JOSE CASTILLO, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. ESTEBAN VALDEZ ET AL., DEFENDANTS AND APPELLANTS.

This action was instituted in the Court of First Instance of
Pangasinan by Jose Castillo against Esteban Valdez and others, for the
purpose of quieting title to a parcel of land covered by transfer
certificate of title No. 2483, containing an area of 39,432 square
meters, and located in the municipality of Rosales. At the time of the
institution of the action the plaintiff obtained a preliminary
injunction against the defendants to prevent them from disturbing the
plaintiff’s possession. The defendants answered with a general denial
and special defense, and, by way of counter-claim, alleged that the
plaintiff’s Torrens certificate of title is a nullity and asked that
the title to said land be declared to be in the estate of Francisca
Valdez, deceased, with damages. Upon hearing the cause the trial court
gave judgment in favor of the plaintiff, reaffirming plaintiff’s title
and declaring the preliminary injunction against the defendants
permanent, without costs.

The land which is the subject of this action formerly belonged to
Francisca Valdez, who on October 5, 1923, applied for the registration
of this parcel in connection with three others. The proceedings
followed the usual course, but on June 21, 1924, the applicant
Francisca Valdez died. The final decree for registration of the
property in her name was issued two days after her death, or on June
23, 1924; and thereafter, on July 16, 1924, the certificate of title
No. 27521 was issued in her name pursuant to said decree. Meanwhile, on
February 6, 1924, or about four and a half months before she died,
Francisca Valdez appears to have executed a deed of conveyance in favor
of Ulpiano Zambrano, for the parcel of land in question, including two
others. On March 7, 1924, Zambrano filed this deed for record under the
provisions of Act No. 2837. But Zambrano did not take any immediate
step in the way of intervening in the land registration proceedings;
and, as we have already shown, the certificate of registration was
issued in the name of Francisca Valdez on July 16, 1924. As Zambrano’s
deed was executed while the proceedings for registration were pending,
he was unable, after the certificate had been issued in favor of
Francisca Valdez, to obtain the transfer of the title without resorting
to the court. Accordingly, on October 27, 1924, he filed a petition in
the expediente in which the registration had been effected,
asking the court to direct the register of deeds to record his
conveyance from Francisca Valdez and to issue a transfer certificate of
title in his name. On November 1, 1924, the court denied this petition,
for the reason that the record did not show that notice of the petition
had been served on the heirs of Francisca Valdez. Two days thereafter
Zambrano filed an amended petition, asking for the same relief and, on
November 14, thereafter, he filed in support of his petition an
affidavit stating that his wife Rufina Abaya was, in his belief, the
only heir of Francisca Valdez. In response to this second petition and
the affidavit as stated, the court, on November 15, 1924, allowed the
petition of Zambrano and ordered the registration of the deed from
Francisca Valdez and the issuance of a transfer certificate of title to
Zambrano. On the same day the register of deeds issued transfer
certificate No. 2205 in favor of Zambrano, and about eight months
thereafter Zambrano sold the parcel covered by the certificate to the
plaintiff herein, Jose Castillo. The trial court found—and the point
appears not to be seriously questioned—that the plaintiff, Jose
Castillo, was a bona fide purchaser for value upon the faith
of the Torrens title. But his ownership is now questioned by the
defendants on the ground that the wife of Ulpiano Zambrano is not the
only heir of Francisca Valdez. On the contrary, her proper heirs appear
to be two brothers and a sister bearing the surname of Valdez. The
affidavit filed on November 14, 1924, by Ulpiano Zambrano was therefore
false in purporting to show that Zambrano’s wife was the only heir of
Francisca Valdez. For this reason it is insisted that the order of the
court of November 16, 1924, granting the petition of Zambrano and
ordering the issuance of the certificate of title to him is void,
because made without jurisdiction on the part of the court.

The petition which Zambrano first filed on October 27, 1924, and
later renewed on November 3, 1924, asking for the issuance of transfer
certificate of title in his own name, based upon the deed executed by
Francisca Valdez, was evidently filed pursuant to section 112 of the
Land Registration Act, which gives the court, among other things,
jurisdiction to hear and determine any matter relative to the title
arising or created pending the proceedings by which the property is
sought to be registered. But the provision granting this power is
qualified by the expression “after notice to all parties in interest.”
The contention made by the attorneys for the appellants is based
principally upon the force of these words; and the reasoning is that,
inasmuch as notice of the petition was not given to the proper heirs of
Francisca Valdez, the court had no power to grant the petition.

We are of the opinion that this contention is unsound. In dealing
with changes in interest pending registration proceedings, the court
exercises a quasi-administrative faculty, analogous to that which the
register of deeds exercises with respect to transfers effected after
registration takes place; and we are of the opinion that, upon an
affidavit showing that Zambrano’s wife was the only heir of Francisca
Valdez, the court had jurisdiction to authorize the transfer of the
certificate without requiring other persons, of whose existence the
court was not aware, to be served with notice. And, at any rate, it
must be borne in mind that the transfer was effected by the court,
which is the functionary clothed with the duty of recognizing the
transfer and authorizing the issuance of a new certificate. A purchaser
for value, who takes property upon the faith of the certificate so
issued, acquires a good title. Any other conclusion would be wholly
inconsistent with the spirit and purposes of the Land Registration Law.
Of course, so long as the property remains in the hands of the person
who has acquired title irregularly, he can be made to surrender the
certificate to be cancelled. But it is not so with an innocent
purchaser for value, as the trial court found the plaintiff in this
case to be.

For the reasons stated the judgment appealed from will be affirmed, and it is so ordered, with costs against the appellants.

Johnson, Malcolm, Ostrand, Romualdez and Villa-Real, JJ., concur.

---

DISSENTING

JOHNS, J.:

As the majority opinion says, the law expressly provides that
petitions like the one in question shall be heard by the court “after
notice to all parties in interest.” In the instant case, there is no
claim or pretense that any notice was ever given to any one of the
filing of the petition in question. It is admitted that it was at first
based upon an ex parte motion, which was then denied, and
later it was supplemented by the affidavit to the effect that the wife
of the petitioner was the only heir, and that upon the making and
filing of that affidavit the court, without notice to any one, then
made the order in question, and the record is conclusive that the
affidavit upon which the court based its order is false.

In other words, the order of the court was made without notice to
any one, and is based on a false affidavit, and it was by such an order
that the majority opinion says that the plaintiff was deprived of
valuable property rights and is left without any redress.

For such reasons, I am forced to dissent.