THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. FIDEL SASOTA, DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT.

The defendant was charged with the crime of rape. It is alleged that the
crime was committed upon the 9th day of November, 1926. A complaint was
presented in the court of the justice of the peace of the municipality of
Dasmariñas, Province of Cavite, on the 18th day of November, 1926. The
defendant was arrested and given a preliminary hearing before said justice of
the peace. At the close of the preliminary hearing the justice of the peace
found that there was probable cause for believing that the defendant was guilty
of the crime charged, and held him for trial in the Court of First Instance.
Later the prosecuting attorney of the Province of Cavite presented a complaint
in the Court of First Instance, which alleged:

“Que en o hacia el 9 de noviembre de 1926, en el Municipio de Dasmariñas,
Provincia de Cavite, Islas Filipinas, el acusado arriba nombrado, voluntaria,
ilegal y criminalmente mediante fuerza, violencia e intimidacidn yacid con
Rufina Barbuco, una sordomuda de 14 años de edad, contra la voluntad de la
misma.

“En la comision del delito ha concurrido la circunstancia agravante de
morada.

“Hecho cometido con inf raccion de la ley.”

Upon that complaint the defendant was duly arraigned, pleaded not guilty, was
tried, found guilty of the crime charged in the complaint, with the aggravating
circumstance of morada, and sentenced by the Honorable Conrado
Carballo, judge, to be imprisoned for a period of eighteen years of
reclusion temporal, to indemnify the offended party in the amount of P1,000, to acknowledge the offspring, should there be any, and to pay the costs
of the action, including those of the preliminary investigation. From that
sentence the defendant appealed, and in this court contends that the lower court
committed an error in holding that the accused was guilty of the crime charged
beyond a reasonable doubt.

The appeal presents a question of fact only.

In support of the said assignment of error the attorney for the appellant in
his brief filed in this court, after a preliminary statement of facts, said:
“The foregoing is the result of a desperate effort to find something on the
record favorable to the accused. Altho personally the writer is more or less
satisfied that a wrong has been committed upon the person of the deaf and dumb
girl, Rufina Barbuco, still he does not desire to substitute his own opinion to
that of this Honorable Court and it is for the purpose of submitting some legal
aspects of the case in behalf of the accused-appellant that the foregoing brief
has been written.”

In the course of the decision of the lower court the judge made the following
findings of fact:

“Son pruebas de la acusacion en esta causa que alia por el dia 9 de noviembre
de 1926, Rufina Barbuco, que es una sordomuda, acompanada de su hermana Severa
Barbuco, una niña de unos 6 o 7 años de edad, se hallaban solas en su casa en
Dasmariñas, Cavite; que estando alli, a eso del mediodia, subio a ella el aqui
acusado Fidel Sasota quien, en primer lugar, dio unas naranjas a Severa y
despues a Rufina Barbuco, pero que esta no quiso aceptar al principio, pero
despues a insistencias del acusado, recibid por fin y las tiro al suelo; que
entonces dicho acusado la cogio, la beso, la toco los pechos y la echo al suelo,
y estando asi, el acusado desabrocho su pantaldn y se puso encima de Rufina para
yacer con ella en esto Rufina lloraba y gritaba. En esta parte de su testimonio
de Severa, al decir que su hermana Rufina gritd quiso dar a entender que su
hermana produjo un sonido inarticulado en la garganta igual que el que producen
los que estan privados de la voz. Sigue declarando Severa diciendo que su
hermana, estando debajo del acusado, pataleo y hacia senas a Severa para que le
diera un bolo que la testigo no ha podido encontrar; que durante todo este
interregno de tiempo, acerto escuchar por alii una tal Tasia, que viene a ser
Constancia Ceilon, testigo de la defensa, y que esta dijo al acusado: “No hagas
eso a la nina porque su padre se va a enfadar,” pero el acusado le dijo que se
callara, pues de lo contrario 61 le acusaria a su padre, y entonces ella se
marcho; pero que despues de que el acusado hubo terminado de satisfacer sus
torpes deseos, se levantd y se marcho, y Rufina, habiendo podido coger un bolo,
trato de perseguir a dicho acusado Fidel, pero que no le alcanzo; que despues de
Uegar el padre de Rufina, esta y Severa le contaron la que habia pasado. Severa
ha demostrado al Juzgado los hechos propios de su edad, que no sabe escribir,
pero el mismo candor y la misma inocencia de la nifia han impresionado al
Juzgado cuando relato todos los actos ejecutados por el acusado y las senas que
su hermana le habia hecho, llegando hasta el extremo de establecer ella, como
una cosa muy natural, de que mientras el aqui acusado yacia con su hermana
Rufina, ella estaba a un metro y medio de distancia viendoles. Establecio ademas
de una manera positiva, a repreguntas del Juzgado, que cuando el acusado se
levanto, tenia desabrochado el pantalon y vio el miembro viril del acusado y el
vello que cubria las partes pudendas del mismo.

“* * *. El mejor testigo de cargo en este asunto es la propia ofendida, que
es una sordomuda como ha quedado demostrado ante el Juzgado. Se intents utilizar
el servicio de Lutgardo Mendoza, instructor en la escuela de sordomudos de
Manila, pero el hecho es que dicho instructor utilizo, para conversar con Rufina
Barbuco, los signos convencionales usados ordinariamente cuando uno quiere
hablar con un sordomudo. El Juzgado ha podido apreciar en todo su valor la
extension y alcance tanto de las preguntas hechas a Rufina como las
contestations dadas por ella a las mismas, habiendo demostrado de una manera
indubitable, grafica y palpablemente al Juzgado el atropello de que ella era
objeto, dando a entender claramente por medio de senas como Fidel Sasota,
utilizando sus fuerzas, la tumbo al suelo, mientras ella pugnaba contra el
mismo, y pudo introducir su miembro viril en las partes pudendas de ella,
indicando ademas, por medio de sus gestos y la expresion de la cara, el dolor
que le causaba el acceso, y demostrando de una u otra manera los hechos
ocurridos como corroborando en todo lo possible a su hermana Severa Barbuco. El
testimonio del Doctor Anonuevo confirma el Exhibit A que es un certificado
medico de las lesiones encontradas por el mismo en la vulva de Rufina Barbuco y
el hallazgo en la membrana himen de dicha Rufina, que estaba rota, y ademas
establecid que el 16 de noviembre, cuando examind a Rufina, introdujo su
especulum en la parte genital de ella y dicha Rufina sintio dolor por la
introduccion de dicho instrumento. El Exhibit B es un certificado de bautismo
que demuestra, segun la declaracion del propio padre de Rufina, que Rufina
Barbuco es soltera de 15 años de edad.”

An examination of the evidence adduced during the trial of the cause clearly
supports the foregoing findings of fact by the lower court.

It is intimated that the testimony of the offended person. who is deaf and
dumb, should not have been accepted at its full value. We have carefully
examined the testimony of the offended person during the trial, and find no
reason nor justification for discrediting her statement.

In the case of People vs. De Leon (50 Phil., 539) this court affirmed the
sentence of the lower court, convicting the appellant of the crime of rape
committed upon the person of Cecilia Galang, who was also a deaf and dumb
person. The sentence of conviction was based entirely on the testimony of said
Cecilia Galang.

Formerly deaf and dumb persons were considered incompetent witnesses. That
theory, however, has been entirely dispelled. Experience and observation have
shown conclusively that the mere fact that a person is deaf and dumb is not
sufficient to justify the finding that he is incompetent as a witness.

Mr. Jones, in his valuable work on Evidence, says:

“Although it was formerly presumed that persons deaf and dumb from
birth were idiots, and therefore incompetent, within the meaning of this rule,
no such presumption now exists. Taylor, in his work on Evidence, gives an
instance in which a cause was decided solely on the testimony of witnesses who
were deaf and dumb. When such a witness is produced, the court may ascertain
whether he has the requisite intelligence; and the judge will allow the witness
to adopt such mode of communicating his ideas, whether by signs or writing, as,
under the circumstances, may be deemed most satisfactory. The mode of taking the
examination is a matter for the exercise of the sound discretion of the court,
which must determine, in the first place, the necessity for an interpreter, and
in the next place, the best method of arriving at the knowledge of the witness
and of (imparting that knowledge to the jury; but this discretion must not be
exercised arbitrarily or to the injury of the litigants. Where error is
predicated on the action of the trial court in taking the testimony of the
deafmutes through an interpreter by signs, instead of through written questions
and answers, the appellate court, in the absence of a showing to the contrary,
will presume that the trial court adopted the better method of taking the
testimony.” (Vol. 4, Jones on Evidence, section 719.)

Mr. Wigmore, in his very valuable work on Evidence, speaking of the
competency of deaf and dumb persons, says:

“At the time when unscientific ideas prevailed concerning mental derangement
and defect, the deaf-and-dumb were so far treated as idiots that they were
presumed to be incapable of testifying, until the contrary was shown. Today this
presumption has disappeared.

“1845, Jewett, J., in People vs. McGee, 1 Den. 21: (The woman) was of sense
sufficient to have intelligence conveyed to her and to communicate intelligence
to T. by signs and motions. * * *. If she had sufficient reason to have
intelligence conveyed to her by T. and to communicate facts to the understanding
of T., although she was not able to talk or write, she could have been sworn and
testified through him by signs.

“No doubt it may sometimes be wise to examine into the capacity of such
persons; but ordinarily the only question will be as to the possibility of
communicating with them by some certain system of signs. So far as such persons
are shown to be mentally defective, the principles applicable to lunatics will
govern.” (Vol. 1, Wigmore on Evidence, sec. 498, p. 918.)

Some criticism has been made with reference to the admission of the testimony
of Severa Barbuco on account of her tender years. She is a young girl of 7 years
of age, and the sister of the offended person. She was the only witness present
at the time of the commission of the crime described in the complaint. Her
testimony was positive, direct and clear. She seemed to have more than the
ordinary intelligence of a child of her age. The trial judge questioned her very
carefully concerning her intelligence and her understanding of the nature of an
oath. The judge was satisfied that she fully understood the nature of an oath
and that her testimony was competent and entitled to credit.

This court, speaking of the competency of children as witnesses, in the case
of United States vs. Buncad (25 Phil., 530, 531), said:

“That the testimony of an 8-year-old boy was properly admitted, it appearing
that the trial judge after a careful examination of his mental capacity was of
opinion that this is an unusually intelligent child for his age, who gave his
evidence in a straightforward and unembarrassed manner and was on the whole as
satisfactory as the average witness who appears in his court.

“The question of the capacity or incapacity of a child to testify in this
jurisdiction rests primarily with the trial judge, and his decision in that
regard will not be disturbed on review unless it clearly appears from the record
that it was erroneous.

“There is no rule in this jurisdiction which disqualifies a child from
serving as a witness, nor is there any rule defining any particular age as
conclusive of incapacity. In each instance the possession or lack of
intelligence of a child offered as a witness is to be determined by such
examination as the trial judge deems necessary for that
purpose.”

This court, in the course of its decision in the case of United States vs.
Tan Teng (23 Phil., 145, 148), referring particularly to the competency, as a
witness, of the offended party, a girl 7 years of age, said:

“During the trial the defendant objected strongly to the admissibility of the
testimony of Oliva, on the ground that because of her tender years her testimony
should not be given credit. The lower court, after carefully examining her with
reference to her ability to understand the nature of an oath, held that she had
sufficient intelligence and discernment to justify the court in accepting her
testimony with full faith and credit. With the conclusion of the lower court,
after reading her declaration, we fully concur.”

Believing that we have answered all of the objections to the conclusions of
the lower court, and finding as we do that the evidence adduced during the trial
of the cause was not only competent but sufficient to show, beyond a reasonable
doubt, that the defendant is guilty of the crime charged, we agree with the
recommendation of the Attorney-General that the sentence appealed from be
affirmed.

A thorough examination of the record fails to disclose any reason or
justification for a revocation or modification of the sentence appealed from.
The lower court, however, failed to impose the accessory penalties provided for
by law. Therefore, the sentence appealed from is hereby affirmed, with the only
modification that the accessory penalties provided for by law be imposed upon
the defendant,

For all of the foregoing reasons, it is hereby ordered and decreed that the
appellant be sentenced, under the provisions of article 438, paragraph 1, of the
Penal Code, to be imprisoned for a period of eighteen years of reclusion
temporal, to indemnify the offended person in the amount of P1,000, to
acknowledge the offspring, should there be any, to suffer the accessory
penalties of the law, and to pay the costs, including the costs of the Court of
First Instance as well as those incurred in the preliminary examination. It is
so ordered.

Avanceña, C. J., Street, Malcolm, Villamor, Ostrand, Romualdez, and
Villa-Real, JJ., concur.