THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. ISIDORO PARAO AND VALENTIN PARAO, DEFENDANTS. ISIDORO PARAO, APPELLANT.

Isidoro Parao appeals to this court from the judgment of the Court
of. First Instance of Surigao in which he was found guilty of the crime
of homicide, and without taking into consideration any circumstance
modifying the criminal liability, sentenced him to fourteen years,
eight months and one day reclusion temporal, with the accessories of the
law, to Indemnify the deceased’s family in the sum of P1,000, and to
pay the proportional part of the costs of the action.

The appellant prays for the reversal of the judgment appealed from,
and his acquittal for the following reasons: (1) That the crime has
prescribed; (2) that his guilt has not been proven beyond a reasonable
doubt.

As to the first ground for the appeal, the facts are as follows :

According to the information and the evidence adduced in support
thereof, the crime charged was committed on the afternoon of June 19,
1911, and Lucia Lasang, mistress of the deceased Julian Picato,
immediately reported the occurrence to the municipal authorities of
Gigaquit, Province of Surigao, denouncing, Valentin and Isidoro Parao
as the ones responsible for the said deceased’s violent death. Inasmuch
as the justice of the peace of said municipality was absent, the
municipal president of said municipality began the preliminary
investigation, and on June 21, 1911, issued the proper warrant of
arrest for the apprehension of the presumed felons. Having been
informed on July 22, 1911, by the policemen whom he had charged with
the execution of said warrant of arrest that the presumed felons
Isidoro and Valentin Parao had fled from the municipality of Gigaquit
and gone to the municipality of Dapa of the same Province of Surigao,
the said municipal president immediately informed the provincial
governor of it, and requested him to send a platoon of Constabulary
soldiers to capture said defendants. The warrant of arrest was sent to
the provincial Constabulary headquarters for execution, where the names
of the accused were placed on the list of persons ordered to be
captured. Notwithstanding the efforts of said organization to capture
the aforesaid accused, Isidoro Parao only was captured in the month of
July 1927, the complaint having been filed on June 29, 1927.

The appellant contends that the crime of which he was convicted has
prescribed, more than fifteen years having elapsed since its co
“omission without any judicial proceeding being taken against him, in
accordance with the provision of article 131 of the Penal Code.

Section 7 of Act No. 2041 provides that in case the justice of the
peace or the auxiliary justice of the peace are temporarily absent from
the municipality the municipal president is empowered to conduct the
preliminary investigation, whenever it cannot be deferred without
prejudice to the interests of justice, and to accept a bail bond for
the provisional liberty of the defendant. Although the law does not
definitely state that the municipal president may in such a case order
the apprehension of the presumed felon, this power is implied in that
of admitting a bail bond for his provisional liberty, since the
furnishing of a bail bond for provisional liberty presupposes the
privation of said liberty, and in order that a person charged with the
commission of a crime may be deprived of his liberty, it is necessary
that he be placed under arrest, with or without a warrant.

Now then, are the first steps taken by the municipal president of Gigaquit a part of the judicial proceeding?

In every criminal proceeding there are three stages; the
investigation of the commission of the crime and the author thereof,
and the latter’s apprehension; the preliminary investigation; and the
final trial. The preliminary investigation or examination is a judicial
function. The first steps taken by the municipal president of Gigaquit
directed towards the investigation of the crime and the apprehension of
the criminals, partakes of the nature of a judicial proceeding as
required by article 131 of the aforementioned Penal Code.

Judicial proceedings having been taken against the accused and his
arrest having been ordered, which was not carried into effect on
account of his default, that is, because he had absented himself from
his residence, hiding in the Province of Leyte, the crime has not
prescribed.

With respect to the second ground of appeal, the evidence conclusively proves the following facts:

At about 3 o’clock in the afternoon of June 17, 1911, while Julian
Picato was seated at a table in the kitchen of his house used also as a
dining room, in company with his mistress Lucia Lasang and the latter’s
sister, Basilisa Lasang, and one Bernardina, eating, the Prarao
brothers, Valentin and Isidoro arrived and greeted them from below.
Julian Picato invited them up, and asked them what they wished. The
visitors answered: “It is you we want.” Valentin Parao, who carried a
club, advanced towards Julian Picato and gave him a blow on the head,
followed by Isidoro Parao, who stabbed him with a pocket-knife in the
abdomen, from which the intestines protruded. When Lucia Lasang saw how
Julian Picato was attacked, she immediately left the house and reported
the incident to the municipal authorities. Julian Picato, after
receiving the blows, got up from his seat but was unable to remain on
his feet and fell to the ground on his side, dying instantly as a
result of his wounds. When his assaulters saw him fall they fled. Upon
raising the body the following morning, a wound in the head and another
in the abdomen were discovered. When Isidoro Parao was captured on July
12, 1927, he made a sworn statement before the justice of the peace of
Surigao, wherein he states that on the day of the crime, Julian Picato
had him called in order to speak about a certain parcel of land which
the latter had detained; that on seeing him, Julian Picato invited him
to fight, attacking him with a pocket-knife; that he dodged the blow
and succeeded in wresting away the weapon, with which he wounded his
assailant.

The defendant, testifying in his own behalf, stated that on the day
of the crime he had gone to visit his brother Valentin Parao in the
latter’s house in the sitio of Cambaliti, municipality of Gigaquit,
Province of Surigao, and found him eating in company with Moseo
Hallazgo, his brother’s brother-in-law; while speaking to his brother
he noticed that the latter was enraged because he had learned that
Julian Picato had compelled his said brother-in-law to kneel down
before him; that later, Valentin left carrying a bolo with him going
toward Julian Picato’s house; suspecting nothing out of the way he went
after his brother, and on arriving near the stairs of Picato’s house he
met Lucia Lasang who was shouting: “Help us, because Julian Picato is
dead.” That he went up to the house and found Julian Picato already
dead and his brother Valentin with a penknife in his hand; that he
wanted to take it from him but Valentin, instead of letting go of the
knife turned on him wounding him on the index finger of the right hand,
and on both forearms; that since then he has not seen his brother and
fearing he would be used as a witness against him, fled from the place.

The trial judge did not give any credit to this statement of the
defendant-appellant, exculpating himself and incriminating his brother.
Neither can we give it any credit for it is a direct contradiction of
the sworn statement made by him before the justice of the peace of
Surigao upon being captured by the Constabulary on July 12, 1927. There
is no question’ that he was present in the deceased’s house on the day
and at the hour of the crime. And, if we cannot believe him when he
asserts that it was his brother Valentin who attacked Julian Picato
with a knife and caused his death, and that he acted in self-defense,
we are forced to believe the statement of the witnesses for the
prosecution that he and his brother Valentin were the assailants of the
deceased in the manner and with the weapons, as testified by them. The
fact that he fled and remained in hiding for a period of over fifteen
years immediately following the incident,—for we cannot accept his
explanation that he did it in order to avoid being competed to testify
against his brother,—shows that he was conscious of his guilt, for an
innocent person does not, except in case of persecution, either flee or
hide himself.

The evidence adduced at the trial establishes beyond all reasonable
doubt that the defendant is guilty of the crime of homicide, committed
by having attacked the deceased Julian Picato with a penknife,
inflicting a wound on his abdomen through which his intestines
protruded, causing his instant death.

The trial court did not consider any circumstance modifying the
criminal liability, but we believe that the fact that the defendants
were invited upstairs upon saying “good afternoon” is not sufficient to
strip the commission of the crime of the aggravating circumstance of
dwelling, for the greeting which preceded the entrance of the defendant
and his brother into the deceased’s house, was nothing more than a ruse
so the latter might not suspect the object of their visit, and that
they might more easily and surely be able to commit their crime by not
giving said deceased any time to arm himself. But this aggravating
circumstance is offset, however, by the special extenuating
circumstance of lack of education, since it appears of record that the
defendant-appellant is a simple farmer.

By virtue whereof, the judgment appealed from is affirmed as to the
qualification of the crime and the penalty, with costs against the
appellant. So ordered.

Johnson, Street, Malcolm, Villamor, Ostrand, Johns, and Romualdez, JJ., concur.