G.R. No. 29663. December 29, 1928

MANUEL ALEJANDRINO, APPLICANT AND APPELLEE, VS. ERIBERTO REYES, AS ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE OF THE DECEASED GREGORIA PAÑGAN, OPPOSITOR AND APPELLANT.

Decisions / Signed Resolutions December 29, 1928 OSTRAND, J.:
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OSTRAND, J.:


Manuel Alejandrino applied for the registration of four parcels
of land referred to as lots Nos. 1, 2, 3, and 4 of the plans attached to the
application. Among others, Eriberto Reyes, as special administrator of the
estate of the deceased Gregoria Pañgan, opposed the registration of the parcels.

Upon trial the Court of First Instance ordered the registration
of lots Nos. 1, 3, and 4 and denied the registration of lot No. 2. From this
decision the oppositor, Eriberto Reyes, appealed to this court.

It appears from the record that the three lots in question were
originally the paraphernal property of the deceased Gregoria Pañgan, and that
she, on March 11, 1922, executed a deed of sale with the right to repurchase for
said lots in favor of Alejandrino. Upon the expiration of the term for the
repurchase, Alejandrino desired to consolidate the title to the land, and to
that effect, Gregoria Pañgan, accompanied by her husband, Vicente Cabigting,
executed a deed of title in fee simple in favor of Alejandrino for the three
lots. The appellant bases his appeal on the ground that the deed of November 14,
1923, is fictitious and that the vendor’s signature to the same is not
authentic. We cannot find the slightest indication that such is the case.
Gregoria Pañgan’s signature on the deed of the sale with right to repurchase of
March 11, 1922, is admittedly authentic, and a comparison between that signature
and that in the document in question convinces us that the vendor’s signature in
the two documents were written by the same person.

The appellant also raises the point that Gregoria Pañgan was a
married woman and that she, in executing the deed, did not have a proper license
from her husband to sell the property in question. The answer to this assertion
is that no special form is required for such license, and that it appears that
in executing the document in question, Gregoria Pañgan was accompanied by her
husband and that he also signed the document. That, in our opinion, is a
sufficient license.

At the trial of the case, the appellant presented two
documents, Exhibits 4 and 5, for the purpose of comparing the alleged signatures
of Gregoria Pañgan in these documents with that in the deed in question. The
court below declined to admit the exhibits in evidence on the ground that they
were private documents and that the authenticity of the signatures therein had
not been proven. The appellant’s contention that this ruling was erroneous is
untenable; the court had a perfect right to insist on proof of the authenticity
of the documents before receiving them in evidence,

We are unable to find any reversible error in the decision
appealed from, and the same is therefore affirmed with the costs against the
appellant So ordered.

Avanceña, C. J., Johnson, Malcolm, Villamor, Johns, and
Romualdez, JJ., concur.