it was not included in the
enumeration of the sections of the Code of Civil Procedure applicable to the
review of the orders, judgments and decrees of said court, contained in section
14 of Act No. 496, as amended by Act No. 1108.

In the case of Soriano vs. Aquino (31 Phil., 176, 180), this
court held section 144 of the Code of Civil Procedure applicable to land
registration cases in solving the question raised by the appellant relative to
the requirement of the bond for the suspension of the issuance of a writ of
possession before the expiration of the period for the filing of the bill of
exceptions, in the following terms:

“Notwithstanding the provision that the filing of a bill of
exceptions shall stay execution of the judgment until the final determination of
the action, it is also within the discretion of the court, according to section
144 of the Code of Civil Procedure to require as a condition of a stay of
execution that a bond shall be given reasonably sufficient to secure the
performance of the judgment appealed from in case it be affirmed in part or
wholly. The trial court has not, therefore, incurred the fifth error specified
in appellant’s brief, with reference to requiring the filing of the bond
mentioned in the order of the court of August 11, 1913.”

As to the contention that the exercise of the right to obtain
the confirmation and registration of a title is not an “action” as this word is
defined in section 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure and as used in section 144
of the same Code, which makes this section inapplicable to ordinary registration
or cadastral proceedings, it suffices to cite this court’s decision in the case
of Lopez Castelo vs. Director of Lands (48 Phil., 589), the first paragraph of
the syllabus of which reads as follows:

“LAND REGISTRATION; ACTION ‘IN REM’; CONCLUSIVENESS OF
DECREE.—A land registration proceeding is in the nature of a suit in
rem; the decree entered therein operates directly on the land and, in the
absence of fraud, is ‘conclusive upon and against all persons’ (sec. 1, Act No.
496) though they may not have received actual notice of the proceedings.”

*******

It is also contended that section 144 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, above cited, refers to the execution of a judgment and not of a
decree, and that a decree is not a judgment. In answer to this it is sufficient
to cite what this court said in the case of Government of the Philippine Islands
vs. Abural (39 Phil., 996, 1001), which is as follows:

*******

“After trial in a cadastral case, three actions are taken. The
first adjudicates ownership in favor of one of the claimants. This constitutes
the decision—the judgment—the decree of the court, and speaks in a judicial
manner.

* * *”

Moreover, public order and the interests of the parties demand
that once a judgment of confirmation of title has been rendered, the successful
party’s interest be protected from any damage which the defeated party may cause
him by remaining in the possession to which the successful party is entitled by
virtue of his title and of the court’s decree confirming it, unless said
defeated party secures the successful party from said damage.

For the foregoing reasons, we are of the opinion, and so hold,
that section 144 of the Code of Civil Procedure is applicable to the execution
of decrees of confirmation of title through the issuance, for special reasons
which must appear in the bill of exceptions, of a writ of possession before the
expiration of the period for the filing of said bill.

By virtue whereof, the remedy sought is denied and the writ of
preliminary injunction issued is hereby dissolved, without express pronouncement
as to costs. So ordered.

Avanceña, C. J., Johnson, Malcolm, Villamor, Ostrand,
and Romualdez, JJ., concur.