INTESTATE ESTATE OF BASILISA F. YANGCO. ALEJANDRO M. PANIS, APPLICANT AND APPELLEE, VS. JACINTO YANGCO, GUARDIAN AD LITEM OF THE MINORS PEDRO UY TIOCO AND BRUNO UY TIOCO, OPPONE…

The present case is an incident in the intestate proceedings of
the estate of Basilisa F. Yangco, deceased. In the course of these proceedings
Attorney Alejandro M. Panis, as attorney for the administrator Teodoro D. Uy
Tioco, presented a statement to the court for professional services rendered by
him, and asked the approval thereof in the sum of P15,000. The administrator of
said estate answered the motion for attorney’s fees, leaving it to the court to
fix a reasonable sum for the services rendered by said attorney. And the court
on December 5, 1927, considering the amount involved in said intestate
proceedings, which, according to the report of the committee on appraisal, was
P210,640.21, and considering also the value of the services rendered by
claimant, fixed Attorney Panis’ fee for all the services rendered by him in
connection with the property left by the deceased Basilisa F. Yangco, at
P15,000, and ordered the administrator to pay this fee.

On February 8, 1928, the guardian ad litem of the minor Pedro
Uy Tioco petitioned the court under the provisions of section 113 of the Code of
Civil Procedure to vacate its order of December 5, 1927, and to give the
petitioner his day in court to prove his contention relative to the fixing of
attorney’s fees in these intestate proceedings; that he believes the amount
fixed by the court to be excessive and prejudicial to the estate; that the
amount involved in the intestate proceedings is only about P100,000, and not
over P200,000, as the committee erroneously stated; that the nature of the
services rendered by the attorney consisted merely in taking simple and ordinary
proceedings in court, with no objection raised therein, and hence, no obstacle
in the course of the proceedings; that the opponent had no opportunity to argue
against the motion of October 8, 1927, and he was surprised to learn of the
existence of said motion and of the court’s order only a few days since.

Counsel for Mr. Panis answered this motion with a prayer for
the confirmation of the order of December 5, 1927, and on February 15, 1928, the
court denied the motion presented by the guardian ad litem of the minor Pedro Uy
Tioco. The latter appealed from such an order after having moved for the
reconsideration of the same, which was denied.

One of the questions raised in the appellant’s brief is whether
a guardian ad litem, being entitled to intervene in the intestate; proceedings
of an estate of which the minor is a forced heir, has a right to be notified of
any motion presented or an order issued bearing on the case. We believe that
since the guardian ad litem was appointed to represent the minor in the
intestate proceedings he has a right to be notified of any motion filed or order
issued by the court in order to be able to protect the minor’s interests; and
the lack of notification of the order issued by the court on December 5, 1927,
fixing the attorney’s fees, is sufficient cause to entitle the guardian ad litem
to invoke the remedy provided by section 113 of the Code of Civil Procedure; and
his failure to except to said order of December 5, 1927 in time is due to the
fact that he was unaware of Attorney Panis’ motion. His neglect in this regard
is excusable, and having filed his petition for relief from the order of
December 5, 1927 on February 8, 1928, it is evident that said petition was
presented within the period fixed by section 113 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

According to section 783 of the Code of Civil Procedure, any
person legally interested in any order, decree, or judgment of a Court of First
Instance in the exercise of its jurisdiction in special proceedings in the
settlement of the estates of deceased persons, etc., may appeal to the Supreme
Court from such order, decree, or judgment, when such order, decree, or judgment
constitutes a final determination of the rights of the appellants, and the
appeal shall affect every order, decree, or judgment appealed from, and not
merely the interests which the appellants may have therein.

Passing now to the consideration of the merits of the question
raised in this appeal, it should be observed that, in accordance with section 29
of the said Code, a lawyer shall be entitled to have and recover from his client
no more than a reasonable compensation for the services rendered, with a view to
the importance of the subject matter of the controversy, the extent of the
services rendered, and the professional standing of the lawyer. But in such
cases the court shall not be bound by the opinion of lawyers as to the proper
compensation, but may disregard such testimony and base its conclusion on its
own professional knowledge. A written contract for services shall control the
amount of recovery if found by the court not to be unconscionable or
unreasonable.

In cases like the one at bar a written contract for
professional services is determinative of the amount to be charged as fees,
provided it is not unreasonable. (Early vs. Sy-Giang, 4 Phil., 727.) And even
where the parties have made a. written agreement as to the fee the courts have
the power to ignore the contract, if the amount fixed is unconscionable or
unreasonable, and reduce the fee to a reasonable amount. (Bachrach vs. Golingco,
39 Phil., 138.) And where there is no agreement as to the fee, the Courts of
First Instance have discretionary power to fix the lawyer’s fee in testate
proceedings pending before them. (Escueta vs. Sy-Juilliong, 5 Phil., 405; Piliin
vs. Jocson and Agoncillo, 41 Phil., 26.) And in any case, whether there is an
agreement or not, the courts can fix a reasonable compensation which lawyers
should receive for their professional services. In the case of Delgatdo vs. De la
Rama (43 Phil., 419) the circumstances to be considered in determining a
lawyer’s compensation were set down as follows: “The amount and character of the
services rendered; the labor, time, and trouble involved; the nature and
importance of the litigation or business in which the services were rendered;
the responsibility imposed; the amount of money or the value of the property
affected by the controversy or involved in the employment; the skill and
experience called for in the performance of the services; the professional
character and social standing of the attorney; the results secured, and whether
or not the fee is absolute or contingent, it being a recognized rule that an
attorney may properly charge a much larger fee when it is to be contingent than
when it is not. The financial ability of the defendant may also be considered by
the jury, not to enhance the amount above as reasonable compensation, but to
determine whether or not he is able to pay a fair and just compensation for the
services rendered, or as an incident in ascertaining the importance and gravity
of the interests involved in the litigation.”

We have carefully examined the various items of the statement
for professional fees submitted by counsel of Attorney Panis, and bearing in
mind the circumstances indicated in the case of Delgado vs. De la Rama, supra,
we are clearly of the opinion that the amount of P15,000 demanded by Attorney
Panis is exorbitant, and we hold that, for the work performed as described in
the aforesaid statement and particularly the character of the services rendered,
the time employed, and the value of the work done by the lawyer in the discharge
of his duty, said fees must be fixed at P5,000.

Wherefore, the order appealed from is modified, and we hold
that the fees to which Attorney Panis is entitled for services rendered in the
aforesaid intestate proceedings are hereby reduced to P5,000.

Without special pronouncement of costs. So ordered.

Avanceña, C. J., Johnson, Street, Malcolm, Johns, Ostrand, and
Romualdez, JJ., concur.